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This dissertation includes three essays. The first essay studies the effects of margin
requirements. The second essay studies how asymmetric information and imperfect
competition affect equilibrium illiquidity. The third essay derives new comparative
statics results for the distribution of portfolio payoffs.
Margin requirements have long been implemented in almost all financial markets
and are often used as an important regulatory tool for improving market conditions.
However, their economic impact beyond affecting default risk is still largely unknown.
The first essay proposes a tractable and flexible equilibrium model with and without
information asymmetry to examine how margin requirements on both long and short
stock positions affect asset prices, market volatility, market illiquidity and the welfare
of market participants. Most of my main results are obtained in closed-form. Contrary
to one of the main regulatory goals, I find that margin requirements can significantly
increase market volatility. In addition, margin requirements always increase market
illiquidity (as measured by price impact) and can lead to a greater return reversal
ii
exactly when they amplify market volatility. I also find that information asymmetry
may reverse or dampen the impact of margin requirements. Moreover, margin re-
quirements always make unconstrained investors worse off and can make constrained
investors better off. The model provides new testable implications.
The second essay proposes a novel and tractable equilibrium model to study how
information asymmetry, competition among market makers, and investors’ risk aver-
sion affect asset pricing, market illiquidity and welfare. The main innovation is that
market makers compete through choosing simultaneously quantities to buy at the bid
and to sell at the ask and accordingly market clears separately at the bid and at the
ask. Equilibrium bid and ask prices, bid and ask depths, trading volume and market
makers’ inventory levels are all derived in closed-form. Our model can help explain
some of the puzzling empirical findings, such as bid-ask spreads can be lower with
asymmetric information and can be positively correlated with trading volume. In ad-
dition, we find that information asymmetry may make informed investors worse off,
may reduce the welfare loss due to market power and may increase the competition
among market makers in equilibrium.
Hart(1975) proved the difficulty of deriving general comparative statics in port-
folio weights. Instead, in the third essay, we derive new comparative statics for the
distribution of payoffs: A is less risk averse than B iff A’s payoff is always distributed
as B’s payoff plus a non-negative random variable plus conditional-mean-zero noise.
If either agent has nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, the non-negative part can be
chosen to be constant. The main result also holds in some incomplete markets with
two assets or two-fund separation, and in multiple periods for a mixture of payoff
distributions over time (but not at every point in time).
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Chapter 1
So What Else Will Margin
Requirements Do?
“I guarantee you that if you want to get rid of the bubble, whatever it is, that [raising
margin requirements] will do it. My concern is that I am not sure what else it will
do.”
Greenspan, Sept. 24, 1996, Fed Policy Meeting
1.1 Introduction
In the wake of the 1929 Crash, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 gave the Fed-
eral Reserve System the authority to regulate margin requirements.1 Since then,
all investors must maintain centrally mandated minimum collateral for any short or
1Before 1934, each broker/firm followed its own custom in setting initial and minimum margin
requirements.
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leveraged long positions.2 Proponents argued that margin requirements would re-
duce market volatility and make market participants better off.3 In 2000, margin
loan reached a historically high level of $278 billion (2.9% of market capitalization4)
and stock market experienced dramatic increase in volatility. This rekindled the de-
bate about using margin requirements as an instrument for reducing market volatil-
ity. More recently, in response to significant financial market volatility surrounding
the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, many countries put short-sale
restrictions (a special form of margin requirements) on some listed securities. Propo-
nents of short-sales restrictions in 2008 cited lowering volatility as a justification for
such restrictions. Clearly, more stringent margin requirements would reduce margin
credit, stock trading, and default risk.5 However, whether more stringent margin
requirements would indeed reduce market volatility and under what conditions this
might happen are still unknown.6 Even less is known about what else margin re-
quirements can do to the market. For example, how do margin requirements affect
2Specifically, Regulation T of the Federal Reserve Banks determines the initial margin require-
ment for stock positions undertaken through brokers-dealers. Currently, the initial margin require-
ment is 50% for a long equity position and 150% for a short equity position. For a long position,
this means that an investor can only borrow up to 50% of the market value of the stock. For a short
position, 102% of the short sale proceeds must typically be held in cash as noted by Geczy et al.
(2002) and Duffie et al. (2002). The remaining 48% needed to cover the margin requirement can be
held in other securities such as U.S. Treasury Bills.
3Moore (1966) summarizes the discussion that transpired in the congressional hearings on margin
authority.
4Hardouvelis and Peristiani (1990) find that, in Japan, where data on margin trading are collected
regularly, margin trading represents approximately 20 percent of trading volume despite the fact
that margin accounts are, as in the United States, less than 2 percent of the capitalized value of the
country’s stock market. Therefore, even though the size of margin debt represents a small fraction
of the market capitalization, volatility can be very sensitive to the presence of margin accounts.
5As noted by Hardouvelis and Theodossiou (2002), some may argue that there are many innova-
tions in the market (e.g., futures and options), which may help circumvent the regulatory restrictions.
These financial innovations are usually costly for many investors who are constrained by margin re-
quirements since, for the purpose of buying stocks, margin loan is easier and cheaper transaction
than any other type of loan.
6See, for example, Ferris and Chance (1988), Schwert (1989), Hsieh and Miller (1990), Hardouvelis
(1990), Seguin (1990), and Kupiec (1998).
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market illiquidity? What is their impact on asset prices and the welfare of the market
participants?
In this paper, we propose a tractable and flexible equilibrium model with and
without asymmetric information to examine the impact of margin requirements (on
both long and short stock positions) on asset prices, market volatility, market illiq-
uidity and the welfare of market participants. We show that contrary to one of the
objectives of the regulators, margin requirements can significantly increase market
volatility. In addition, margin requirements always increase market illiquidity (as
measured by price impact) and can lead to a greater return reversal exactly when
they amplify market volatility. Furthermore, margin requirements can make all mar-
ket participants worse off even when they reduce market volatility. Interestingly,
margin requirements always make unconstrained investors worse off and can make
constrained investors better off.
More specifically, there are two types of investors, “liquidity demanders” and “liq-
uidity suppliers,” who can trade a risk-free asset and a risky asset (“stock”) on dates
0 and 1 and are both subject to margin requirements. Different from liquidity suppli-
ers, liquidity demanders are endowed with a non-traded asset (such as labor income)
whose payoff is correlated with the stock payoff.7 Therefore, liquidity demanders
have extra hedging demand for trading the stock due to the non-traded asset risk.
Under the assumption that stock price is equal to its conditional expected payoff, Di-
amond and Verrecchia (1987) show that binding short-sale constraints do not affect
7This is for expositional simplicity, in general, we only need that these two types of investors
have heterogenous endowment shocks. Endowment shocks have been modeled as a risk-sharing
motive to trade in various forms in market microstructure literature. See, for example, Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980), Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991), Wang (1994), O’Hara (2003), Bai, Chang and
Wang (2006), and Vayanos and Wang (2010).
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asset price conditional on the same public information because rational uninformed
agents take the constraints into account. In contrast, we show that consistent with
Miller (1977), Harrison and Kreps (1978), and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), binding
short margin requirements always increase stock price with and without asymmetric
information.8 The main difference from Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) is that in
our model all investors are risk averse and subject to short-sale constraints, while
in Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) risk neutral market makers are not subject to
short-sale constraints. Our findings of the impact of short margin requirements on
asset prices are strongly supported by extensive empirical evidence (e.g., Asquith,
Pathak and Ritter (2005), Boehme, Danielsen and Sorescu (2005), Chen, Hong and
Stein (2002), Jones and Lamont (2002) and Nagel (2005)). In addition, we show that
more stringent long margin requirements decrease the price. This is confirmed by
the empirical studies on the impact of long margin requirements on stock prices (e.g.,
Largay (1973), Eckardt and Rogoff (1976), Seguin (1990), Hardouvelis (1990), and
Hardouvelis and Peristiani (1992)).
We find that when margin requirements constrain liquidity demanders, they reduce
market volatility and lead to a smaller return reversal. However, when margin require-
ments constrain liquidity suppliers, they can significantly increase market volatility
and lead to a greater return reversal. Intuitively, binding long margin requirements
reduce purchases and thus drive price lower and binding short margin requirements
reduce sales and thus drive price higher. Therefore, if long margin requirements bind
when price is low and short margin requirements bind when price is high, then the
price fluctuation is amplified and market volatility is increased. Liquidity demanders
8For convenience, we refer to the constraints on borrowing (short selling) implied by the margin
requirements as the “long (short) margin requirement”.
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buy (sell) the stock when hedging demand is positive (negative) and drive the price
up (down). Thus, they buy when the stock price is high and sell when the stock price
is low. As the counterparty, liquidity suppliers sell when the stock price is high and
buy when the stock price is low. Therefore, if liquidity suppliers are constrained by
margin requirements, then market volatility is increased. Since in this case margin
requirements exacerbate the price fluctuation, the liquidity demanders’ trades on date
0 drive the price further away from intrinsic value, while the two coincide on date 1.
Therefore, margin requirements lead to a greater return reversal exactly when they
increase market volatility.
In addition, we show that with and without asymmetric information, even when
liquidity demanders are constrained by margin requirements, margin requirements
always increase market illiquidity as measured by the average price impact of an
exogenous additional trade. Intuitively, when margin requirements bind for some in-
vestors, the unconstrained investors have to absorb the entire additional trade and
thus require greater price change (in the right direction) to induce them to accom-
modate the extra trade.
Even when margin requirements do lower market volatility, we show that they can
make all market participants worse off, which suggests that volatility may not be a
good measure for welfare. More specifically, we show that binding margin require-
ments have an adverse price effect on unconstrained investors and have an adverse
quantity effect and a favorable price effect on constrained investors. The quantity
effect hurts constrained investors because they are restricted from trading the opti-
mal amount. The price effect hurts unconstrained investors and benefits constrained
investors. For example, short margin requirements reduce sales and thus increase
5
the equilibrium price. Therefore, short margin requirements hurt unconstrained in-
vestors who are buying and benefit constrained investors who are selling. Clearly,
margin requirements always make unconstrained investors worse off. Whether con-
strained investors are better or worse off depends on which effect dominates. If margin
requirements are stringent, then the quantity effect dominates, and therefore margin
requirements make constrained investors also worse off. If margin requirements are
not stringent, then the price effect dominates, and margin requirements make con-
strained investors better off. In some sense, margin requirements are like a cartel:
they protect constrained investors from competition with each other and allow con-
strained investors to enjoy favorable trading prices. In addition, we show that the
welfare gain of the constrained never exceeds the welfare loss of the unconstrained
and thus margin requirements always reduce the total welfare of the constrained and
the unconstrained.9
We further analyze how asymmetric information and default risk affect the impact
of margin requirements. All our main results still hold. Moreover, the presence of
asymmetric information can reverse, magnify or reduce the impact of margin require-
ments on market volatility.
Our model generates some policy implications. If regulators’ goal is to reduce
market volatility, then they may loosen long margin requirements and tighten short
margin requirements in declining markets. This would soften the downward pressure
on prices because less stringent long margin requirements encourage the technical
investors or more knowledgeable investors to enter the market and purchase stocks
and more stringent short margin requirements discourage the short sellers from selling
9The change in welfare depends on the choice of welfare function. A useful canonical choice of
welfare function is total surplus measured by taking the sum of certainty equivalent across agents.
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more shares of the stock when the prices are low, thus smoothing the decline in prices
and reducing volatility.10 On the other hand, volatility may be reduced if we tighten
long margin requirements and loosen short margin requirements in advancing markets.
In addition, our model implies that market volatility can also be reduced if we set less
stringent margin requirements for liquidity suppliers (e.g., market makers and hedge
funds) or encourage more participation of liquidity suppliers because it would be
more likely for liquidity demanders who are destabilizing investors to be constrained
by margin requirements. Since tightening margin requirements always reduce market
liquidity, policy makers need to balance any benefit from a lower volatility and the
cost of worse liquidity. If a higher volatility is not a big concern, then relaxing margin
requirements can increase market liquidity. Moreover, our paper also sheds lights on
how to determine the optimal margin requirements in practice. Margin requirements
should be determined by balancing the cost of restricting mutually beneficial trading
and the benefit of avoiding the default cost from potential systemic risk.
Our model also generates some unique testable empirical implications. (1) Market
volatility is reduced by long margin requirements that bind when the price is high and
by short margin requirements that bind when the price is low; (2) Market volatility is
increased by long margin requirements that bind when the price is low11 and by short
margin requirements that bind when the price is high; (3) If a stock is mainly owned
by liquidity suppliers ( e.g., market makers and hedge funds), then more stringent
10Seguin and Jarrell (1993) examine the relative return and volume behavior of marginable and
nonmarginable stocks during the October 1987 stock market crash, they find that the price declines
recorded by marginable securities were less severe (returns were 0.8% greater) than those recorded
by nonmarginable securities. Hardouvelis and Peristiani (1992) find that, in the Japanese stock
market, following a price decline, the authorities reduce long margin requirements and subsequently
prices rebound immediately.
11Moore (1966) finds that when the stock market has risen, margin loans are lower than if the stock
market had declined. This suggests that margin requirements may actually inhibit the stabilizing
influence of investors.
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margin requirements tend to reduce market volatility; (4) If a stock is mainly owned
by liquidity demanders ( e.g., portfolio insurers and individuals), then more stringent
margin requirements tend to increase market volatility. These unique implications
may explain why empirical analysis of the effect of margin requirements on market
volatility has been generally inconclusive. For example, a number of studies (e.g.,
Hardouvelis (1988, 1990), Hardouvelis and Peristinani (1989,1992)) find that margin
requirements indeed reduce stock price volatility. On the other hand, other studies
(e.g., Ferris and Chance (1988), Kupiec (1989), Schwert (1989), Hsieh and Miller
(1990)) find either no relationship or a positive relationship between margin require-
ments and market volatility. If we have data on stock ownership or data on which
stocks are binding at long or short margin requirements, then we can use a cross sec-
tional regression to study the relationship between margin requirements and market
volatility. Consistent with our prediction, Hardouvelis and Theodossiou (2002) find
that, following large declines in stock prices, more stringent long margin requirements
increase market volatility; and, following large increases in prices, more stringent long
margin requirements reduce market volatility.
On the theory side, Cuoco and Liu (2000) examine the impact of margin require-
ments on consumption choices and the cost of hedging contingent claims in a partial
equilibrium setting. G푎ˆrleanu and Pedersen (2010) derive a margin-adjusted asset
pricing model where securities’ required returns are characterized both by their betas
and their margins. Kupiec and Sharpe (1991) examine the impact of margin require-
ments on stock price volatility. They numerically illustrate that imposing binding
margin requirements can increase market volatility in one model and can decrease
it in a different model. In contrast, in this paper we show analytically that margin
8
requirements can increase or decrease market volatility without resorting to different
models. In addition, we also provide explicit sufficient conditions under which mar-
gin requirements increase or decrease market volatility. Our paper is also related to
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008), Rytchkokv (2009), and Huang and Wang (2010).
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) show that market liquidity and funding liquidity
are mutually reinforcing. They emphasize the importance of availability of funding
to risk neutral speculators and they show that margins can increase in price volatility
when financiers who set the margin cannot distinguish between fundamental shocks
and liquidity shocks. In contrast to our paper, they do not study the effect of margin
requirements on market depth and they assume an exogenous autoregressive condi-
tional heteroscedasticity of fundamental volatility. Rytchkokv (2009) studies theoret-
ical implications of time variation in long margin requirements. In contrast to our
paper, he finds that binding long margin constraints always decrease return volatility
and may improve market liquidity. Huang and Wang (2010) study the impact of par-
ticipation costs of liquidity suppliers on market liquidity. They show that lowering
the cost of supplying liquidity (e.g., relaxation of ex post margin constraints) can
lower market liquidity. Our paper is also related to the literature on borrowing and
short-sale constraints. For example, Yuan (2005) studies crises and contagion in an
economy with information asymmetry and borrowing constraints. Bai, Chang and
Wang (2006) study the impact of short-sale constraints on asset prices and market
volatility assuming only liquidity demanders are subject to short-sale constraints. In
their model, short-sale constraints can bind only when prices are low and therefore
the stock price volatility is always reduced with short-sale constraints in the absence
of asymmetric information. In addition, neither Yuan (2005) nor Bai, Chang and
9
Wang (2006) has examined the effect of margin requirements on the welfare of mar-
ket participants.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the basic
model. Section 1.3 solves the equilibrium in the absence of asymmetric information,
analyzes the effects of margin requirement on market illiquidity and the level and
volatility of stock return, and conducts the welfare analysis for both types of investors.
Section 1.4 solves the equilibrium in the presence of asymmetric information and
analyzes the effects of margin requirements. Section 1.5 verifies our main results in
the presence of default risk. Section 1.6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
1.2 The Model
In a one period setting, a continuum of investors with a total population mass of 1
can trade a risk-free asset and a risky asset (“stock”) on date 0 to maximize their
expected constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility from the terminal wealth on
date 1. There is a zero net supply for the risk-free asset and the risk-free interest rate
is normalized to 0. The total supply of the stock is 휃¯ shares and the date 1 payoff of
each share is 푉˜ = 푉¯ + 퐹˜ + 푢˜, where 푉¯ is a constant representing the publicly known
expected payoff, 퐹˜ is a zero-mean random variable that is realized on date 0 and
may be observed by some or all of the investors on date 0 and 푢˜ is an independent
zero-mean random variable that no one can observe before date 1.
Every investor is endowed with 휃¯ shares of the stock. There are two types of
investors: liquidity demanders (LD) with a population mass of 휔 ∈ [0, 1], and liquidity
suppliers (LS) with a population mass of 1− 휔. In addition to the stock, on date 0 a
10
liquidity demander is also endowed with 푋˜퐿퐷 units of a non-traded risky asset with
per-unit payoff of 푀˜ on date 1. We allow 푢˜ and 푀˜ to be correlated with a covariance
of 휎푢푀 . A liquidity supplier does not have any endowment of the non-traded asset,
i.e., 푋˜퐿푆 = 0.
12 Both liquidity demanders and liquidity suppliers are subject to
margin requirements when trading the stock.13 Specifically, let 휃푖 (푖 = 퐿퐷,퐿푆) be
the number of shares an investor holds in the stock. Then it must satisfy14
−푐푠휃¯ ≤ 휃푖 − 휃¯ ≤ 푐푏휃¯, 푖 = 퐿퐷,퐿푆 (1.1)
where 푐푠 ≥ 1 and 푐푏 ≥ 0. In other words, investors who are subject to margin require-
ments cannot borrow to buy more than 푐푏 times their collateral (휃¯) and cannot sell
more than 푐푠 times their collateral.
15 We refer to the constraints on short selling (bor-
rowing) implied by the margin requirements as the short (long) margin requirements
and use 푐푏 (푐푠) measuring the stringency of long (short) margin requirements.
For tractability, we assume that 퐹˜ , 푢˜, 푋˜퐿퐷 and 푀˜ are all zero-mean normally
distributed random variables with variances 휎2퐹 , 휎
2
푢, 휎
2
퐿퐷 and 휎
2
푀 , respectively. On
date 1, random variables 푢˜ and 푀˜ are realized and become publicly known.
12Assuming all investors have the same stock endowment is without loss of generality because
what matters is the total endowment of each type. Assuming some investors do not have non-traded
assets is only for expositional simplicity, because 푋˜퐿퐷 can be more or less than 푋˜퐿푆 (=0).
13As we assume a one-period setting, we do not incorporate maintenance margin requirements
in our model. Fortune (2003) has shown that maintenance margin requirements on equities rarely
come into play, only in the event of extreme price declines, and are therefore of minor relevance.
14As shown by Cuoco and Liu (2000), the standard margin requirement in the case of one risky
asset reduces to the form in (1.1). (1) is equivalent to say that margin requirements for long position
is 휃¯푃
(푐푏+1)휃¯푃
= 1
푐푏+1
and margin requirements for short position is 1 + 휃¯푃
(푐푠−1)휃¯푃
= 푐푠
푐푠−1
, where 푃 is
the equilibrium stock price at time 0, 푖.푒., to buy (푐푏 +1)휃¯ shares of stock at price 푃 on margin, we
need to put 휃¯푃 as collateral, to short sell (푐푠− 1)휃¯ shares of stock at price 푃 on margin, in addition
to the short-sale proceeds (푐푠 − 1)휃¯푃 , we also need to deposit 휃¯푃 as collateral. The current margin
requirement corresponds to 푐푏 = 1 and 푐푠 = 3 in our model.
15In contrast to Bai, Chang and Wang (2006), we assume all investors are subject to margin
requirements. As we show later, this modeling difference reverses some of the important findings in
Bai, Chang and Wang (2006).
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Let 푃 be the equilibrium price on date 0 of the stock. In the sequel, we first consider
the symmetric information case where 퐹˜ is observed by all investors on date 0 and
then examine the asymmetric information case where only the liquidity demanders
observe 퐹˜ on date 0.16 The information set of liquidity demanders on date 0 is given
by 퐼퐿퐷 = {푋˜퐿퐷, 퐹˜ , 푃}, and that of liquidity suppliers is given by 퐼퐿푆 = {퐹˜ , 푃} in
the symmetric information case and 퐼퐿푆 = {푃} in the asymmetric information case.
For 푖 ∈ {퐿퐷,퐿푆}, investor 푖’s problem is
max
휃푖
퐸[−푒−훿푊˜푖 ∣퐼푖], (1.2)
subject to the budget constraint
푊˜푖 = 휃¯푃 + 휃푖(푉˜ − 푃 ) + 푋˜푖푀˜, (1.3)
and the margin requirement (1.1), where 훿 > 0 is the absolute risk-aversion parameter.
With the substitution of (3.2) into (3.1), the investor’s problem becomes equivalent
to
max
휃푖
−푒훿휃푖(푃−푉¯ )+ 12 훿2(휃2푖 휎2푢+푋˜2푖 휎2푀+2휃푖푋˜푖휎푢푀 ) ×퐸[푒−훿휃푖퐹˜ ∣퐼푖], (1.4)
subject to the margin requirement (1.1).
In this incomplete economy, we consider the following competitive equilibrium (i.e.,
all investors are price takers)
Definition 1.1 A competitive equilibrium (휃퐿퐷, 휃퐿푆, 푃 ) is such that
16The case where only the liquidity suppliers observe 퐹˜ reduces to symmetric information case
because their trading will fully reveal the private information.
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1. 휃푖 (푖 ∈ {퐿퐷,퐿푆}) solves investor 푖’s problem (3.1); and
2. both the risk-free asset market and the stock market clear.
1.3 The Equilibrium under Symmetric Informa-
tion
In this section we examine the effect of margin requirements in the absence of in-
formation asymmetry. To this end, we divide this case into two subcases: with and
without margin requirements.
1.3.1 Symmetric Information without Margin Requirements
Let 푃 ∗푠0 denote the equilibrium price under symmetric information and without margin
requirements. In this case, an investor’s information set is 퐼퐿퐷 = 퐼퐿푆 = {퐹˜ , 푋˜퐿퐷, 푃 ∗푠0}.17
Therefore, for 푖 ∈ {퐿퐷,퐿푆}, investor 푖’s objective function is equivalent to
max
휃푖
−훿휃푖(푃 ∗푠0 − 푉¯ − 퐹˜ )−
1
2
훿2(휃2푖 휎
2
푢 + 푋˜
2
푖 휎
2
푀 + 2휃푖푋˜푖휎푢푀 ). (1.5)
The following proposition provides the equilibrium price and equilibrium stock
holdings.18
17Even though liquidity suppliers do not know the liquidity demanders’ endowment of the non-
traded asset, they can infer it from the equilibrium price and 퐹˜ .
18The proofs of all the analytical results in the text are relegated to the Appendix.
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Proposition 1.1 In the absence of asymmetric information and margin require-
ments, the date 0 equilibrium price of the stock is
푃 ∗푠0 = 푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 훿휎2푢휃¯ + 훿휔휎2푢퐷˜, (1.6)
and the equilibrium stock holdings are
휃∗퐿퐷푠 = 휃¯ + (1− 휔)퐷˜, 휃∗퐿푆푠 = 휃¯ − 휔퐷˜,
where 퐷˜ = −휎푢푀 푋˜퐿퐷
휎2푢
represents liquidity demanders’ hedging demand, 푖.푒., 퐷˜ is the
optimal number of shares a liquidity demander wants to buy on margin or sell to hedge
their risk from the non-traded asset and 휎푢푀
휎2푢
is the conditional (on 퐹˜ and 푋˜퐿퐷) beta
of the non-traded asset payoff (푀˜) with respect to the stock payoff (푉˜ ).
Proposition 1.1 implies that the equilibrium price increases with the expected
payoff (푉¯ + 퐹˜ ), decreases with the volatility of the payoff and the supply of the
stock. In addition, liquidity demanders’ hedging demand also impacts the equilibrium
price. In particular, suppose liquidity demanders have a positive endowment of the
non-traded asset, i.e., 푋˜퐿퐷 > 0. If the stock is negatively correlated with the non-
traded asset payoff, i.e., 휎푢푀 < 0, then liquidity demanders have positive hedging
demand (퐷˜ > 0) and they are willing to buy at a higher price to induce liquidity
suppliers to sell more so that liquidity demanders can hedge their risk from the non-
traded asset and thus the equilibrium price gets higher than the case without non-
traded asset (푋˜퐿퐷 = 0). As it is well known in the literature, equilibrium price
decreases with risk aversion, because the demand for the stock decreases as risk
aversion increases. Interestingly, the equilibrium price can increase with the risk
aversion in our model. This is because for liquidity demanders the risk from the
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non-traded asset may dominate the risk from the stock and thus they may be willing
to buy more shares of the stock to hedge the non-traded asset risk as they become
more risk averse.
We study market illiquidity using the price impact of some exogenous additional
trade (Kyle’s lambda). Suppose there is some extra exogenous trade 휀, the market
clearing condition becomes
휔휃∗퐿퐷푠 + (1− 휔)휃∗퐿푆푠 + 휀 = 휃¯. (1.7)
The equilibrium price of the stock becomes
푃 ∗푠0 = 퐹˜ + 푉¯ − 훿휎2푢휃¯ + 훿휔휎2푢퐷˜ + 훿휎2푢휀, (1.8)
and the price impact without margin requirements is
휆푠 =
∂푃 ∗푠0
∂휀
= 훿휎2푢. (1.9)
This implies that illiquidity increases in agents’ risk aversion and stock payoff
volatility.
1.3.2 Symmetric Information with Margin Requirements
Since both groups are subject to margin requirements, if the population weight of
liquidity demanders is very small, then the maximum number of shares that liquidity
demanders as a group can buy (sell) is always less than the maximum number of
shares that the liquidity suppliers as a group can sell (buy). For example, suppose
that there are 50 liquidity demanders and 200 liquidity suppliers, and each of them is
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endowed with 1 share of the stock. The current margin requirements imply that 푐푏 = 1
and 푐푠 = 3. Liquidity demanders as a group can buy on margin 50 shares and can sell
150 shares, while liquidity suppliers as a group can sell 600 shares and can buy on
margin 200 shares. Therefore, when the population weight of liquidity demanders is
very small, it is only possible for margin requirements to bind for liquidity demanders.
In general, depending on the population weight of liquidity demanders, there are four
different cases in equilibrium: margin requirements bind only for liquidity demanders,
margin requirements bind only for liquidity suppliers, only long margin requirements
can bind, and only short margin requirements can bind. Let 푃 ∗푠 denote the equilibrium
price under symmetric information and with margin requirements. Solving for the
equilibrium subject to the margin requirement (1.1), we have19
Proposition 1.2 1. if 휔 < min{ 푐푏
푐푏+푐푠
, 푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
}, then margin requirements can never
bind for liquidity suppliers but can bind for liquidity demanders, and the equi-
librium stock price is
푃 ∗푠 =
⎧⎨
⎩
푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 훿휎2푢휃¯ + 훿휔 푐푏1−휔휎2푢휃¯ 퐷˜ ≥ 푐푏1−휔 휃¯,
푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 훿휎2푢휃¯ + 훿휔휎2푢퐷˜ − 푐푠1−휔 휃¯ < 퐷˜ < 푐푏1−휔 휃¯,
푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 훿휎2푢휃¯ − 훿휔 푐푠1−휔휎2푢휃¯ 퐷˜ ≤ − 푐푠1−휔 휃¯;
2. if 휔 > max{ 푐푏
푐푏+푐푠
, 푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
}, then margin requirements never bind for liquidity de-
manders but can bind for liquidity suppliers, and the equilibrium stock price
is
푃 ∗푠 =
⎧⎨
⎩
푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 훿휎2푢휃¯ + 훿휎2푢퐷˜ − 훿(1− 휔) 푐푠휔 휎2푢휃¯ 퐷˜ ≥ 푐푠휔 휃¯,
푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 훿휎2푢휃¯ + 훿휔휎2푢퐷˜ − 푐푏휔 휃¯ < 퐷˜ < 푐푠휔 휃¯,
푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 훿휎2푢휃¯ + 훿휎2푢퐷˜ + 훿(1− 휔) 푐푏휔 휎2푢휃¯ 퐷˜ ≤ − 푐푏휔 휃¯;
19If 휔 = 푐푏
푐푏+푐푠
or 휔 = 푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
then one type of agents is binding in long margin requirements
while the other type of agents is binding in short margin requirements, the equilibrium price is
indeterminate. We assume that these two equalities are not true.
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Figure 1.1: Equilibrium Prices with and without Margin Requirements
The straight (resp. dashed) line denotes the equilibrium stock price with (resp. with-
out) margin requirements. The parameter values are 푉¯ = 3, 휃¯ = 1, 휎푢 = 0.4, 휎푀 =
0.4, 훿 = 1, 퐹˜ = 0.
3. if 푐푏
푐푏+푐푠
< 휔 < 푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
, then only long margin requirements can bind, and the
equilibrium stock price is
푃 ∗푠 =
⎧⎨
⎩
푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 훿휎2푢휃¯ + 훿휔 푐푏1−휔휎2푢휃¯ 퐷˜ ≥ 푐푏1−휔 휃¯,
푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 훿휎2푢휃¯ + 훿휔휎2푢퐷˜ − 푐푏휔 휃¯ < 퐷˜ < 푐푏1−휔 휃¯,
푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 훿휎2푢휃¯ + 훿휎2푢퐷˜ + 훿(1− 휔) 푐푏휔 휎2푢휃¯ 퐷˜ ≤ − 푐푏휔 휃¯;
4. if 푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
< 휔 < 푐푏
푐푏+푐푠
, then only short margin requirements can bind, and the
equilibrium stock price is
푃 ∗푠 =
⎧⎨
⎩
푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 훿휎2푢휃¯ + 훿휎2푢퐷˜ − 훿(1− 휔) 푐푠휔 휎2푢휃¯ 퐷˜ ≥ 푐푠휔 휃¯,
푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 훿휎2푢휃¯ + 훿휔휎2푢퐷˜ − 푐푠1−휔 휃¯ < 퐷˜ < 푐푠휔 휃¯,
푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 훿휎2푢휃¯ − 휔 푐푠1−휔훿휎2푢휃¯ 퐷˜ ≤ − 푐푠1−휔 휃¯.
Corollary 1.1 1. If long margin requirements are binding, then 푃 ∗푠0 ≥ 푃 ∗푠 ;
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2. If short margin requirements are binding, then 푃 ∗푠0 ≤ 푃 ∗푠 ;
3. If neither constraints are binding, then 푃 ∗푠0 = 푃
∗
푠 .
To help understand the results in Proposition 1.2, we define 휂푖퐿푆 = (1− 휔)푐푖휃¯ and
휂푖퐿퐷 = 휔푐푖휃¯, for 푖 ∈ {푏, 푠}. Then by (1.1), 휂푏퐿푆 represents the maximum number
of shares that liquidity suppliers as a group can buy-on-margin, whereas 휂푠퐿퐷 is the
maximum number of shares that the liquidity demanders as a group can sell. In
equilibrium the total number of shares bought on margin must be equal to the total
number of shares sold. So if 휂푏퐿푆 > 휂
푠
퐿퐷, then the long margin requirements never bind
for liquidity suppliers. Similarly if 휂푠퐿푆 > 휂
푏
퐿퐷, then the short margin requirements
never bind for liquidity suppliers. In this way, the comparisons of 휂푖퐿푆 and 휂
푗
퐿퐷, where
푖, 푗 ∈ {푏, 푠} and 푖 ∕= 푗, yield the four cases in this proposition.
The equilibrium prices reflect that when margin requirements are not binding then
the prices stay the same as the case without margin requirements. If long margin re-
quirements bind for an investor, then the equilibrium price decreases because the
demand is reduced. If short margin requirements bind for an investor, then the
equilibrium price increases because the sales are reduced. This finding implies that
in contrast to Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), imposing only short-sale constraints
would increase the expected equilibrium stock price. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987)
assume that all agents are risk neutral and the price is set to the conditional ex-
pectation of the payoff. Therefore, binding short-sale constraints do not affect asset
price conditional on the same public information because rational uninformed agents
take the constraints into account. In contrast, we show that consistent with Miller
(1977), Harrison and Kreps (1978), and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), binding short
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margin requirements always increase stock price. The main difference from Diamond
and Verrecchia (1987) is that in our model all investors are risk averse and subject to
short-sale constraints, while in Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) risk neutral market
makers are not subject to short-sale constraints.
Figure 1.1 illustrates this comparison of the equilibrium stock prices with and with-
out margin requirements for Cases 1-4 in Proposition 1.2. In Case 1, the population
weight of liquidity demanders is small and thus margin requirements can bind only
for liquidity demanders. More specifically, when hedging demand 퐷˜ ≤ −3.75, the
short margin requirements bind for liquidity demanders and when hedging demand
퐷˜ ≥ 1.25, the long margin requirements bind for liquidity demanders. In Case 2, the
population weight of liquidity suppliers is small and thus margin requirements can
bind only for liquidity suppliers. More specifically, when hedging demand 퐷˜ ≤ −1.25,
the long margin requirements bind for liquidity suppliers and when hedging demand
퐷˜ ≥ 3.75, the short margin requirements bind for liquidity suppliers. In Case 3 (
Case 4 ), long (short) margin requirements are more stringent than short (long) mar-
gin requirements and therefore only long (short) margin requirements can bind for
either liquidity demanders or liquidity suppliers.
As we can see from Figure 1.1, any binding long margin requirements always
reduce the equilibrium stock price and any binding short margin requirements always
increase the equilibrium stock price. More importantly, margin requirements bind
for liquidity demanders and liquidity suppliers at different prices. Specifically, short
margin requirements bind for liquidity demanders when the equilibrium price is low
but they bind for liquidity suppliers when the equilibrium price is high. Conversely,
long margin requirements bind for liquidity demanders when the equilibrium price is
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high but they bind for liquidity suppliers when the equilibrium price is low. Therefore,
in our model margin requirements can bind both when stock price is high and when
it is low, depending on the hedging demand and the relative wealth of investors. This
finding is consistent with empirical evidence and is the critical driving force of the
result that margin requirements can increase or decrease return volatility, as we will
show in the next section. In contrast, short-sale constraints as modeled in Bai et. al.
(2006) can only bind when stock price is low.
1.3.3 The Impact of Margin Requirements on the Expected
Price, Return Volatility and Market Illiquidity under
Symmetric Information
Since conditional on 퐹˜ and 푋˜퐿퐷, binding long margin requirements always decrease
stock price and binding short margin requirements always increase stock price, it is
interesting to investigate ex-ante (i.e., before the realizations of 퐹˜ and 푋˜퐿퐷) whether
margin requirements increase or decrease the expected equilibrium price. To this
extent, we have the following result:
Proposition 1.3 The expected date 0 stock price with and without margin require-
ments have the following relation:
퐸[푃 ∗푠 ] ≤ 퐸[푃 ∗푠0] if and only if 푐푏 ≤ 푐푠.
Corollary 1.2 퐸[푃 ∗푠 ] increases in 푐푏 and decreases in 푐푠.
Because long and short margin requirements have opposite effects on the equilib-
rium stock price, whether margin requirements increase or decrease the stock price
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depends on which constraint has a greater effect. By (1.1), if 푐푏 = 푐푠, then it is equally
likely for long and short margin requirements to be binding. Therefore, the effects of
long and short margin requirements cancel out in expectation and the expected stock
price remains the same with and without margin requirements. When 푐푏 < (>)푐푠, the
long (short) margin requirements are more likely to be binding and therefore margin
requirements tend to decrease (increase) the equilibrium stock price.
The result of Corollary 1.2 is also driven by the opposite effects of long and short
margin requirements. The result that 퐸[푃 ∗푠 ] increases in 푐푏 is consistent with ear-
lier empirical studies concentrated on the effect of long margin requirements on the
level of the market prices. For example, Largay (1973), Eckardt and Rogoff (1976),
Hardouvelis (1990), and Hardouvelis and Peristiani (1992) find that less stringent long
margin requirements (larger 푐푏) tend to increase stock prices. The result that 퐸[푃
∗
푠 ]
decreases in 푐푠 is consistent with most empirical studies which focus on the impact
of short-sale constraints on stock prices. For example, Asquith, Pathak and Ritter
(2005), Boehme, Danielsen and Sorescu (2005), Chen, Hong and Stein (2002), Jones
and Lamont (2002) and Nagel (2005) find that more stringent short-sale constraints
(smaller 푐푠) tend to increase stock prices.
Next we examine the effects of margin requirements on the volatility of stock
returns. In our set-up, we measure stock returns by the price differences. Then we
have:
Proposition 1.4 1. If 휔 < min{ 푐푏
푐푏+푐푠
, 푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
}, then margin requirements decrease
the volatility of stock returns on both date 0 and date 1, 푖.푒.,
푉 푎푟[푃 ∗푠−푃 ∗푠,−1] < 푉 푎푟[푃 ∗푠0−푃 ∗푠0,−1] 푎푛푑 푉 푎푟[푉˜−푃 ∗푠 ] < 푉 푎푟[푉˜ −푃 ∗푠0], (1.10)
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which implies that margin requirements lead to a smaller return reversal (less
negative stock return auto-covariance), 푖.푒.,
퐶표푣(푃 ∗푠0 − 푃 ∗푠0,−1, 푉˜ − 푃 ∗푠0) < 퐶표푣(푃 ∗푠 − 푃 ∗푠,−1, 푉˜ − 푃 ∗푠 ) < 0, (1.11)
where 푃 ∗푠,−1 and 푃
∗
푠0,−1 denote the equilibrium stock prices with and without
margin requirements before date 0, which are constants.20
2. If 휔 > max{ 푐푏
푐푏+푐푠
, 푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
}, then margin requirements increase the volatility of
stock returns on both date 0 and date 1, which implies that margin requirements
lead to a greater return reversal (more negative stock return auto-covariance).21
3. If min{ 푐푏
푐푏+푐푠
, 푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
} < 휔 < max{ 푐푏
푐푏+푐푠
, 푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
}, then margin requirements can
increase or decrease market volatility.
As illustrated in Figure 1.1, in Case 1, margin requirements can only bind for
liquidity demanders. From this Figure, we can see that, from left to right, 푃 ∗푠 −퐸[푃 ∗푠 −
푃 ∗푠0] crosses 푃
∗
푠0 only once
22 and from above. This implies that 푃 ∗푠−퐸[푃 ∗푠 −푃 ∗푠0] second-
order stochastically dominates 푃 ∗푠0 and therefore 푉 푎푟[푃
∗
푠 −푃 ∗푠,−1] < 푉 푎푟[푃 ∗푠0−푃 ∗푠0,−1].
More specifically, when liquidity demanders have positive hedging demand, to hedge
their non-traded asset risk, liquidity demanders want to buy more shares of the stock.
The positive hedging demand drives up the stock price. When the positive hedging
20More specifically, assuming agents are identical on date -1, and a fraction 휔 of agents receive
푋˜퐿퐷 units of non-traded risky asset on date 0, we solved the equilibrium prices on date -1 with and
without margin requirements in closed-form. We find that the equilibrium price on date -1 decreases
in the volatility of the amount of non-traded asset 휎2퐿퐷, risk aversion 훿, the absolute value of the
covariance between the payoff of stock and non-traded risky asset ∣휎푢푀 ∣, the volatility of stock payoff
휎푢, the volatility of the non-traded risky asset payoff 휎푀 , and the proportion of liquidity demanders
휔.
21The auto-covariance is negative because the liquidity demanders’ trades on date 0 drive the price
away from the stock’s intrinsic value (the equilibrium price when 푋˜퐿퐷 = 0), while the two coincide
on date 1.
22If 퐸[푃 ∗푠 ] = 퐸[푃
∗
푠0], then 푃
∗
푠 cross 푃
∗
푠0 over a line from above, we can pick any point on the line.
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demand is very large, long margin requirements bind for liquidity demanders when
stock price is high. On the other hand, if liquidity demanders have negative hedging
demand, and they want to sell more shares of the stock to hedge their risk. The
negative hedging demand drives down the stock price. When the negative hedging
demand is very large, short margin requirements bind for liquidity demanders when
stock price is low. Therefore, in this Scenario, the long margin requirements bind
and thus reduce price when the stock price is high and the short margin requirements
bind and thus increase price when the stock price is low. Margin requirements reduce
the overall fluctuation of the stock price and thus decrease market volatilities.
Conversely, in Case 2, margin requirements can only bind for liquidity suppliers.
From this Figure, we can see that, from left to right, 푃 ∗푠 −퐸[푃 ∗푠 −푃 ∗푠0] crosses 푃 ∗푠0 only
once and from below. This implies that 푃 ∗푠 −퐸[푃 ∗푠 −푃 ∗푠0] is second-order stochastically
dominated by 푃 ∗푠0 and therefore 푉 푎푟[푃
∗
푠 −푃 ∗푠,−1] > 푉 푎푟[푃 ∗푠0−푃 ∗푠0,−1]. More specifically,
liquidity demanders’ positive hedging demand drives up the stock price, and when
liquidity demanders buy a lot to hedge their risk, the short margin requirements can
bind for liquidity suppliers (who are selling) when the stock price is high. On the
other hand, the negative hedging demand drives down the stock price, and when
liquidity demanders sell a lot to hedge their risk, the long margin requirements can
bind for liquidity suppliers (who are buying) when the price is low. Therefore, in
this Scenario, the long margin requirements bind and thus reduce price when the
stock price is low and the short margin requirements bind and thus increase price
when the stock price is high. Contrary to one of the stated regulatory goals, margin
requirements can exacerbate the overall fluctuation of the stock price and thus increase
market volatilities.
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In Case 3, either the long margin requirements or the short margin requirements
bind both when stock price is low and when stock price is high (for different investors).
Therefore margin requirements have opposite effects on price volatility depending on
whether they bind in the high price region or in the low price region. Thus the
net effect of margin requirements in this case depends on the distribution of the
equilibrium price which is in turn determined by the distribution of the hedging
demand.
In our model, liquidity demanders are destabilizing traders since they are buying
when price is high and they are selling when price is low. Therefore, when margin
requirements bind for liquidity demanders, market volatility is reduced. Liquidity
suppliers in our model are like those technical investors or knowledgeable investors
who take positions that stabilize the market. They may buy on margin when they
think the prices are too low and they may short-sell when they think the prices are
too high. When they are constrained by margin requirements, market volatility is
increased.
In contrast, Bai, Chang and Wang (2006) show that short-sale constraints can
bind only when prices are low and the stock price volatility is always reduced with
short-sale constraints in the absence of asymmetric information. The main reason for
this difference is that we assume both liquidity demanders and liquidity suppliers are
subject to short margin requirements, while they assume only liquidity demanders are
subject to short-sale constraints. As we have shown that short margin requirements
have opposite impact on market volatility when they are binding for different type
of investors. Kupiec and Sharpe (1991) numerically illustrate that imposing binding
margin requirements can increase market volatility in one model and can decrease
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it in a different model. In contrast, in this paper we show analytically that margin
requirements can increase or decrease market volatility without resorting to different
models. In addition, we derive sufficient conditions under which margin requirements
increase or decrease market volatility. Specifically, if 휔 < min{ 푐푏
푐푏+푐푠
, 푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
}, then
margin requirements decrease market volatility. If 휔 > max{ 푐푏
푐푏+푐푠
, 푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
}, then margin
requirements increase market volatility.
Our finding may explain why empirical studies which focus on the impact of mar-
gin requirements on market volatility have been generally inconclusive (e.g., Ferris
and Chance (1988), Kupiec (1989,1998), Schwert (1989), Hsieh and Miller (1990),
Hardouvelis (1988, 1990)). In addition, our model generates some unique empirically
testable implications. For example, if we have data on which stocks are binding on
short margin requirements and we divide stocks into two groups: one with short mar-
gin requirements more likely binding at high prices and the other more likely binding
at low prices, then the volatilities of the stock returns in the first group are increased
while those in the second are decreased. Consistent with our prediction, Hardou-
velis and Theodossiou (2002) find that, following large declines in stock prices, more
stringent long margin requirements increase market volatility; and, following large
increases in prices, more stringent long margin requirements reduce market volatility.
Alternatively, our model predicts that, if a stock is mainly owned by liquidity suppliers
(e.g., market makers and hedge funds), then more stringent margin requirements tend
to reduce market volatility; and if a stock is mainly owned by liquidity demanders
(e.g., portfolio insurers and individuals), then more stringent margin requirements
tend to increase market volatility.
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If regulators’ goal is to reduce market volatility, then they may loosen long margin
requirements and tighten short margin requirements in declining markets. This would
soften the downward pressure on prices because less stringent long margin require-
ments encourage the technical investors or more knowledgable investors to enter the
market and purchase stocks and more stringent short margin requirements discourage
the short sellers to sell more shares of the stock when the prices are low, thus smooth-
ing the decline in prices and reducing volatility. On the other hand, volatility may
be reduced if we tighten long margin requirements and loosen short margin require-
ments in advancing markets. This would encourage short sellers to sell more shares
of the stock when the prices are high and discourage investors to buy more shares of
the stock, thus dampening the upward pressure on prices and reducing volatility. In
addition, our model implies that market volatility can also be reduced if we set less
stringent margin requirements for liquidity suppliers (e.g., market makers and hedge
funds) or encourage more participants of liquidity suppliers because it would be more
likely for liquidity demanders who are destabilizing investors to be constrained by
margin requirements.
We now examine how margin requirements affect market liquidity using the price
impact of some exogenous additional trade on date 0. We define Kyle’s lambda with
margin requirements, 휆푚푠 as the average price impact of per unit of the additional
trade, 휀. We have
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Proposition 1.5 1. Price impact with margin requirements 휆푚푠 =
⎧⎨
⎩
훿휎2푢
1−휔
(
1 + 휔푁(− 푐푠1−휔 휃¯ + 휀1−휔 )− 휔푁( 푐푏1−휔 휃¯ + 휀1−휔 )
)
휔 < min{ 푐푏푐푏+푐푠 ,
푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
},
훿휎2푢
휔
(
1 + (1− 휔)푁(− 푐푏휔 휃¯ − 휀휔 )− (1− 휔)푁( 푐푠휔 휃¯ − 휀휔 )
)
휔 > max{ 푐푏푐푏+푐푠 ,
푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
},
훿휎2푢
휔(1−휔)
(
휔 − 휔2푁( 푐푏1−휔 휃¯ + 휀1−휔 ) + (1− 휔)2푁(− 푐푏휔 휃¯ − 휀휔 )
)
푐푏
푐푏+푐푠
< 휔 < 푐푠푐푏+푐푠
,
훿휎2푢
휔(1−휔)
(
1− 휔 + 휔2푁(− 푐푠1−휔 휃¯ + 휀1−휔 )− (1− 휔)2푁( 푐푠휔 휃¯ − 휀휔 )
)
푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
< 휔 < 푐푏푐푏+푐푠
;
2. 휆푚푠 > 휆푠;
3. 휆푚푠 decreases in 푐푠 and 푐푏.
Proposition 1.5 implies that margin requirements always increase market illiquidity
measured by price impact of per unit of some extra exogenous trade. Intuitively, when
some investors are constrained by margin requirements, the unconstrained investors
need to absorb all the extra net demand. Therefore, unconstrained investors require
greater price change (in the right direction) to induce them to accommodate the extra
trade. In addition, Proposition 1.5 also implies that market liquidity decreases when
margin requirements become more stringent (smaller 푐푏 and 푐푠). Since tightening
margin requirements always reduce market liquidity, policy makers need to balance
any benefit from a possible lower volatility (when margin requirements constrain
liquidity demanders) and cost of worse liquidity.
1.3.4 Welfare Analysis under Symmetric Information
In this subsection, we analyze how margin requirements affect market participants’
welfare by comparing the expected utilities investors achieve in equilibrium with and
without margin requirements. We first define the “stringency” of margin requirements
as below:
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Figure 1.2: Certainty Equivalent Wealth Gain/Loss with Margin Requirements
The dashed (resp. thin solid) curve denotes the certainty equivalent wealth gain/loss
with margin requirements of liquidity demanders (resp. liquidity suppliers) and the
thick solid curve denotes the change in total surplus with margin requirements. The
parameter values are 푉¯ = 3, 휃¯ = 1, 휎푢 = 0.4, 휎푀 = 0.4, 훿 = 1, 퐹˜ = 0.
Definition 1.2 For any given hedging demand 퐷˜, margin requirements are stringent
for liquidity demanders if
푐푏 <
(1− 푤)2퐷˜
(1 + 푤)휃¯
표푟 푐푠 < −(1− 푤)
2퐷˜
(1 + 푤)휃¯
;
margin requirements are stringent for liquidity suppliers if
푐푏 < − 휔
2퐷˜
(2− 휔)휃¯ 표푟 푐푠 <
휔2퐷˜
(2− 푤)휃¯ .
Proposition 1.6 1. Binding margin requirements always hurt the unconstrained
investors;
2. Stringent margin requirements hurt the constrained investors;
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3. Binding but not stringent margin requirements benefit constrained investors.
Binding margin requirements have a price effect on the unconstrained investors
and have two opposite effects on the constrained investors, a quantity effect and a
price effect. The quantity effect hurts the constrained investors because they are
restricted from trading the optimal amount. The price effect hurts unconstrained
investors and benefits constrained investors. This is because margin requirements
always move the price in favor of the constrained investors. For example, short
margin requirements reduce sales and thus increase the equilibrium price. Therefore
they hurt unconstrained investors who are buying and benefit constrained investors
who are selling. Thus, somewhat surprisingly, binding margin requirements always
make unconstrained investors worse off and may make the constrained investors better
off. Whether constrained investors are better or worse off depends on which effect
dominates. If margin requirements are stringent, then the quantity effect dominates,
and therefore constrained investors are also worse off. If margin requirements are not
stringent, then the price effect may dominate, and thus constrained investors may be
better off. In some sense, margin requirements are like a cartel: constrained investors
are protected from competition with each other and thus enjoy better trading prices.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the certainty equivalent wealth gain/loss with margin require-
ments as a function of hedging demand 퐷˜ for liquidity demanders (dashed curve) and
liquidity suppliers (thin solid curve) for Cases 1-4 in Proposition 1.2.23 As we can see
from the graph, in Case 1, liquidity suppliers are never better off. When hedging de-
mand is large (for 퐷˜ > 1.9, or 퐷˜ < −5.6), liquidity demanders are also worse off. This
23The certainty equivalent wealth is defined to be the extra initial wealth required for an investor
to be indifferent between facing margin requirements or not.
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figure also shows that liquidity demanders can be better off with margin requirements
if and only if the hedging demand is neither too small nor too large. Intuitively, if the
hedging demand is too small, then margin requirements do not bind. As the hedging
demand increases to a certain level, margin requirements start to bind. At this point
the price effect dominates and therefore liquidity demanders are better off. As we
discussed before, when margin requirements reduce too much hedging, the quantity
effect dominates and therefore liquidity demanders become worse off. In contrast, in
Case 2, liquidity demanders are never better off. When hedging demand is large (for
퐷˜ > 5.6, or 퐷˜ < −1.9), liquidity suppliers are also worse off. Liquidity suppliers are
better off if 퐷˜ is neither too small nor too large.
Theorem 1 Under symmetric information, imposition of margin requirements is
Pareto-dominated by some lump-sum transfer from unconstrained investors to con-
strained investors.
Corollary 1.3 Under symmetric information, any binding margin requirements re-
duce market participants’ total welfare measured using certainty equivalents.
Intuitively, when margin requirements are binding, the marginal rates of substitu-
tion differ across investors in equilibrium, which implies that the equilibrium is Pareto
suboptimal. Therefore there exists a redistribution of wealth that Pareto-dominates
the imposition of margin requirements. In the case when constrained investors are
better off with margin requirements, this implies that the welfare gain (measured
by certainty equivalent wealth increase) of the constrained investors is insufficient to
offset the welfare loss of the unconstrained investors. In this sense, the imposition of
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margin requirements is always socially suboptimal. The thick solid curve in Figure
1.2 illustrates the change of total welfare with margin requirements measured using
certainty equivalents. As we can see from the graph, any binding margin requirements
always reduce the total welfare.
1.4 The Equilibrium under Asymmetric Informa-
tion
We now consider the impact of information asymmetry on the above analysis. Specif-
ically, we assume that 퐹˜ and 푋˜퐿퐷 are private information to the liquidity demanders
who trade for both risk-sharing and private information.24 We first look at the bench-
mark case, the equilibrium without margin requirements.
1.4.1 Asymmetric Information without Margin Requirements
To understand how equilibrium price may depend on the state variables, it is helpful
to first derive the optimal demand of the liquidity demanders which is the same as in
the symmetric information case,
휃∗퐿퐷푎 =
푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 훿휎푢푀푋˜퐿퐷 − 푃 ∗푎0
훿휎2푢
. (1.12)
Other market participants can only observe 휃∗퐿퐷푎 and accordingly the equilibrium price
can only depend on 푆˜ ≡ 1
2
(
퐹˜ − 훿휎푢푀푋˜퐿퐷
)
. Thus we conjecture that there exists an
equilibrium where the equilibrium stock price depends on 퐹˜ and 푋˜퐿퐷 only through 푆˜.
24The case where the liquidity suppliers are informed is reducible to the case with symmetric
information because the liquidity demanders can fully back out the private information from the
market price.
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Let 푃 ∗푎0 denote the equilibrium price with asymmetric information but without margin
requirements. The information sets for liquidity demanders and liquidity suppliers
are respectively 퐼퐿퐷 = {퐹˜ , 푋˜퐿퐷, 푃 ∗푎0} and 퐼퐿푆 = {푃 ∗푎0}. We have
Proposition 1.7 With asymmetric information but without margin requirements,
there exists an equilibrium where the equilibrium price is
푃 ∗푎0 = 푉¯ + 퐴2푆˜ − 퐵2휃¯, (1.13)
The liquidity demanders and liquidity suppliers’ optimal stock demands are
휃∗퐿퐷푎 = 휃¯ + (1− 휔)푎1(푆˜ +
1
2
훿휎2퐹 휃¯), 휃
∗
퐿푆푎 = 휃¯ − 휔푎1(푆˜ +
1
2
훿휎2퐹 휃¯), (1.14)
where 퐴2 > 0, 퐵2 > 0, 푎1 > 0 and 푏1 > 1 are constants defined in (1.36)-(1.37) in
the Appendix.
Since 퐴2 > 0 and 퐵2 > 0, the equilibrium price increases with the combined
demand of liquidity demanders and decreases with the stock supply. In addition, while
liquidity demanders’ optimal stock holding increases with 푆˜, the liquidity suppliers’
demand decreases with 푆˜ because of the increase in the equilibrium price.
As in the symmetric information case, we study market illiquidity using the price
impact of some exogenous additional trade (Kyle’s lambda). Suppose there is some
extra exogenous trade 휀, the market clearing condition becomes
휔휃∗퐿퐷푎 + (1− 휔)휃∗퐿푆푎 + 휀 = 휃¯. (1.15)
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The market lambda without margin requirements in the presence of asymmetric in-
formation,
휆푎 =
푃 ∗푎0
∂휀
= 훿휎2푢
⎛
⎝1 + 1− 휔
휔 +
(
1
훿2휎2푢푀휎
2
퐿퐷
+ 1
휎2퐹
)
휎2푢
⎞
⎠ . (1.16)
This implies that 휆푎 increases in 휎
2
푢, 휎
2
퐹 , 휎푢푀 , 휎퐿퐷, and 훿, and decreases in 휔.
Next we examine the effect of information asymmetry on the expected equilibrium
price. We have:
Proposition 1.8 Asymmetric information reduces the expected equilibrium stock price,
i.e., 퐸[푃 ∗푎0] ≤ 퐸[푃 ∗푠0].
The presence of asymmetric information decreases the expected stock price because
investors require a higher risk premium for trading the stock.
Letting 휉 = 퐷˜
퐹˜+훿휎2퐹 휃¯
, 푖.푒., 휉 is the ratio between liquidity demanders’ trading due
to hedging demand to the trading due to private information. We have:
Proposition 1.9 In the absence of margin requirements, liquidity demanders are
worse off in the presence of asymmetric information if
휉 > 퐶1 표푟 휉 < −퐶2, (1.17)
where 퐶1 > 0 and 퐶2 > 0 are constants and defined in (1.39) in Appendix.
25
25Clearly, liquidity suppliers can also be worse off in the presence of asymmetric information in
certain states.
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To understand the intuition behind Proposition 1.9, we consider those states when
퐹˜ > −훿휎2퐹 휃¯. From Propositions 1.1 and 1.7, for any 퐹˜ , if 휉 > 퐶1, 푖.푒., the hedging
demand is very large, then the equilibrium stock price is higher with asymmetric
information. This is because, observing a large combined demand, liquidity suppliers
rationally attribute some of the trade due to hedging demand to the trade due to
private information and therefore they are willing to sell the stock only at a higher
price, 푖.푒., 푃 ∗푎0 > 푃
∗
푠0. Consequently, liquidity demanders will optimally buy less shares
of the stock due to the higher stock price and they are worse off with asymmetric
information. Conversely, if 휉 < −퐶2, then liquidity demanders are worse off with
asymmetric information because they sell less shares than in the case with symmetric
information due to the lower stock price.
Proposition 1.10 Asymmetric information increases the variance of the stock re-
turn on date 1 and the total variance of the stock returns on date 0 and 1, 푖.푒.,
푉 푎푟[푉˜ − 푃 ∗푎0] > 푉 푎푟[푉˜ − 푃 ∗푠0],
푉 푎푟[푃 ∗푎0 − 푃 ∗푎0,−1] + 푉 푎푟[푉˜ − 푃 ∗푎0] > 푉 푎푟[푃 ∗푠0 − 푃 ∗푠0,−1] + 푉 푎푟[푉˜ − 푃 ∗푠0],
which implies that asymmetric information leads to a greater return reversal (more
negative stock return auto-covariance), 푖.푒., 퐶표푣(푃 ∗푎0 − 푃 ∗푎0,−1, 푉˜ − 푃 ∗푎0) < 퐶표푣(푃 ∗푠0 −
푃 ∗푠0,−1, 푉˜ − 푃 ∗푠0) < 0, where 푃 ∗푎0,−1 and 푃 ∗푠0,−1 denote the equilibrium stock prices with
and without asymmetric information before date 0, which are constants.
Because liquidity suppliers can only observe 푆˜ in the presence of asymmetric in-
formation, they rationally attribute some hedging motivated trades to information
motivated ones and vise versa. Therefore, comparing to the case with symmetric
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information, for a given shock in 퐹˜ , the equilibrium return on date 0, (푃 ∗푎0 − 푃 ∗푎0,−1)
changes less, and for a given shock in 푋˜퐿퐷, the equilibrium return on date 0 changes
more. This implies that the date 0 return is less sensitive to 퐹˜ and more sensitive to
푋˜퐿퐷 and therefore the date 0 return volatility may increase or decrease with asym-
metric information, depending on which effect dominates. Since the date 1 stock price
is equal to 푉˜ = 푉¯ + 퐹˜ + 푢˜, the date 1 return 푉˜ −푃 ∗푎0 is more sensitive to both 퐹˜ and
푋˜퐿퐷 and therefore the date 1 return volatility always increases with asymmetric in-
formation. The total variance also increases with asymmetric information because the
volatility reduction due to the decreased sensitivity of date 0 return to 퐹˜ is dominated
by the sum of the volatility increase due to the increased sensitivity of date 0 and date
1 returns to 푋˜퐿퐷 and the increased sensitivity of date 1 return to 퐹˜ . This is similar
to the main result of Wang (1993), which uses a dynamic asset-pricing model under
asymmetric information and also finds that information asymmetry among investors
can increase price volatility and negative auto-covariance in returns.
1.4.2 Asymmetric Information with Margin Requirements
In this subsection, we examine the effect of margin requirements in the presence of
asymmetric information. In the presence of margin requirements, it is easy to show
that a liquidity demander’s optimal stock demand is:
휃∗퐿퐷푎 = min
{
max
[
푉¯ + 2푆˜ − 푃 ∗푎
훿휎2푢
,−(푐푠 − 1)휃¯
]
, (푐푏 + 1)휃¯
}
, (1.18)
and a liquidity supplier’s optimal stock demand is:
휃∗퐿푆푎 = min
⎧⎨
⎩max
⎡
⎣ 푉¯ + 퐸[퐹˜ ∣푆˜]− 푃 ∗푎
훿
(
휎2푢 + 푉 푎푟[퐹˜ ∣푆˜]
) ,−(푐푠 − 1)휃¯
⎤
⎦ , (푐푏 + 1)휃¯
⎫⎬
⎭ , (1.19)
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where 푃 ∗푎 denotes the equilibrium stock price with asymmetric information and mar-
gin requirements. When liquidity demanders are constrained, there may be multiple
equilibria, in this section, we focus on one type of equilibrium,26 under which the
equilibrium stock price is an affine function of 푆˜, as in the case without margin
requirements.27
We summarize this equilibrium in the following proposition:
Proposition 1.11 In the presence of asymmetric information, there are four cases:
(1) if 휔 < min{ 푐푏
푐푏+푐푠
, 푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
}, then margin requirements can never bind for liquidity
suppliers but can bind for liquidity demanders, and the equilibrium stock price is
푃 ∗푎 =
⎧⎨
⎩
푉¯ + 퐴1푆˜ − 퐵1휃¯ + 휔푐푏1−휔퐵1휃¯ 푆˜ ≥ 푆∗퐿퐷1,
푉¯ + 퐴2푆˜ − 퐵2휃¯ 푆∗퐿퐷2 < 푆˜ < 푆∗퐿퐷1,
푉¯ + 퐴1푆˜ − 퐵1휃¯ − 휔푐푠1−휔퐵1휃¯ 푆˜ ≤ 푆∗퐿퐷2;
(2) if 휔 > max{ 푐푏
푐푏+푐푠
, 푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
}, then margin requirements can never bind for liquidity
demanders but can bind for liquidity suppliers, and the equilibrium stock price is
푃 ∗푎 =
⎧⎨
⎩
푉¯ + 2푆˜ − 훿휎2푢휃¯ − (1−휔)푐푠휔 훿휎2푢휃¯ 푆˜ ≥ 푆∗퐿푆1,
푉¯ + 퐴2푆˜ − 퐵2휃¯ 푆∗퐿푆2 < 푆˜ < 푆∗퐿푆1,
푉¯ + 2푆˜ − 훿휎2푢휃¯ + (1−휔)푐푏휔 훿휎2푢휃¯ 푆˜ ≤ 푆∗퐿푆2;
26There may exist another type of equilibrium, under which the equilibrium stock price is an affine
function of 푆˜ in certain region and independent on 푆˜ beyond that region as in Bai, Chang and Wang
(2006). There seems to be no closed-form solution in this case, but all the numerical results are
consistent with the main results of the equilibrium we focus on in this section. Detailed analysis of
this case is available from the author.
27Implicitly we assume that there is an auctioneer to whom all investors submit their optimal
orders disregarding the existence of margin requirements and then the their optimal demand is
censored by the margin requirements.
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(3) if 푐푏
푐푏+푐푠
< 휔 < 푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
, then only long margin requirements can bind, and the
equilibrium stock price is
푃 ∗푎 =
⎧⎨
⎩
푉¯ + 퐴1푆˜ − 퐵1휃¯ + 휔푐푏1−휔퐵1휃¯ 푆˜ ≥ 푆∗퐿퐷1,
푉¯ + 퐴2푆˜ − 퐵2휃¯ 푆∗퐿푆2 < 푆˜ < 푆∗퐿퐷1,
푉¯ + 2푆˜ − 훿휎2푢휃¯ + (1−휔)푐푏휔 훿휎2푢휃¯ 푆˜ ≤ 푆∗퐿푆2;
(4) if 푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
< 휔 < 푐푏
푐푏+푐푠
, then only short margin requirements can bind, and the
equilibrium stock price is
푃 ∗푎 =
⎧⎨
⎩
푉¯ + 퐴1푆˜ −퐵1휃¯ − 휔푐푠1−휔퐵1휃¯ 푆˜ ≤ 푆∗퐿퐷2,
푉¯ + 퐴2푆˜ −퐵2휃¯ 푆∗퐿퐷2 < 푆˜ < 푆∗퐿푆1,
푉¯ + 2푆˜ − 훿휎2푢휃¯ − (1−휔)푐푠휔 훿휎2푢휃¯ 푆˜ ≥ 푆∗퐿푆1.
where 푆∗퐿퐷1, 푆
∗
퐿퐷2, 푆
∗
퐿푆1, 푆
∗
퐿푆2, 퐴1, 퐵1, 퐴2, and 퐵2 are constants defined in (1.48)-
(1.52) and (1.36) in Appendix.
푆∗퐿퐷1 (resp. 푆
∗
퐿퐷2 ) is the critical point at which the long (resp. short) margin
requirements start to bind for liquidity demanders. Similarly, 푆∗퐿푆1 (resp. 푆
∗
퐿푆2) is
the critical point at which the short (resp. long) margin requirements start to bind
for liquidity suppliers. As in Proposition 1.2, the comparisons of 휂푖퐿푆 and 휂
푗
퐿퐷, where
푖, 푗 ∈ {푏, 푠} and 푖 ∕= 푗, yield the four cases in this proposition. Since 퐴1 < 퐴2 < 1,
Proposition 1.11 suggests that even though the equilibrium price is always informa-
tive about the state variable 푆˜, it becomes less sensitive when margin requirements
bind for liquidity demanders and more sensitive when margin requirements bind for
liquidity suppliers. This proposition also implies that, as in the symmetric informa-
tion case, long margin requirements tend to decrease the equilibrium price and short
margin requirements tend to increase it. Figure 1.3 illustrates the comparison of the
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Figure 1.3: Equilibrium Prices with and without Margin Requirements in the presence
of Asymmetric Information
The solid (resp. dashed) line denotes the equilibrium stock price with (resp. without)
margin requirements. The parameter values are 푉¯ = 3, 휃¯ = 1, 휎푢 = 0.4, 휎푀 = 0.4, 훿 =
1, 휎퐿퐷 = 0.6, 휎퐹 = 0.2, 휎푢푀 = 0.4.
equilibrium stock prices with and without margin requirements for Cases (1)-(4) in
Proposition 1.11. For example, in Case (1), when 푆˜ ≤ −0.5, the short margin re-
quirements bind for liquidity demanders and thus the equilibrium price is higher with
margin requirements. On the other hand, if 푆˜ ≥ 0.15, then long margin requirements
bind for liquidity demanders and thus the equilibrium price is lower. Figure 1.3 shows
that, as in the symmetric information case, short margin requirements bind for liquid-
ity demanders when the equilibrium price is low and bind for liquidity suppliers when
the equilibrium price is high. Similarly, long margin requirements bind for liquidity
demanders when the equilibrium price is high and bind for liquidity suppliers when
the equilibrium price is low.
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1.4.3 The Impact of Margin Requirements on the Expected
Stock Price, Return Volatility and Market Illiquidity
We now examine the impact of margin requirements on the initial expected stock
price under asymmetric information. We have the following results:
Proposition 1.12 Under asymmetric information, the expected date 0 stock price
with and without margin requirements have the following relation:
퐸[푃 ∗푎 ] < 퐸[푃
∗
푎0] if and only if 푐푏 < 푐푠 + 푑,
where 푑 > 0 when 휔 < min{ 푐푏
푐푏+푐푠
, 푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
}, 푑 < 0 when 휔 > max{ 푐푏
푐푏+푐푠
, 푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
}, and
푑 = 0 when 푐푏
푐푏+푐푠
< 휔 < 푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
, and 푑 is defined in (1.54) in the Appendix.
Corollary 1.4 퐸[푃 ∗푎 ] increases in 푐푏 and decreases in 푐푠.
The basic intuition of Proposition 1.12 is the same as that of Proposition 1.3 in
symmetric information case. The two propositions differ in the thresholds for 푐푏 − 푐푠
in Part (1). In symmetric information case 푑 = 0 and we combine the three cases.
From margin requirements (1.1), when 푐푏 = 푐푠 + 푑, it is equally likely for the long
and short margin requirements to be binding, and therefore the equilibrium prices
with and without margin requirements are the same, where 푑 > 0 for the case when
margin requirements can only bind for liquidity demanders and 푑 < 0 for the case
when margin requirements can only bind for liquidity suppliers. The intuition is
as follows. From Proposition 1.7, the expected net trade for liquidity demanders,
퐸[휃∗퐿퐷푎 ]− 휃¯ > 0, and the expected net trade for liquidity suppliers, 퐸[휃∗퐿푆푎 ]− 휃¯ < 0.
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Liquidity suppliers require a higher risk premium to hold the stock. Therefore, ex-
ante, in the presence of asymmetric information, liquidity demanders are buying and
liquidity suppliers are selling.
Next we examine whether margin requirements reduce or increase the volatility of
stock return in the presence of asymmetric information. We have
Proposition 1.13 1. If margin requirements can only bind for liquidity deman-
ders, then margin requirements reduce the volatility of the initial equilibrium
stock return, 푖.푒., 푉 푎푟[푃 ∗푎 − 푃 ∗푎,−1] < 푉 푎푟[푃 ∗푎0 − 푃 ∗푎0,−1], where 푃 ∗푎,−1 and 푃 ∗푎0,−1
denote the equilibrium stock prices with and without margin requirements before
date 0, which are constants. In addition, if 퐴1 > 1,
28 then margin requirements
also reduce the total variance of stock returns on dates 0 and 1, 푖.푒.,
푉 푎푟[푃 ∗푎 − 푃 ∗푎,−1] + 푉 푎푟[푉˜ − 푃 ∗푎 ] < 푉 푎푟[푃 ∗푎0 − 푃 ∗푎0,−1] + 푉 푎푟[푉˜ − 푃 ∗푎0],
which implies that margin requirements lead to a smaller return reversal (less
negative stock return auto-correlation),푖.푒., 퐶표푣(푃 ∗푎0−푃 ∗푎0,−1, 푉˜−푃 ∗푎0) < 퐶표푣(푃 ∗푎−
푃 ∗푎,−1, 푉˜ − 푃 ∗푎 ) < 0;
2. If margin requirements can only bind for liquidity suppliers, then margin require-
ments increase the volatility of the date 0 stock return, in addition, if 퐴2 > 1,
then margin requirements also increase the total variance of stock returns on
dates 0 and 1;
3. If margin requirements can bind for both liquidity demanders and liquidity sup-
pliers, then margin requirements can increase or decrease market volatility.
28Although we are not able to prove that the total variance is also reduced even when 퐴1 ≤ 1, all
our numerical results suggest that this is likely to be true.
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Figure 1.4: The Percentage Volatility Changes with Margin Requirements with and
without Asymmetric Information
The dashed (resp. solid) curve denotes the percentage volatility changes with margin
requirements with (resp. without) asymmetric information. The parameter values
are 푉¯ = 3, 휃¯ = 1, 휎푢 = 0.4, 휎푀 = 0.4, 훿 = 1, 휎퐿퐷 = 0.6, 휎퐹 = 0.2, 휎푢푀 = 0.4, 푐푠 =
3, 푐푏 = 1.
Proposition 1.13 shows that the presence of asymmetric information does not
change the conclusion that margin requirements may increase or decrease market
volatility. More specifically, market volatility increases when short margin require-
ments bind at high prices or when long margin requirements bind at low prices. Con-
versely, market volatility decreases when short margin requirements bind at low prices
or when long margin requirements bind at high prices. However, margin requirements
may have a smaller impact on market return volatility in the presence of asymmetric
information. Figure 1.4 illustrates the difference of the percentage volatility changes
due to margin requirements with and without asymmetric information. The dashed
curve denotes the percentage volatility change ((푉 푎푟[푃 ∗푎 ]− 푉 푎푟[푃 ∗푎0])/푉 푎푟[푃 ∗푎0]) due
to margin requirements with asymmetric information, and the solid curve denotes the
percentage volatility change ((푉 푎푟[푃 ∗푠 ]− 푉 푎푟[푃 ∗푠0])/푉 푎푟[푃 ∗푠0]) due to margin require-
ments with symmetric information. As we can see from the graph, in the example, in
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the case when margin requirements increase market volatility with and without asym-
metric information (for 0.55 < 휔 < 1), market volatility increase less in the presence
of asymmetric information. Similarly, in the case when margin requirements decrease
market volatility with and without asymmetric information (for 0 < 휔 < 0.39), mar-
ket volatility decreases less in the presence of asymmetric information. Intuitively, as
the degree of information asymmetry measured by 휎퐹 increases, the adverse selection
problem becomes more severe and liquidity demanders may buy less or sell less due to
the price pressure. For example, suppose liquidity demanders optimally buy shares
on margin, if 휎퐹 is large, then liquidity suppliers optimally attribute more of the
combined demand to the private information about stock payoff and thus liquidity
suppliers are only willing to sell their shares at a higher price. Liquidity demanders
optimally buy less on margin because of this adverse price impact. Therefore, margin
requirements may become less likely to bind and have a smaller impact on market
volatility with asymmetric information.
Interestingly, margin requirements may have opposite effect on market volatility
with and without asymmetric information. In addition, margin requirements may
also have a larger impact on volatility in the presence of asymmetric information. In
our example with 푐푏 = 1 and 푐푠 = 3, when 0.43 < 휔 < 0.55, margin requirements
decrease market volatility with asymmetric information while they increase market
volatility with symmetric information. For 0.39 < 휔 < 0.43, margin requirements
decrease more of the market volatility with asymmetric information. The intuition is
as following. With 푐푏 < 푐푠, only long margin requirements can bind for either liquid-
ity suppliers or liquidity demanders. Ex-ante, liquidity demanders are buyers since
liquidity suppliers require a higher risk premium for holding the stock. Therefore,
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in the presence of asymmetric information, the same long margin requirements bind
for liquidity demanders more often than they bind for liquidity suppliers comparing
to the case with symmetric information case. Since long margin requirements reduce
market volatility when they bind for liquidity demanders and increase market volatil-
ity when they bind for liquidity suppliers, long margin requirements may decrease
market volatility with asymmetric information while they increase market volatility
with symmetric information, or margin requirements decrease more of the market
volatility with asymmetric information.
We now examine how margin requirements affect market illiquidity in the presence
of asymmetric information using the average price impact (휆푚푎 ) of some additional
exogenous trade on date 0. We have
Proposition 1.14 1. Price impact with margin requirements 휆푚푎 > 휆푎;
2. 휆푚푎 decreases in 푐푠 and 푐푏.
Proposition 1.14 implies that the presence of asymmetric information does not
change our main results: margin requirements always increase market illiquidity mea-
sured by price impact of some extra exogenous trade and market illiquidity increases
when margin requirements become more stringent (smaller 푐푏 and 푐푠). The intuition
is the same as the symmetric information case.
1.4.4 Welfare Analysis under Asymmetric Information
In this subsection, we examine the impact of margin requirements on market par-
ticipants’ welfare in the presence of asymmetric information. We also compare the
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welfare impact of margin requirements with and without asymmetric information.
We first define the “stringency” of margin requirements with asymmetric information
as below:
Definition 1.3 Under asymmetric information, given 푆˜, margin requirements are
stringent for investors 푖 (푖 = 퐿퐷,퐿푆) when long margin requirements 푐푏 < 푏푖(푆˜)− 1,
or short margin requirements 푐푠 < 1 − 푏푖(푆˜), where 푏푖(푆˜), 푖 = 퐿퐷,퐿푆, is defined
(1.63) in Appendix.
Proposition 1.15 In the presence of asymmetric information,
(1) stringent margin requirements make all market participants worse off;
(2) binding but not stringent margin requirements make constrained investors better
off but unconstrained investors worse off.
As in the symmetric information case, the following theorem shows that even when
constrained investors are better off with margin requirement, margin requirements are
always socially suboptimal.
Theorem 2 In the presence of asymmetric information, any binding margin require-
ments are Pareto-dominated by some lump-sum transfer from unconstrained investors
to constrained investors.
Corollary 1.5 In the presence of asymmetric information, any binding margin re-
quirements reduce total welfare measured using certainty equivalents.
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The basic intuition of Proposition 1.15 and Theorem 2 is the same as that in the
case with symmetric information. However, the presence of asymmetric information
has a significant impact on this welfare analysis. Due to asymmetric information,
informed agents also trade to explore their private information. Therefore the pres-
ence of asymmetric information can magnify the negative welfare impact of margin
requirements on the agents when the trade due to private information 퐹˜ is more sig-
nificant than the trade due to the hedging demand. The darker shade area in Figure
1.5 illustrates those states when the same margin requirements reduce more of the
total surplus in the presence of asymmetric information for the case when margin
requirements can only bind for liquidity demanders,29 푖.푒., 휔 < min{ 푐푏
푐푏+푐푠
, 푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
}. The
lighter shaded area in Figure 1.5 illustrates those states when margin requirements
are not binding in either symmetric or asymmetric information case. Clearly, we can
see that, in the presence of asymmetric information, the same margin requirements
reduce more of the total welfare surplus in certain states when 퐹˜ is far away from its
ex ante mean for a given realization of 푋˜퐿퐷. For example, if 푋˜퐿퐷 = 1, then when
퐹˜ > 0.7 or 퐹˜ < −0.7, margin requirements reduce more of the total welfare surplus
in the presence of asymmetric information.
1.5 Margin Requirements with Limited Liability
In this section, we check our main results in the presence of limited liability, 푖.푒.,
investors can default if the wealth on the margin account is negative.30 Our main
29The graphes comparing the welfare impact of margin requirements with and without asymmetric
information for Cases (2)-(4) in Proposition 1.11 are similar to Case (1), we skip them to save space
and they are available from the author.
30For simplicity, we assume that investors’ non-traded assets are protected if they default.
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Figure 1.5: The Comparison of the Total Certainty Equivalent Wealth Gain/Loss
with Margin Requirements with and without Asymmetric Information
The darker shaded area illustrates those states when the same margin requirements
reduce more of the total surplus in the presence of asymmetric information. The
parameter values are 푉¯ = 3, 휃¯ = 1, 휎푢 = 0.4, 휎푀 = 0.4, 훿 = 1, 휎퐿퐷 = 0.6, 휎퐹 =
0.2, 휎푢푀 = 0.4, 푐푠 = 3, 푐푏 = 1, 휔 = 0.2.
results on the impact of margin requirements on market volatility and equilibrium
stock prices still hold. Furthermore, the systemic cost of default could provide a
justification for having margin regulation.
Specifically, when liquidity demanders buy and liquidity suppliers sell some of their
endowed shares of the stock, liquidity demanders’ problem is:
max
휃퐿퐷≤푐푏휃¯
퐸[−푒−훿푊˜퐿퐷 ]
푠.푡. 푊˜퐿퐷 =
(
(휃¯ − 휃퐿퐷)푃 + 휃퐿퐷푉˜
)+
+ 푋˜퐿퐷푀˜, (1.20)
and liquidity suppliers’ problem is:
max
휃퐿푆
퐸[−푒−훿푊˜퐿푆 ]
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푠.푡. 푊˜퐿푆 = (휃¯ − 휃퐿푆)푃 + 휃퐿푆 푉˜ − 휔
1− 휔
(
(휃¯ − 휃퐿퐷)푃 + 휃퐿퐷푉˜
)−
. (1.21)
To incorporate limited liability in our model, we assume that the payoff of the
risky asset 푉˜ = 푒푣˜ and the payoff of the non-traded asset 푀˜ = 푒푚˜−푒휇푚+ 12휎2푚 ,31 where
푣˜ and 푚˜ follow a bivariate normal distribution, 푖.푒., the joint 푝.푑.푓. of 푣˜ and 푚˜ is:
푓(푣˜, 푚˜) =
1
2휋휎푣휎푚
√
1− 휌2 푒
− 1
2(1−휌2)
(
(푣˜−휇푣)
2
휎2푣
+ (푚˜−휇푚)
2
휎2푚
− 2휌(푣˜−휇푣)(푚˜−휇푚)
휎푣휎푚
)
, (1.22)
where 휌 = 휎푣푚
휎푣휎푚
is the correlation coefficient between 푣˜ and 푚˜.
In equilibrium, both stock market and bond market clear,
휔휃∗퐿퐷 + (1− 휔)휃∗퐿푆 = 휃¯. (1.23)
From (1.20), (1.21) and (1.23), we can numerically solve the equilibrium stock
prices with different level of long margin requirements 푐푏. We find that the stricter
margin requirement may significantly reduce investors’ default probability. As we can
see from Figure 1.6, with one share of stock as collateral in the margin account, if
borrowers are allowed to borrow to buy 2 shares of the stock, then the borrower’s
default probability is 14%. If buyers are only allowed to borrow to buy 1 share of the
stock, then the default probability is reduced to 3%.
Consistent with our previous results, the equilibrium stock price is lower with the
stricter long margin requirement.32 In Figure 1.7, long margin requirements bind for
31We demean the payoff of the non-traded asset, so that the expected payoff of the non-traded
asset is zero and the average endowment shock is zero ex-ante.
32We use the equilibrium with less strict long margin requirements as the benchmark in this
section while we use the equilibrium without margin requirements as the benchmark in the previous
sections.
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Figure 1.6: The Borrower’s Default Probability Against the Level of Long Margin
Requirements
The parameter values are 휃¯ = 1, 휎푢 = 0.4, 휎푀 = 0.6, 휎푢푀 = 0.2, 훿 = 1, 휔 = 0.2, 휇푀 =
0, 휇푉 = 0, 푋˜퐿퐷 = −1.
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Figure 1.7: Equilibrium Prices with Long Margin Requirements 푐푏 = 1 and 푐푏 = 3
(Case 1)
The dashed (resp. solid) curve denotes the equilibrium price with long margin re-
quirements 푐푏 = 3 (resp. 푐푏 = 1). The parameter values are 휃¯ = 1, 휎푢 = 0.4, 휎푀 =
0.6, 휎푢푀 = 0.2, 훿 = 1, 휔 = 0.2, 휇푀 = 0, 휇푉 = 0.
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Figure 1.8: Equilibrium Prices with Long Margin Requirements 푐푏 = 1 and 푐푏 = 3
(Case 2)
The dashed (resp. solid) curve denotes the equilibrium price with long margin re-
quirements 푐푏 = 3 (resp. 푐푏 = 1). The parameter values are 휃¯ = 1, 휎푢 = 0.4, 휎푀 =
0.6, 휎푢푀 = 0.2, 훿 = 1, 휔 = 0.8, 휇푀 = 0, 휇푉 = 0.
liquidity demanders and the long margin requirements bind when equilibrium stock
price is relatively high. Therefore the long margin requirements reduce volatility.
In Figure 1.8,33 long margin requirements bind for liquidity suppliers and the long
margin requirements bind when equilibrium stock price is relatively low. Therefore
the long margin requirements increase volatility.
Interestingly, in the presence of limited liability, as we can see from Figure 1.9, there
is an optimal long margin requirement for margin buyers and sellers respectively. In
our example, 푐푏 = 1.52 is optimal for margin buyers and 푐푏 = 1.04 is optimal for sell-
ers. As we discussed in the welfare analysis in Section 3.4, long margin requirements
have two effects, a quantity effect and a price effect on margin buyers. If long margin
requirements are not very stringent, then margin buyers can be better off because
the price effect dominates the quantity effect. Therefore, in the presence of limited
33This is the case when liquidity demanders sell some of their endowed shares of the stock and
liquidity suppliers buy.
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Figure 1.9: The Certainty Equivalent Wealth of Borrowers and Lenders Against Long
Margin Requirements
The parameter values are 휃¯ = 1, 휎푢 = 0.4, 휎푀 = 0.6, 휎푢푀 = 0.2, 훿 = 1, 휔 = 0.2, 휇푀 =
0, 휇푉 = 0, 푋˜퐿퐷 = −1.
liability, the optimal margin requirements for margin buyers are determined by bal-
ancing the price effect, the quantity effect and default benefit. On the other hand,
long margin requirements have an adverse price effect on the sellers because sellers
have to sell at a lower price. However, in the presence of limited liability, long margin
requirements protect sellers who are also lenders from borrowers’ default. Therefore,
the optimal margin requirements for sellers are determined by balancing the price
effect and buyers’ default risk.
In addition, regulators solve an optimal margin requirement which maximizes social
welfare by incorporating some systemic cost of default.34 We use a simplest reduced-
form model to capture the systemic cost of default. More specifically, we assume that
34Schwarcz (2008): systemic risk results from a type of tragedy of the commons in which market
participants lack sufficient incentive, absent regulation, to limit risk taking in order to reduce the
systemic danger to others. For example, default in paying debts might well cause the institution’s
failure, as well as trigger a potential chain of defaults as other institutions are not paid amounts
owned them (and in turn, if highly leveraged, such other institutions might then be unable to pay
amounts owed to other institutions.) These costs would likely be high because they include not only
direct economic costs but also indirect social costs (poverty, unemployment and crime as potential
social costs).
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regulator’s problem is
max
푐푏
휔퐸[−푒−훿푊˜퐿퐷 ]+(1−휔)퐸[−푒−훿푊˜퐿푆 ]+퐸
[
푐휔
(
휃퐿퐷푉˜ + (휃¯ − 휃퐿퐷)푃 − 푧(휃퐿퐷 − 휃¯)푃
)−]
.
(1.24)
The sum of the first two terms in (3.39) is the weighted average utility of buyers
and sellers. The third term in (3.39) captures the externality of financial crisis and
푐 measures the severity of the externality imposed the the economy when borrowers
as a group are in distress.35 We define that borrowers are in financial distress when
all borrowers’ total wealth is below a fraction of their total debt,36 푖.푒., 휃퐿퐷푉˜ + (휃¯ −
휃퐿퐷)푃 < 푧(휃퐿퐷− 휃¯)푃 , and each borrower’s systemic expected shortfall as the amount
that the wealth drops below a fraction 푧 of the debt in case of a systemic crisis, 푖.푒.,
퐸
[(
휃퐿퐷푉˜ + (휃¯ − 휃퐿퐷)푃 − 푧(휃퐿퐷 − 휃¯)푃
)−]
.
The optimal margin requirement for the regulator is more stringent than the sellers
would prefer, as illustrated in Figure 1.10, the optimal margin requirement for the
regulator in our example is 푐푏 = 0.95. Therefore, this systemic cost of default could
provide a justification for having margin regulation.
The results with default shed some lights on how to determine the optimal margin
requirements in practice. Margin requirements should be determined by balancing two
facts: the cost of restricting mutually beneficial trading and the benefit of avoiding
the default cost from potential systemic risk. If it is unlikely that defaulting on
margin can lead to systemic risk, then the damage may be greater than the potential
35This is similar to the reduced-form model of measuring systemic risk used in Acharya, Pedersen,
Philippon and Richardson (2010).
36Though in our model all borrowers are identical and there is one risky asset, and thus all
borrowers default at the same time, our simplified model captures the economics without bearing
complicated numerical computations since borrowers who buy on margin on multiple risky assets
may default at the same time when they face a systematic shock.
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Figure 1.10: The Certainty Equivalent Wealth of Regulators Against Long Margin
Requirements
The parameter values are 휃¯ = 1, 휎푢 = 0.4, 휎푀 = 0.6, 휎푢푀 = 0.2, 훿 = 1, 휔 = 0.2, 휇푀 =
0, 휇푉 = 0, 푋˜퐿퐷 = −1.
benefit from margin regulation. It might be optimal to leave the private sectors to
determine their own margin requirements. On the other hand, as we experienced in
financial crisis in 1929, private sectors’ margin requirements are extremely loose and
that encourage margin buying and might have caused the following market crash. It
might be social optimal for the regulators to set margin requirements.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
We propose a tractable and flexible equilibrium model with and without asymmetric
information to examine the impact of margin requirements (on both long and short
stock positions) on asset prices, market volatility, market illiquidity and the welfare
of market participants. We show that margin requirements reduce market volatility
and lead to a smaller return reversal when they constrain liquidity demanders (e.g.,
portfolio insurers and individuals) who are buying when prices are high or selling
when prices are low. However, margin requirements can significantly increase market
volatility and lead to a greater return reversal when they constrain liquidity suppliers
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(e.g., market markers and hedge funds) who are selling when prices are high or buying
when prices are low.
In addition, margin requirements always increase market illiquidity measured by
price impact even when they constrain liquidity demanders. Moreover, stringent
margin requirements make both participants worse off and less stringent margin re-
quirements benefit constrained investors and hurt unconstrained investors. Our main
results remain the same in the presence of asymmetric information and default risk
while the presence of asymmetric information may reverse or reduce the impact of
margin requirements on market volatility.
1.7 Appendix
We provide all the proofs for the case when margin requirements never bind for liq-
uidity suppliers and can only bind for liquidity demanders 푖.푒., 휔 < min{ 푐푏
푐푏+푐푠
, 푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
},
the proofs for the case when 휔 > max{ 푐푏
푐푏+푐푠
, 푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
} are very similar and we skip them
here to save space and they are available from the author.
Proof of Proposition 1.1:
From investor i’s objective function (1.5), it is straightforward to get i’s optimal
demand for the risky asset:
휃∗푖 =
(퐹˜ + 푉¯ − 푃 ∗푠0)− 훿휎푢푀푋˜푖
훿휎2푢
, 푖 = 퐿퐷,퐿푆. (1.25)
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Substituting (1.25) into the market clearing condition, 휔휃∗퐿퐷푠 + (1 − 휔)휃∗퐿푆푠 = 휃¯, we
get that the equilibrium price is
푃 ∗푠0 = 푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 훿휔휎푢푀푋˜퐿퐷 − 훿휎2푢휃¯. (1.26)
Plugging (1.26) into (1.25), we get 휃∗퐿퐷푠 = 휃¯ − (1 − 휔)휎푢푀휎2푢 푋˜퐿퐷, and 휃
∗
퐿푆푠 = 휃¯ +
휔 휎푢푀
휎2푢
푋˜퐿퐷.
푄.퐸.퐷.
Proof of Proposition 1.2 and Corollary 1.1:
Liquidity demanders’ optimal demand is given by (1.25), if
−(푐푠 − 1)휃¯훿휎2푢 < 푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 푃 ∗푠 − 훿휎푢푀푋˜퐿퐷 < (푐푏 + 1)휃¯훿휎2푢, (1.27)
then neither long nor short margin requirements are binding, the equilibrium price
is the same as that without margin requirement, 푖.푒., 푃 ∗푠 = 푃
∗
푠0. Plugging (1.26) into
(1.27), we get that when − 푐푏
1−휔휎
2
푢휃¯ < 휎푢푀푋˜퐿퐷 <
푐푠
1−휔휎
2
푢휃¯, neither long or short margin
requirements are binding for liquidity demanders; if 휎푢푀 푋˜퐿퐷 >
푐푠
1−휔휎
2
푢휃¯, then short
margin requirements are binding for liquidity demanders; if 휎푢푀푋˜퐿퐷 < − 푐푏1−휔휎2푢휃¯,
then long margin requirements are binding for liquidity demanders.
Similarly, we have: (i) if − 푐푠
휔
휎2푢휃¯ < 휎푢푀푋˜퐿퐷 <
푐푏
휔
휎2푢휃¯, then margin requirements
are not binding for liquidity suppliers; (ii) if 휎푢푀푋˜퐿퐷 >
푐푏
휔
휎2푢휃¯, then long margin
requirements are binding for liquidity suppliers; (iii) if 휎푢푀푋˜퐿퐷 < − 푐푠휔 휎2푢휃¯, then
short margin requirements are binding for liquidity suppliers. Therefore, we have the
following cases: (1) if 휔
1−휔 < min{ 푐푏푐푠 , 푐푠푐푏}, then margin requirements can bind only for
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liquidity demanders; (2) if 휔
1−휔 > max{ 푐푏푐푠 , 푐푠푐푏}, then margin requirements can bind
only for liquidity suppliers; (3) if 푐푏
푐푠
< 휔
1−휔 <
푐푠
푐푏
, then long margin requirements
are more stringent than short margin requirements. Therefore, only long margin
requirements can bind. (4) if 푐푠
푐푏
< 휔
1−휔 <
푐푏
푐푠
, then short margin requirements are more
stringent than long margin requirements. Therefore, only short margin requirements
can bind.
We now prove the Proposition for case (1). For case (1), if 휎푢푀푋˜퐿퐷 ≤ − 푐푏1−휔휎2푢휃¯,
long margin requirements are binding. In equilibrium, 휃∗퐿퐷푠 = (푐푏 + 1)휃¯ and 휃
∗
퐿푆푠 =
1−휔−휔푐푏
1−휔 휃¯. From (1.25), liquidity suppliers’ optimal demand is 휃
∗
퐿푆푠 =
푉¯+퐹˜−푃 ∗푠
훿휎2푢
. It fol-
lows that the equilibrium stock price is 푃 ∗푠 = 푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 1−휔−휔푐푏1−휔 훿휎2푢휃¯. It can be shown
that 푃 ∗푠0 − 푃 ∗푠 = −훿휔휎푢푀푋˜퐿퐷 − 휔 푐푏1−휔훿휎2푢휃¯ ≥ 0, 푖.푒., 푃 ∗푠0 ≥ 푃 ∗푠 , long margin require-
ments tend to decrease stock price. If 휎푢푀 푋˜퐿퐷 ≥ 푐푠1−휔휎2푢휃¯, short margin requirements
are binding. In equilibrium, 휃∗퐿퐷푠 = −(푐푠 − 1)휃¯ and 휃∗퐿푆푠 = 1−휔+휔푐푠1−휔 휃¯, from (1.25),
liquidity suppliers’ optimal demand is 휃∗퐿푆푠 =
푉¯+퐹˜−푃 ∗푠
훿휎2푢
. It follows that the equilib-
rium stock price is 푃 ∗푠 = 푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 1−휔+휔푐푠1−휔 훿휎2푢휃¯. It can be shown that 푃 ∗푠0 − 푃 ∗푠 =
−훿휔휎푢푀푋˜퐿퐷 + 휔 푐푠1−휔 훿휎2푢휃¯ ≤ 0, 푖.푒., 푃 ∗푠0 ≤ 푃 ∗푠 , short margin requirements tend to
increase stock price. 푄.퐸.퐷.
Proof of Proposition 1.3 and Corollary 1.2:
퐸[푃 ∗푠 ]− 퐸[푃 ∗푠0] = 훿휔 ×
∣휎푢푀 ∣휎퐿퐷√
2휋
×
[
−푒−
(−푐푏휎
2
푢휃¯)
2
2(1−휔)2휎2
푢푀
휎2
퐿퐷 + 푒
− (푐푠휎
2
푢휃¯)
2
2(1−휔)2휎2
푢푀
휎2
퐿퐷
]
+
훿휔푐푏휎
2
푢휃¯
1− 휔 푁
(
− 푐푏휎
2
푢휃¯
(1 − 휔)∣휎푢푀 ∣휎퐿퐷
)
− 훿휔푐푠휎
2
푢휃¯
1− 휔 푁
(
− 푐푠휎
2
푢휃¯
(1− 휔)∣휎푢푀 ∣휎퐿퐷
)
.
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Note that 퐸[푃 ∗푠 ] = 퐸[푃
∗
푠0], when 푐푏 = 푐푠. We now prove that 퐸[푃
∗
푠 ] increases in 푐푏
and decreases in 푐푠, then, it follows that 퐸[푃
∗
푠 ] ≥ 퐸[푃 ∗푠0], iff 푐푏 ≥ 푐푠. We have
∂퐸[푃 ∗푠 ]
∂푐푏
=
휔훿휎2푢휃¯
1− 휔 푁
(
− 푐푏휎
2
푢휃¯
(1− 휔)∣휎푢푀 ∣휎퐿퐷
)
> 0,
∂퐸[푃 ∗푠 ]
∂푐푠
= −휔훿휎
2
푢휃¯
1− 휔 푁
(
− 푐푠휎
2
푢휃¯
(1− 휔)∣휎푢푀 ∣휎퐿퐷
)
< 0. (1.28)
Therefore, 퐸[푃 ∗푠 ]− 퐸[푃 ∗푠0] increases in 푐푏 and decreases in 푐푠. 푄.퐸.퐷.
Lemma 1.1 S is continuously distributed in [−∞,+∞] with probability density func-
tion 푓푆(푠), we define
푌 =
⎧⎨
⎩
푘푆 + (1− 푘)푛 푆 ≥ 푛
푆 푚 < 푆 < 푛
푘푆 + (1− 푘)푚 푆 ≤ 푚
where 푚, 푛 and 푘 are constants with 푛 > 푚 and 0 ≤ 푘 < 1. Then, 푉 푎푟(푌 ) < 푉 푎푟(푆)
Proof of Lemma 1.1: We define 푌1 = 푌 + 퐸[푆]− 퐸[푌 ], then 퐸[푌1] = 퐸[푆]. From
Figure 1.11, there exists 푠∗, (not necessarily unique, pick one) such that 푌1 > 푆, for
푆 < 푠∗ and 푌1 < 푆 for 푆 > 푠∗. Let 퐹푌1(푠) be the 푐.푑.푓. for 푌1 and 퐺푆(푠) be the
푐.푑.푓. for 푆. ∀푠 < 푠∗, 푌1 < 푠 ⇒ 푆 < 푠. This implies that 퐺푆(푠) − 퐹푌1(푠) ≥ 0
for 푠 < 푠∗. And ∀푠 ≥ 푠∗, 푌1 ≥ 푠 ⇒ 푆 ≥ 푠. This implies 푃푟표푏(푆 > 푠) ≥
푃푟표푏(푌1 > 푠), 푖.푒., 퐺푆(푠) − 퐹푌1(푠) ≤ 0 for 푠 ≥ 푠∗. Now, consider the stochastic
dominance integral 퐼(푠) =
∫ 푠
휏=−∞ (퐺푆(휏)− 퐹푌1(휏)) 푑휏. Since 퐸[푆] = 퐸[푌1], we have
퐼(+∞) = 0. The sign pattern of 퐺푆(푠) − 퐹푌1(푠) implies that ∀푠, we have 퐼(푠) ≥ 0.
푖.푒.,
∫ 푠
−∞퐺푆(휏)푑휏 ≥
∫ 푠
−∞ 퐹푌1(휏)푑휏, ∀푠. This means that 푌1 second-order stochastically
dominates 푆, we immediately get 푉 푎푟(푌1) < 푉 푎푟(푆), note that 푉 푎푟(푌1) = 푉 푎푟(푌 ),
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Figure 1.11: Random Variables 푌1, 푌 and 푆
The dot-dashed line denotes 푌1. The solid line denotes 푌 . The dashed line denotes
푆.
therefore, 푉 푎푟(푌 ) < 푉 푎푟(푆). 푄.퐸.퐷.
Proof of Proposition 1.4:
푃 ∗푠 =
⎧⎨
⎩
푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 1−휔−휔푐푏
1−휔 훿휎
2
푢휃¯ 푃
∗
푠0 ≥ 푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 1−휔−휔푐푏1−휔 훿휎2푢휃¯
푃 ∗푠0 푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 1−휔+휔푐푠1−휔 훿휎2푢휃¯ < 푃 ∗푠0 < 푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 1−휔−휔푐푏1−휔 훿휎2푢휃¯
푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 1−휔+휔푐푠
1−휔 훿휎
2
푢휃¯ 푃
∗
푠0 ≤ 푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 1−휔+휔푐푠1−휔 훿휎2푢휃¯
And we have 푉 푎푟[푉˜ −푃 ∗푠 ] = 푉 푎푟[퐹˜ −푃 ∗푠 ] and 푉 푎푟[푉˜ −푃 ∗푠0] = 푉 푎푟[퐹˜ −푃 ∗푠0]. For any
fixed 퐹˜ , using Lemma 3.1 with 푘 = 0, we get 푉 푎푟[푃 ∗푠 ] < 푉 푎푟[푃
∗
푠0], and 푉 푎푟[퐹˜−푃 ∗푠 ] <
푉 푎푟[퐹˜ − 푃 ∗푠0]. Since the sum of the variances of stock returns of dates 0 and 1 with
and without margin requirements are respectively 푉 푎푟(푃 ∗푠 −푃 ∗푠,−1) + 푉 푎푟(푉˜ −푃 ∗푠 ) =
푉 푎푟(푉˜ ) − 2퐶표푣(푃 ∗푠 − 푃 ∗푠,−1, 푉˜ − 푃 ∗푠 ), and 푉 푎푟(푃 ∗푠0 − 푃 ∗푠0,−1) + 푉 푎푟(푉˜ − 푃 ∗푠0) =
푉 푎푟(푉˜ )−2퐶표푣(푃 ∗푠0−푃 ∗푠0,−1, 푉˜ −푃 ∗푠0). Under symmetric information, since 퐹˜ is public
information, we have 퐶표푣(푃 ∗푠−푃 ∗푠,−1, 푉˜ −푃 ∗푠 ) = −푉 푎푟(푃 ∗푠 ) < 0, 퐶표푣(푃 ∗푠0−푃 ∗푠0,−1, 푉˜ −
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푃 ∗푠0) = −푉 푎푟(푃 ∗푠0) < 0. Therefore margin requirements lead to a less negative auto-
correlation of stock returns. 푄.퐸.퐷.
Proof of Proposition 1.5: We prove the first case, other cases are very similar.
If 휔 < min{ 푐푏
푐푏+푐푠
, 푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
}, then margin requirements can only bind for liquidity de-
manders. When long margin requirements bind for liquidity demanders, 푖.푒., when
퐷˜ > 푐푏
1−휔 휃¯+
휀
1−휔 , we have 푃
∗
푠 = 퐹˜+푉¯ −훿휎2푢휃¯+훿휔 푐푏1−휔휎2푢휃¯+ 훿휎
2
푢
1−휔휀. Therefore,
∂푃 ∗푠
∂휀
= 훿휎
2
푢
1−휔 .
Similarly, we can show that 휆푚푠 =
∂푃 ∗푠
∂휀
= 훿휎
2
푢
1−휔 when short margin requirements bind for
liquidity demanders, 푖.푒., when 퐷˜ < − 푐푠휃¯
1−휔 +
휀
1−휔 . Therefore, the average price impact
휆푚푠 =
훿휎2푢
1−휔
(
1 + 휔푁(− 푐푠
1−휔 휃¯ +
휀
1−휔 )− 휔푁( 푐푏1−휔 휃¯ + 휀1−휔 )
)
> 훿휎2푢 = 휆푠. In addition, we
have ∂휆
푚
푠
∂푐푏
< 0 and ∂휆
푚
푠
∂푐푠
< 0. 푄.퐸.퐷.
Proof of Proposition 1.6: We first show that stringent margin requirements make
liquidity demanders worse off while binding but less stringent margin requirements
make liquidity demanders better off. More specifically, let 푊 ∗퐿퐷 and 푊
∗
퐿퐷0 denote
the equilibrium terminal wealth of liquidity demanders with and without margin
requirements respectively. We want to show the following: (1) if 퐷˜ < − 1+휔
(1−휔)2 푐푠휃¯ or
퐷˜ > 1+휔
(1−휔)2 푐푏휃¯, then 퐸[−푒−훿푊˜
∗
퐿퐷0 ] > 퐸[−푒−훿푊˜ ∗퐿퐷 ]; (2) if − 1+휔
(1−휔)2 푐푠휃¯ < 퐷˜ ≤ − 휃¯1−휔푐푠 or
휃¯
1−휔푐푏 ≤ 퐷˜ < 1+휔(1−휔)2 푐푏휃¯, then 퐸[−푒−훿푊˜
∗
퐿퐷0 ] ≤ 퐸[−푒−훿푊˜ ∗퐿퐷 ]; (3) if− 휃¯
1−휔 푐푠 ≤ 퐷˜ ≤ 휃¯1−휔 푐푏,
then 퐸[−푒−훿푊˜ ∗퐿퐷0 ] = 퐸[−푒−훿푊˜ ∗퐿퐷 ].
From Proposition 1.1 and Proposition 1.2, we can compute 퐸[−푒−훿푊˜ ∗퐿퐷0 ] = −푒푑1 ,
and when short margin requirements bind for liquidity demanders, 퐸[−푒−훿푊˜ ∗퐿퐷 ] =
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−푒푑2 . We have:
푑1 − 푑2 = −훿
2(1− 휔)2휎2푢
2
(
−퐷˜ − 푐푠 휃¯
1− 휔
)(
−퐷˜ − 1 + 휔
(1− 휔)2 푐푠휃¯
)
. (1.29)
Therefore, if 퐷˜ < − 1+휔
(1−휔)2 푐푠휃¯ then 푑1 < 푑2; and if − 1+휔(1−휔)2 푐푠휃¯ ≤ 퐷˜ ≤ −푐푠 휃¯1−휔 ,
then 푑1 ≥ 푑2. When long margin requirements bind for liquidity demanders, we can
compute 퐸[−푒−훿푊˜ ∗퐿퐷 ] = −푒푑3 . And we have
푑1 − 푑3 = −훿
2(1− 휔)2휎2푢
2
(
−퐷˜ + 휃¯
1− 휔푐푏
)(
퐷˜ +
1 + 휔
(1− 휔)2 푐푏휃¯
)
. (1.30)
Therefore, liquidity demanders are worse off if margin requirements are stringent and
they are better off if margin requirements are binding but not stringent.
We now show that liquidity suppliers are always worse off with binding margin
requirements. Let 푊 ∗퐿푆 and 푊
∗
퐿푆0 denote the equilibrium terminal wealth of liquid-
ity suppliers with and without margin requirements respectively. We can compute
퐸[−푒−훿푊˜ ∗퐿푆0 ] = −푒푑4 , and if short margin requirements bind for liquidity demanders,
퐸[−푒−훿푊˜ ∗퐿푆 ] = −푒푑5 , we have
푑4 − 푑5 = −1
2
훿2휔2휎2푢
(
퐷˜2 − 푐2푠
휃¯2
(1− 휔)2
)
. (1.31)
Obviously, if 퐷˜ ≤ − 휃¯
1−휔 푐푠, then 푑4 ≤ 푑5. Therefore, liquidity suppliers are always
worse off when short margin requirements bind for liquidity demanders. Similarly, we
can prove that liquidity suppliers are always worse off when long margin requirements
bind for liquidity demanders.
푄.퐸.퐷.
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Proof of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1.3: We assume that liquidity suppliers are
indifferent between having margin requirements and lifting margin requirements after
transferring Δ푊퐿푆 to liquidity demanders, 푖.푒., −푒푑5 = −푒푑4+훿Δ푊퐿푆 . We get
Δ푊퐿푆 =
푑5 − 푑4
훿
=
1
2
훿푤2휎2푢
(
퐷˜2 − 푐2푠
휃¯2
(1− 휔)2
)
. (1.32)
To make liquidity demanders better off, we need −푒푑1−훿Δ푊퐿퐷 ≥ −푒푑2 , 푖.푒., 푑1 − 푑2 ≤
훿Δ푊퐿퐷 = 훿
1−휔
휔
Δ푊퐿푆, which is equivalent to
(
퐷˜ − 푐푠 휃¯1−휔 퐷˜
)2
≥ 0. Therefore, even
though the liquidity demanders are better off with binding but not stringent short
margin requirements, the total surplus measured by certainty equivalent is reduced.
This implies that short margin requirements are dominated by a lump-sum transfer
scheme without constraints. Similarly, we can prove that long margin requirements
are also dominated by some lump-sum wealth transfer.
푄.퐸.퐷.
Proof of Proposition 1.7: Liquidity demanders’ optimal stock demand is
휃∗퐿퐷푎 =
푉¯ + 퐹˜ − 훿휎푢푀푋˜퐿퐷 − 푃 ∗푎0
훿휎2푢
=
푉¯ + 2푆˜ − 푃 ∗푎0
훿휎2푢
. (1.33)
Liquidity suppliers’ information set is: 퐼퐿푆 = {푃 ∗푎0} = {푆˜}, therefore, liquidity sup-
pliers’ problem is
min
휃퐿푆
푒훿휃퐿푆(푃
∗
푎0−푉¯ )+ 12 훿2(휃2퐿푆휎2푢+푋˜2퐿푆휎2푀+2휃퐿푆푋˜퐿푆휎푢푀 ) × 퐸[푒−훿휃퐿푆 퐹˜ ∣푆˜]. (1.34)
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Letting 푎 = 훿휎푢푀 , and 푘 = 휎퐿퐷/휎퐹 , then 푆˜ ∼ 푁(0, 14(휎2퐹 + 푎2휎2퐿퐷)). We have
퐸[퐹˜ ∣푆˜] = 2푆˜
1 + 푎2푘2
, 푉 푎푟[퐹˜ ∣푆˜] = 푎
2푘2
1 + 푎2푘2
휎2퐹 , 퐸[푒
−훿휃퐿푆 퐹˜ ∣푆˜] = 푒−훿휃퐿푆퐸[퐹˜ ∣푆˜]+ 12 훿2휃2퐿푆푉 푎푟[퐹˜ ∣푆˜].
(1.35)
Liquidity suppliers’ optimal stock demand given 푃 ∗푎0 is 휃
∗
퐿푆푎
=
푉¯+ 2푆˜
1+푎2푘2
−푃 ∗푎0
훿
(
휎2푢+
푎2푘2
1+푎2푘2
휎2퐹
) . Define
퐴2 =
2 [(1 + 휔푎2푘2)휎2푢 + 휔푎
2푘2휎2퐹 ]
(1 + 푎2푘2)휎2푢 + 휔푎
2푘2휎2퐹
, 퐵2 =
훿휎2푢 [(1 + 푎
2푘2)휎2푢 + 푎
2푘2휎2퐹 ]
(1 + 푎2푘2)휎2푢 + 휔푎
2푘2휎2퐹
. (1.36)
푎1 =
2푎2푘2
훿 ((1 + 푎2푘2)휎2푢 + 휔푎
2푘2휎2퐹 )
, 푏1 =
(1 + 푎2푘2)휎2푢 + 푎
2푘2휎2퐹
(1 + 푎2푘2)휎2푢 + 휔푎
2푘2휎2퐹
. (1.37)
We can solve for the equilibrium price 푃 ∗푎0 = 푉¯ +퐴2푆˜−퐵2휃¯ using the market clearing
condition, 휔휃∗퐿퐷푎+(1−휔)휃∗퐿푆푎 = 휃¯. 푄.퐸.퐷.
Proof of Proposition 1.8: We have 퐸[푃 ∗푎0] = 푉¯ −퐵2휃¯, 퐸[푃 ∗푠0] = 푉¯ − 훿휎2푢휃¯. There-
fore, 퐸[푃푎0∗ ]−퐸[푃푠0∗ ] = (훿휎2푢−퐵2)휃¯ < 0. 푄.퐸.퐷.
Proof of Proposition 1.9: We can compute the expected utilities of liquidity de-
manders with and without asymmetric information are −푒푐1 and −푒푑1 . It is not
difficult to get
푐1 − 푑1 = 퐶3휎2푢
(
퐷˜ − 퐶1(퐹˜ + 훿휎2퐹 휃¯)
)(
퐷˜ + 퐶2(퐹˜ + 훿휎
2
퐹 휃¯)
)
, (1.38)
where
퐶3 =
훿2(1− 휔)2(휎2푢 + 휔푎2푘2휎2퐹 )((1 + 2푎2푘2)휎2푢 + 휔푎2푘2휎2퐹 )
2 ((1 + 푎2푘2)휎2푢 + 휔푎
2푘2휎2퐹 )
2
휎2푢
> 0,
퐶1 =
푎2푘2
훿 (휎2푢 + 휔푎
2푘2휎2퐹 )
> 0, 퐶2 =
푎2푘2
훿 ((1 + 2푎2푘2)휎2푢 + 휔푎
2푘2휎2퐹 )
> 0. (1.39)
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The results in Proposition 1.9 follow directly. 푄.퐸.퐷.
Proof of Proposition 1.10: From Proposition 1.1 and 1.7, we have
푉 푎푟(푃 ∗푠0) = 휎
2
퐹 + 휔
2푎2휎2퐿퐷, 푉 푎푟(푃
∗
푎0) =
1
4
퐴22(휎
2
퐹 + 푎
2휎2퐿퐷), 푉 푎푟(푉˜ − 푃 ∗푠0) = 휔2푎2휎2퐿퐷
(1.40)
푉 푎푟(푉˜ − 푃 ∗푎0) = 휎2퐹 +
1
4
퐴22(휎
2
퐹 + 푎
2휎2퐿퐷)− 2퐶표푣(퐹˜ , 퐴2푆˜)
= (1− 1
2
퐴2)
2휎2퐹 +
1
4
퐴22푎
2휎2퐿퐷 > 휔
2푎2휎2퐿퐷. (1.41)
It is not difficult to get that
(푉 푎푟(푃 ∗푠0 − 푃−푠1) + 푉 푎푟(푉˜ − 푃 ∗푠0))− (푉 푎푟(푃 ∗푎0 − 푃−푎1) + 푉 푎푟(푉˜ − 푃 ∗푎0)), (1.42)
is equivalent to
2휔(휔 − 1)푎2휎2퐿퐷(
(1 + 푎2푘2)휎2푢 + 휔푎
2푘2휎2퐹
)2 ((1 + 푎2푘2)휎4푢 + 휔(휔 + 1)푎4푘4휎4퐹 + 푎2푘2 (2휔(1 + 푎2푘2) + 1) 휎2푢휎2퐹 ) < 0
(1.43)
The increase of the total variance implies that 퐶표푣(푃 ∗푠0−푃−푠1, 푉˜ −푃 ∗푠0) > 퐶표푣(푃 ∗푎0−
푃−푎1, 푉˜ − 푃 ∗푎0). We also have
퐶표푣(푃 ∗푠0 − 푃−푠1, 푉˜ − 푃 ∗푠0) = −푉 푎푟(푃 ∗푠0) < 0,
퐶표푣(푃 ∗푎0 − 푃−푎1, 푉˜ − 푃 ∗푎0) = 퐴2
(
1
2
− 1
4
퐴2(1 + 푎
2푘2)
)
휎2퐹 < 0. (1.44)
Therefore, the presence of asymmetric information tends to increase market volatility
and leads to a more negative market return auto-correlation. 푄.퐸.퐷.
62
Proof of Proposition 1.11: Similarly to the proof of Proposition 1.2, we have four
cases. For case (1), when margin requirements can bind only for liquidity demanders,
liquidity demanders’ optimal stock demand is:
휃∗퐿퐷푎 = min{max[
푉¯ + 2푆˜ − 푃 ∗푎
훿휎2푢
,−(푐푠 − 1)휃¯], (푐푏 + 1)휃¯}. (1.45)
From the proof of Proposition 1.7, we know that 휃∗퐿푆푎 =
푉¯+ 2푆˜
1+푎2푘2
−푃 ∗푎
훿
(
휎2푢+
푎2푘2
1+푎2푘2
휎2퐹
) . If neither
long or short margin requirements are binding, then the equilibrium price is the
same as that without margin requirements, 푖.푒., 푃 ∗푎 = 푉¯ +퐴2푆˜−퐵2휃¯. If long margin
requirements are binding for liquidity demanders, then 휃∗퐿퐷푎 = (푐푏+1)휃¯, and therefore
in equilibrium, using market clearing condition, we get that the equilibrium price is
푃 ∗푎 = 푉¯ +
2푆˜
1 + 푎2푘2
− 훿
(
휎2푢 +
푎2푘2
1 + 푎2푘2
휎2퐹
)
(1− 휔 − 휔푐푏) 휃¯
1− 휔 . (1.46)
If short margin requirements are binding for liquidity demanders, then 휃∗퐿퐷푎 = −(푐푠−
1)휃¯, and therefore in equilibrium, using market clearing condition, we get that the
equilibrium price is
푃 ∗푎 = 푉¯ +
2푆˜
1 + 푎2푘2
− 훿
(
휎2푢 +
푎2푘2
1 + 푎2푘2
휎2퐹
)
(1− 휔 + 휔푐푠) 휃¯
1− 휔 . (1.47)
Define
퐴1 =
2
1 + 푎2푘2
, 퐵1 = 훿
(
휎2푢 +
푎2푘2
1 + 푎2푘2
휎2퐹
)
, (1.48)
we can write the equilibrium stock price as in the Proposition. 푆∗퐿퐷1 and 푆
∗
퐿퐷2 can be
solved directly by the continuity of the equilibrium stock price. Specifically, we have
푆∗퐿퐷1 =
[
1 + 푎2푘2
2푎2푘2
푐푏휎
2
푢 −
1
2
(1− 휔 − 휔푐푏)휎2퐹
]
훿휃¯
1− 휔 , (1.49)
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푆∗퐿퐷2 =
[
−1 + 푎
2푘2
2푎2푘2
푐푠휎
2
푢 −
1
2
(1− 휔 + 휔푐푠)휎2퐹
]
훿휃¯
1− 휔 , (1.50)
푆∗퐿푆1 =
[
1 + 푎2푘2
2푎2푘2
푐푠휎
2
푢 +
1
2
휔(푐푠 − 1)휎2퐹
]
훿휃¯
휔
, (1.51)
푆∗퐿푆2 =
[
−1 + 푎
2푘2
2푎2푘2
푐푏휎
2
푢 −
1
2
휔(푐푏 + 1)휎
2
퐹
]
훿휃¯
휔
. (1.52)
Proof of Proposition 1.12 and Corollary 1.4:
퐸[푃 ∗푎 ] = 퐸[푃
∗
푎0] + (퐴1 −퐴2)×
√
1 + 푎2푘2휎퐹
2
√
2휋
×
[
푒
− 2푆
∗
퐿퐷1
2
(1+푎2푘2)휎2
퐹 − 푒−
2푆∗퐿퐷2
2
(1+푎2푘2)휎2
퐹
]
+
(
퐵2휃¯ − 퐵1 (1− 휔 − 휔푐푏)휃¯
1− 휔
)
푁
(
− 2푆
∗
퐿퐷1√
1 + 푎2푘2휎퐹
)
+
(
퐵2휃¯ − 퐵1 (1− 휔 + 휔푐푠)휃¯
1− 휔
)
푁
(
2푆∗퐿퐷2√
1 + 푎2푘2휎퐹
)
, (1.53)
where 퐴1, 퐴2, 퐵1, 퐵2 are defined in (1.48) and (1.36). We notice that 퐸[푃
∗
푎 ] = 퐸[푃
∗
푎0],
when 푐푏 = 푐푠 + 푑, where
푑 =
푑1푎
2휎2퐿퐷휎
2
퐹
(휎2퐹 + 푎
2휎2퐿퐷)휎
2
푢 + 휔푎
2휎2퐿퐷휎
2
퐹
, (1.54)
where 푑1 = 2(1−휔) for 휔 < min{ 푐푏푐푏+푐푠 ,
푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
} and 푑1 = −2휔 for 휔 > max{ 푐푏푐푏+푐푠 ,
푐푠
푐푏+푐푠
}.
Now, we want to prove that 퐸[푃 ∗푎 ] increases in 푐푏 and decreases in 푐푠. Then, it follows
that 퐸[푃 ∗푎 ] > 퐸[푃
∗
푎0] iff 푐푏 > 푐푠 + 푑. It is not difficult to see that
∂퐸[푃 ∗푎 ]
∂푐푏
= (퐴1 − 퐴2)×
[
1 + 푎2푘2
2푎2푘2
휎2푢 +
휔
2
휎2퐹
]
(−푆∗퐿퐷1)푓(푆∗퐿퐷1)
+(퐵2휃¯ − 퐵1(1− 휔 − 휔푐푏) 휃¯
1− 휔 )×
[
1 + 푎2푘2
2푎2푘2
휎2푢 +
휔
2
휎2퐹
]
(−푓(푆∗퐿퐷1))
+퐵1휔
휃¯
1− 휔푁
(
− 2푆
∗
퐿퐷1√
1 + 푎2푘2휎퐹
)
= 퐵1휔
휃¯
1− 휔 ×푁
(
− 2푆
∗
퐿퐷1√
1 + 푎2푘2휎퐹
)
> 0. (1.55)
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The last equality follows from 푆∗퐿퐷1(퐴1−퐴2) = −퐵2휃¯+퐵1(1−휔−휔푐푏) 휃¯1−휔 . Similarly,
we can prove that ∂퐸[푃
∗
푎 ]
∂푐푠
< 0. Therefore, 퐸[푃 ∗푎 ] increases in 푐푏 and decreases in 푐푠.
푄.퐸.퐷.
Proof of Proposition 1.13:
푃 ∗푎 =
⎧⎨
⎩
퐴1
퐴2
푃 ∗푎0 +
퐴1
퐴2
퐵2휃¯ −퐵1 (1−휔−휔푐푏)휃¯1−휔 +
(
1− 퐴1퐴2
)
푉¯ 푃 ∗푎0 ≥ 푉¯ +퐴2푆∗퐿퐷1 −퐵2휃¯
푃 ∗푎0 푉¯ +퐴2푆
∗
퐿퐷2 −퐵2휃¯ < 푃 ∗푎0 < 푉¯ +퐴2푆∗퐿퐷1 −퐵2휃¯
퐴1
퐴2
푃 ∗푎0 +
퐴1
퐴2
퐵2휃¯ −퐵1 (1−휔+휔푐푠)휃¯1−휔 +
(
1− 퐴1퐴2
)
푉¯ 푃 ∗푎0 ≤ 푉¯ +퐴2푆∗퐿퐷2 −퐵2휃¯
It is not hard to show that 퐴1
퐴2
< 1, using Lemma 3.1, it is obvious that 푉 푎푟[푃 ∗푎 −
푃 ∗−푎1] < 푉 푎푟[푃
∗
푎0 − 푃−푎1]. In order to prove the reduction of total variance, we need
the following Lemma
Lemma 1.2 For two functions 푓(푥), 푔(푥) with 푓 ′(푥) ≥ 0 and 푔′(푥) ≤ 0, where 푥
is randomly distributed in set Ω with probability density function 푝(푥). We have
퐶표푣(푓(푥), 푔(푥)) ≤ 0.
푃 푟표표푓 :
퐶표푣(푓(푥), 푔(푥)) = 퐸(푓(푥)푔(푥))−퐸(푓(푥))퐸(푔(푥))
=
∫
Ω
푓(푥)푔(푥)푝(푥)푑푥−
∫
Ω
푓(푥)푝(푥)푑푥
∫
Ω
푔(푥)푝(푥)푑푥
=
∫
Ω
푝(푦)푑푦
∫
Ω
푓(푥)푔(푥)푝(푥)푑푥−
∫
Ω
푓(푦)푝(푦)푑푦
∫
Ω
푔(푥)푝(푥)푑푥
=
∫
Ω
∫
(푓(푥)푔(푥)− 푓(푦)푔(푥))푝(푥)푝(푦)푑푥푑푦
=
1
2
∫
Ω
∫
(푓(푥)− 푓(푦)) (푔(푥)− 푔(푦)) 푝(푥)푝(푦)푑푥푑푦.
65
From 푓 ′(푥) ≥ 0 and 푔′(푥) ≤ 0, we know that (푓(푥)− 푓(푦))(푔(푥)− 푔(푦)) ≤ 0 is always
true. 푄.퐸.퐷.
The difference of total variance with and without margin requirements is:
푉 푎푟(푉˜ − 푃 ∗푎 ) + 푉 푎푟(푃 ∗푎 − 푃 ∗−푎1)− 푉 푎푟(푉˜ − 푃 ∗푎0)− 푉 푎푟(푃 ∗푎0 − 푃−푎1)
= 2퐶표푣(푃 ∗푎 − 푃 ∗푎0, 푃 ∗푎 + 푃 ∗푎0 − 퐹˜ ). (1.56)
It is not hard to see,
푓(퐹˜ , 푋˜퐿퐷) ≡ 푃 ∗푎 − 푃 ∗푎0
=
⎧⎨
⎩
1
2 (퐴1 −퐴2)퐹˜ − 12 (퐴1 −퐴2)푎푋˜퐿퐷 −퐵1(1− 휔 − 휔푐푏) 휃¯1−휔 +퐵2휃¯ 퐹˜ − 푎푋˜퐿퐷 ≥ 2푆∗퐿퐷1
0 2푆∗퐿퐷2 < 퐹˜ − 푎푋˜퐿퐷 < 2푆∗퐿퐷1
1
2 (퐴1 −퐴2)퐹˜ − 12 (퐴1 −퐴2)푎푋˜퐿퐷 −퐵1(1− 휔 + 휔푐푠) 휃¯1−휔 +퐵2휃¯ 퐹˜ − 푎푋˜퐿퐷 ≤ 2푆∗퐿퐷2
and
푔(퐹˜ , 푋˜퐿퐷) ≡ 푃 ∗푎 + 푃 ∗푎0 − 퐹˜
=
⎧⎨
⎩
(
1
2 (퐴1 +퐴2)− 1
)
퐹˜ − 12 (퐴1 +퐴2)푎푋˜퐿퐷 −퐵1(1− 휔 − 휔푐푏) 휃¯1−휔 −퐵2휃¯ 퐹˜ − 푎푋˜퐿퐷 ≥ 2푆∗퐿퐷1
(퐴2 − 1)퐹˜ −퐴2푎푋˜퐿퐷 − 2퐵2휃¯ 2푆∗퐿퐷2 < 퐹˜ − 푎푋˜퐿퐷 < 2푆∗퐿퐷1(
1
2 (퐴1 +퐴2)− 1
)
퐹˜ − 12 (퐴1 +퐴2)푎푋˜퐿퐷 −퐵1(1− 휔 + 휔푐푠) 휃¯1−휔 −퐵2휃¯ 퐹˜ − 푎푋˜퐿퐷 ≤ 2푆∗퐿퐷2
We know that 퐴2 > 퐴1 > 0, if 퐴1 ≥ 1, it is easy to see that
∂푓
∂퐹˜
≤ 0, ∂푓
∂푋˜퐿퐷
≥ 0, ∂푔
∂퐹˜
≥ 0, ∂푔
∂푋˜퐿퐷
≤ 0 (1.57)
The strict inequalities in (1.57) hold for non-zero measure sets.
퐶표푣
(
푓(퐹˜ , 푋˜퐿퐷), 푔(퐹˜ , 푋˜퐿퐷)
)
= 퐸퐹˜ 푋˜퐿퐷
(
푓(퐹˜ , 푋˜퐿퐷)푔(퐹˜ , 푋˜퐿퐷)
)
−퐸퐹˜ 푋˜퐿퐷푓(퐹˜ , 푋˜퐿퐷)×퐸퐹˜ 푋˜퐿퐷푔(퐹˜ , 푋˜퐿퐷)
= 퐸푋˜퐿퐷
(
퐶표푣퐹˜
(
푓(퐹˜ , 푋˜퐿퐷), 푔(퐹˜ , 푋˜퐿퐷)
))
+ 퐶표푣푋˜퐿퐷
(
퐸퐹˜푓(퐹˜ , 푋˜퐿퐷), 퐸퐹˜ 푔(퐹˜ , 푋˜퐿퐷)
)
.
(1.58)
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From Lemma 1.2 and (1.57), we know that for any 푋˜퐿퐷, we have
퐶표푣퐹˜
(
푓(퐹˜ , 푋˜퐿퐷), 푔(퐹˜ , 푋˜퐿퐷)
)
< 0,
Therefore, the first term in (1.58) is negative. Also, we have
∂퐸퐹˜푓(퐹˜ , 푋˜퐿퐷)
∂푋˜퐿퐷
= 퐸퐹˜
∂푓(퐹˜ , 푋˜퐿퐷)
∂푋˜퐿퐷
≥ 0, ∂퐸퐹˜ 푔(퐹˜ , 푋˜퐿퐷)
∂푋˜퐿퐷
= 퐸퐹˜
∂푔(퐹˜ , 푋˜퐿퐷)
∂푋˜퐿퐷
≤ 0.
(1.59)
The strict inequalities in (1.59) hold for non-zero measure sets. Using the above
Lemma, we get that the second term in (1.58) is negative too. Therefore, we have
showed that, for 퐴1 > 1, 퐶표푣(푃
∗
푎 −푃 ∗푎0, 푃 ∗푎 +푃 ∗푎0− 퐹˜ ) < 0, and from (1.56), the total
variance of stock returns on date 0 and 1 is reduced with margin requirements. The
auto-correlation between stock returns on date 0 and 1 without margin requirements
is:
퐶표푣(푃 ∗푎0 − 푃−푎1, 푉˜ − 푃 ∗푎0) = 퐶표푣(퐴2푆˜, 퐹˜ − 퐴2푆˜) = 퐴2
(
1
2
− 1
4
퐴2(1 + 푎
2푘2)
)
휎2푓 < 0
Using similar argument, when 퐴1 > 1, it is not hard to show that the auto-
correlation between stock returns on date 0 and 1 with margin requirements 퐶표푣(푃 ∗푎−
푃 ∗−푎1, 푉˜ − 푃 ∗푎 ) < 0. The reduction of total variance implies that margin requirements
lead to a less negative auto-correlation between stock returns under asymmetric infor-
mation. 푄.퐸.퐷.
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Proof of Proposition 1.14: If margin requirements bind for liquidity demanders,
then 휆푚푎 =
푃 ∗푎
∂휀
=
훿
(
휎2푢+
푎2푘2
1+푎2푘2
휎2퐹
)
1−휔 > 휆푎. If margin requirements bind for liquidity sup-
pliers, then 휆푚푎 =
훿휎2푢
휔
> 휆푎. Therefore, the average 휆
푚
푎 > 휆푎. 푄.퐸.퐷.
Proof of Proposition 1.15: We first show that stringent margin requirements make
liquidity demanders worse off while binding but less stringent margin requirements
make liquidity demanders better off. More specifically, let 푊 ∗퐿퐷 and 푊
∗
퐿퐷0 denote
the equilibrium terminal wealth of liquidity demanders with and without margin
requirements respectively. We want to show the following: (1) if 푆˜ > 푆∗∗퐿퐷1 or 푆˜ <
푆∗∗퐿퐷2, then 퐸[−푒−훿푊˜ ∗퐿퐷0 ] > 퐸[−푒−훿푊˜ ∗퐿퐷 ]; (2) if 푆∗퐿퐷1 < 푆˜ ≤ 푆∗∗퐿퐷1 or 푆∗∗퐿퐷2 ≤ 푆˜ < 푆∗퐿퐷2,
then 퐸[−푒−훿푊˜ ∗퐿퐷0 ] ≤ 퐸[−푒−훿푊˜ ∗퐿퐷 ]; (3) if 푆∗퐿퐷2 ≤ 푆˜ ≤ 푆∗퐿퐷1, then 퐸[−푒−훿푊˜ ∗퐿퐷0 ] =
퐸[−푒−훿푊˜ ∗퐿퐷 ]. 푆∗퐿퐷1 and 푆∗퐿퐷2 are defined in (1.49) and (1.50), 푆∗∗퐿퐷2 < 푆∗퐿퐷2 and 푆∗∗퐿퐷1 >
푆∗퐿퐷1 are constants depending on parameters in this model, we will define them below.
From Proposition 1.7, we can compute퐸[−푒−훿푊˜ ∗퐿퐷0 ] = −푒푐1 , and when short margin
requirements bind for liquidity demanders, we can compute 퐸[−푒−훿푊˜퐿퐷 ] = −푒푐2 . It
is not difficult to compute
푐1 − 푐2 ≡ 푓1(푆˜) = −2(1− 휔)
2
휔2휎4퐹
(
1− 퐵2
퐵1
)2
휎2푢(푆˜ − 푆∗퐿퐷2)(푆˜ − 푆∗∗퐿퐷2),
where
푆∗∗퐿퐷2 = −
2퐵1
2 −퐴1
휃¯
1− 휔
(
1
2
+
휔
1− 휔
퐵1
퐵2
)
+
휔휎2퐹
1− 퐵2
퐵1
(
1
2
− 퐵1
(1− 휔)퐵2
)
훿(푐푠 − 1) 휃¯
1− 휔 .
(1.60)
푆∗∗퐿퐷2−푆∗퐿퐷2 = −
휔
1 − 휔
2퐵1
2− 퐴1
퐵1
퐵2
휃¯
1− 휔+
휔휎2퐹
1− 퐵2
퐵1
(
1− 퐵1
(1− 휔)퐵2
)
훿(푐푠−1) 휃¯
1− 휔 < 0.
(1.61)
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Therefore, if 푆˜ < 푆∗∗퐿퐷2, then 푐1 < 푐2; and if 푆
∗∗
퐿퐷2 ≤ 푆˜ ≤ 푆∗퐿퐷2, then 푐1 ≥ 푐2. Similarly,
we can prove the arguments for the long margin requirements and
푆∗∗퐿퐷1 = −
2퐵1
2 −퐴1
휃¯
1− 휔
(
1
2
+
휔
1− 휔
퐵1
퐵2
)
− 휔휎
2
퐹
1− 퐵2
퐵1
(
1
2
− 퐵1
(1− 휔)퐵2
)
훿(푐푏 + 1)
휃¯
1− 휔 .
(1.62)
Therefore, liquidity demanders are worse off if margin requirements are stringent and
they are better off if margin requirements are binding but not stringent. Letting
푏퐿퐷(푆˜) =
푆˜ + 2퐵1
2−퐴1
휃¯
1−휔
(
1
2
+ 휔
1−휔
퐵1
퐵2
)
휔휎2퐹
1−퐵2
퐵1
(
퐵1
(1−휔)퐵2 − 12
)
훿 휃¯
1−휔
, 푏퐿푆(푆˜) = −
푆˜ + 훿휃¯휎2퐹 − 훿
2휎2퐹 휎
2
푢휃¯
휔퐵2
(
1−퐵2
퐵1
) + 훿휎2푢−휔퐵2
(2−퐴2)휔 휃¯
훿휎2퐹 휃¯(
1−퐵2
퐵1
)
(
훿휎2푢
휔퐵2
− 1
2
) ,
(1.63)
where 퐴1, 퐵1 and 퐵2 are defined as in (1.48) and (1.36). Margin requirements are
stringent for investors 푖 when 푐푏 < 푏푖(푆˜)− 1 or 푐푠 < 1− 푏푖(푆˜), 푖 = 퐿퐷,퐿푆.
We now show that liquidity suppliers are always worse off with binding margin
requirements. Let 푊 ∗퐿푆 and 푊
∗
퐿푆0 denote the equilibrium terminal wealth of liquid-
ity suppliers with and without margin requirements respectively. We can compute
퐸[−푒−훿푊˜ ∗퐿푆0 ] = −푒푐4 , and if short margin requirements bind for liquidity demanders,
퐸[−푒−훿푊˜ ∗퐿푆 ] = −푒푐5 , we have
푐4 − 푐5 ≡ 푔1(푆˜) = −(2− 퐴1)
(
1− 퐵2
퐵1
)
휔퐵2
훿휎2퐹휎
2
푢
(푆˜ − 푆∗퐿퐷2)(푆˜ − 푆 ′퐿퐷2).
It is not difficult to show that
푆 ′퐿퐷2 − 푆∗퐿퐷2 =
(
1 + 푎2푘2
푎2푘2
푐푠휎
2
푢 + (1− 휔 + 휔푐푠)휎2퐹 − (1− 휔)휎2퐹
)
훿
휃¯
1− 휔 > 0.
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Obviously, if 푆˜ ≤ 푆∗퐿퐷2, then 푐4 ≤ 푐5, 푖.푒., liquidity suppliers are always worse off with
binding short margin requirements under asymmetric information. Similarly, we can
prove that liquidity suppliers are worse off with binding long margin requirements.
푄.퐸.퐷.
Proof of Theorem 2 and Corollary 1.5: Given the hedging demand, when short
margin requirements are not stringent, 푖.푒., 푆∗퐿퐷1 < 푆˜ ≤ 푆∗∗퐿퐷1, liquidity demanders are
better off and liquidity suppliers are worse off, 푖.푒., −푒푐1 ≤ −푒푐2 , −푒푐4 ≥ −푒푐5 . First,
we assume liquidity suppliers are indifferent between having margin requirements
and lifting margin requirements after transferring Δ푊퐿푆 to liquidity demanders, 푖.푒.,
−푒푐5 = −푒푐4+훿Δ푊퐿푆 . Therefore, Δ푊퐿푆 = 푐5−푐4훿 , to make liquidity demanders better
off, we need −푒푐1−훿Δ푊퐿퐷 ≥ −푒푐2 , 푖.푒.,
푐1 − 푐2 ≤ 훿Δ푊퐿퐷 = 훿1− 휔
휔
Δ푊퐿푆 =
1− 휔
휔
(푐5 − 푐4).
This is equivalent to
(
푆˜ +
1
2
(
휔휎2퐹
1− 퐵2
퐵1
(푐푠 − 1) + 2퐵1
(2− 퐴1)훿
)
훿
휃¯
1− 휔
)2
≥ 0. (1.64)
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Chapter 2
Asymmetric Information,
Endogenous Illiquidity, and Asset
Pricing With Imperfect
Competition1
2.1 Introduction
How do information asymmetry, competition among market makers and risk aversion
affect asset pricing, market illiquidity and welfare? How are bid and ask prices, bid
and ask depths, and market makers’ inventory levels jointly determined in equilib-
rium? What is the impact of information asymmetry on the equilibrium degree of
competition among market makers? Is the value of private information to informed
investors always positive? In this paper, we develop a novel and tractable equilibrium
model that can help answer questions like these.
Specifically, we consider an economy with three types of risk averse investors:
informed investors, uninformed investors, and potential market makers who are also
1This is a joint work with Hong Liu.
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uninformed. All investors optimally choose how to trade a risk-free asset and a stock
to maximize their expected utility and all are endowed with some shares of a stock
but no risk-free asset. Informed investors can privately observe the expected payoff
of the stock before the terminal date and thus they have trading demand motivated
by the private information. They are also subject to a liquidity shock modeled as
a random endowment of a nontraded asset (e.g., labor income, highly illiquid asset)
that is correlated with the stock. Accordingly, informed investors also have trading
demand motivated by the liquidity needs for hedging.2 Neither the informed nor the
uninformed trade strategically. Any trades informed and uninformed investors choose
to make must be with market makers at the bid or ask prices. A potential market
maker can choose to be an uninformed investor or to pay a fixed utility cost to become
a (uninformed) market maker.3 As in Kyle (1985), informed and uninformed investors
submit buy or sell orders simultaneously to market makers who then choose how to
trade. In contrast to the standard literature which assumes Bertrand (or perfect)
competition among market makers, we model the competition among market makers
as a Cournot competition: they choose simultaneously how much to buy at the bid and
2As in Glosten (1989) and Vayanos and Wang (2009), the assumption that the informed have
both information and liquidity motivated trades is a simple way to keep the private information not
fully revealed in equilibrium. All we need is that some uninformed investors with liquidity needs
trade in the same direction as the informed so that market makers only see the pooled order flow.
Indeed, we analyzed an alternative model where we have four types of investors: (1) informed who
observe the expected stock payoff, but do not have any liquidity shock; (2) uninformed without
any liquidity shock; (3) uninformed with a privately observed liquidity shock; and (4) uninformed
market makers without any liquidity shock. In the non-fully revealing equilibrium, the equilibrium
price is a linear combination of the private signal and the liquidity shock. The uninformed with a
privately observed liquidity shock can infer the private information from the market price and thus
become informed. We show that our qualitative results in this alternative model stay the same as
in our current model. However, the alternative model involves much more notations and makes the
key intuitions less transparent.
3Allowing informed and uninformed investors to be strategic does not change our main results.
For example, the bid-ask spread could still be lower with asymmetric information. If the market
making cost were a pecuniary payment, then one would need to model where this payment goes in
the economy. We assume it is a utility cost so that we can focus on our main points of interest.
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how much to sell at the ask, taking into account the price impact of their trades. The
equilibrium bid and ask prices are then determined by the market clearing conditions
at the bid and at the ask, i.e., the total amount market makers buy at the bid is equal
to the total amount other investors sell, and the total amount market makers sell at
the ask is equal to the total amount other investors buy. In equilibrium, both the
stock market and the risk-free asset market clear. We solve the equilibrium bid and
ask prices, bid and ask depths, trading volume, and inventory levels in closed forms.
In addition to the methodological contribution, our model can also help explain
some puzzling empirical findings, such as the bid-ask spread can be lower with asym-
metric information (e.g., Kini and Mian (1995), Brooks (1996), Huang and Stoll
(1997), Acker, Stalker and Tonks (2002)) and the bid-ask spread can be positively
correlated with trading volume (e.g., Brock and Kleidon (1992), Lin, Sanger and
Booth (1995), Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001)).4 To help explain the main
intuitions behind these findings, consider the case where the informed buy the stock
while the uninformed sell it in equilibrium. Unlike “noise traders” as modeled in most
of the microstructure models, uninformed investors in our model optimally react to
market prices in determining their trades. Define the reservation price as the critical
price such that an investor buys (sells) the stock if and only if the ask (bid) is lower
(higher) than this critical price. Since the informed buy and the uninformed sell, we
must have the reservation price of the informed > ask > bid > the reservation price
of the uninformed. Similar to the standard result in the classical Cournot competi-
tion models, the equilibrium spread is equal to the absolute value of the difference
4For example, Brooks (1996) find a negative relationship between bid-ask spreads and information
asymmetry around earnings and dividends announcements. Similarly, Acker, Stalker and Tonks
(2002) find that bid-ask spreads start to narrow about two weeks before earnings announcements.
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001) find that the effective bid and ask spread is positively
correlated with trading volume unconditionally (Table III).
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between the informed’s and the uninformed’s reservation prices, divided by one plus
the number of competitors, i.e., market makers. Because the uninformed do not have
liquidity shock and must estimate the expected stock payoff, the difference is the
sum of three differences across the informed and the uninformed: (1) the difference
due to hedging demand for liquidity shock (“hedging demand effect”); (2) the dif-
ference in the estimation of the expected payoff (“estimation error effect”); and (3)
the difference in the risk premium required for estimation risk (“estimation risk ef-
fect”). Since the uninformed are risk averse, they require a positive estimation risk
premium, thus the estimation risk effect lowers the reservation price. In contrast,
because the uninformed can overestimate or underestimate the expected payoff, the
estimation error effect can increase or decrease their reservation price. When the
uninformed overestimate, the estimation error effect drives up the reservation price
of the uninformed. Thus, if the estimation error effect dominates the estimation risk
effect, then the absolute value of the reservation price difference in the asymmetric
information case can be lower than in the symmetric information case where only the
first effect is present. Therefore, the bid-ask spread with asymmetric information can
be lower than with symmetric information. On the other hand, if the uninformed
underestimate, then the estimation error effect drives down the reservation price and
thus makes it further away from that of the informed. then the absolute value of the
reservation price difference is greater and so is the spread in the asymmetric infor-
mation case. Because the difference between the bid (ask) and the seller’s (buyer’s)
reservation price is also proportional to the absolute value of the reservation price
difference, the trading volume from both the informed and the uninformed also in-
creases in this case. Therefore, the trading volume can be higher with asymmetric
information and can be positively correlated with the bid-ask spread.
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In addition, we show that as competition among market makers (measured by the
number of market makers) increases, the equilibrium bid-ask spread decreases and
trading volume increases. Therefore, our model can also allow for negative corre-
lation between the bid-ask spread and trading volume. As the number of market
makers increases, the net benefit from being a market maker decreases, therefore the
maximum number of market markers that can exist in equilibrium is finite if mar-
ket making cost is positive. We find that the maximum number of market makers in
equilibrium increases in the trading demand and decreases in the market making cost.
When the bid-ask spread increases in information asymmetry, so does the maximum
number of market makers in equilibrium.
Unlike the standard models with noise traders, we find that the value of private
information to the informed can be negative. This is because the uninformed can
over-attribute the informed’s trading to the private information and thus the mar-
ket prices can be worse for the informed investors with asymmetric information. We
also find that even though market makers gain from their market power, both the
informed and the uninformed investors lose. More importantly, the market makers’
welfare gain is smaller than the welfare losses of other investors and thus social welfare
is reduced by the presence of market power. This finding suggests the importance of
increasing competition among market makers through some systematic mechanism
(e.g., improving electronic markets). It also suggests that some limits on bid-ask
spreads and the bid-ask depths with appropriate compensation for market making
may increase social welfare. In addition, consistent with the finding that asymmetric
information may reduce the bid-ask spread, we find that greater information asym-
metry can reduce the social welfare loss due to market power.
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While our analysis focuses on a pure dealership market, our main results also
apply to designated market makers in hybrid markets (e.g., NYSE). As found by
Venkataraman and Waisburd (2007) and Saar (2010), in many limit order markets,
designated market makers for less active securities can improve market quality and
are indeed commonly hired to facilitate trading in these securities.
In contrast to our model, most of the existing models in market microstructure
literature assume market makers engage in Bertrand competition, have unlimited
capital, and are risk neutral (e.g., Copeland and Galai (1983), Kyle (1985), Glosten
and Milgrom (1985)). As is well-known, it takes only two Bertrand competitors to
reach the perfect competition equilibrium prices. However, market prices can be far
from the perfect competition ones (e.g., Christie and Schultz (1994), Chen and Rit-
ter (2000), and Biais, Bisie`re and Spatt (2003)). In addition, the capital of market
makers is likely finite and market makers can be risk-averse (e.g., Garman (1976),
Lyons (1995)).5 The existing literature also assumes that market makers acquire a
net inventory position after each trading. As shown by the existing literature (e.g.,
Sofianos (1993)), market makers on average lose money from inventory positions and
they tend to offset trades at the bid and the ask to avoid significant net inventory
positions. In addition, in contrast to standard theories (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson
(1980)) which predict that dealers will use their price quotes to control their inven-
tories, Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) find that market makers mainly adjust quote
depths to manage inventories. Our model provides a simple framework for analyzing
how market makers vary the bid and ask depths (and then market determines the
prices) to offset trades to control inventories.
5The popularity of various hedging trades (e.g., delta hedging) by market makers also suggests
they are typically risk averse.
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Our model is also related to Kyle (1989), Subrahmanyam (1991), Diamond and Ver-
recchia (1991), Naik, Neuberger, and Viswanathan (1999), Back and Baruch (2004),
Vayanos and Wang (2009), and Rasu (2010). Kyle (1989) considers the imperfect
competition among risk averse informed investors. He shows that informed investors
reveal less information when competition is imperfect. Subrahmanyam (1991) finds
that increasing the precision of private information intensifies competition between
risk averse informed investors and thus can increase market liquidity. Diamond and
Verrecchia (1991) show that reducing information asymmetry can increase liquidity
and security prices may be nonmonotonic in information asymmetry because of the
potential exit of market makers. In all these three papers, market makers post a single
price, the trading needs of some of the uninformed investors (i.e., “noise investors”)
are exogenous and thus do not respond to price changes. Therefore if market makers
were allowed to post bid and ask prices, then in contrast to our predictions, the bid-
ask spread would always be increasing in information asymmetry. Naik, Neuberger,
and Viswanathan (1999) examine whether full and prompt disclosure of public-trade
details improves the welfare of a risk-averse investor in a two-stage dealership mar-
ket. Similar to the other three papers, market makers post a single price which is the
conditional expected payoff of the stock. Back and Baruch (2004) solve a version of
the Glosten-Milgrom model with a single informed investor, in which the informed in-
vestor chooses his trading times optimally. As in the original Glosten-Milgrom model,
they find that the bid-ask spread is greater with asymmetric information. Vayanos
and Wang (2009) examine how liquidity and asset prices are affected by market imper-
fections and find asymmetric information always increases market illiquidity measured
by price impact. In contrast to Vayanos and Wang (2009), in our model, market mak-
ers are strategic and transaction costs are endogenous. Rasu (2010) finds that bid-ask
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spread can decrease with the fraction of informed investors because the competition
among them intensifies (similar to the effect of signal precision on competition in Sub-
rahmanyam (1991)) and they can trade with impatient investors who are assumed
to always submit market orders. In contrast to our setting and the markets where
bid-ask spreads were empirically found to be smaller with asymmetric information
(e.g., NYSE, Nasdaq), Rasu (2010) considers a pure limit order book market where
there is no designated market maker who must post reasonable quotes.
There also exists a large literature on the effect of illiquidity on portfolio choice
and asset pricing (e.g., Constantinides (1986), Vayanos (1998), Liu and Loewenstein
(2002), Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2004), Liu (2004), Acharya and Pedersen (2005)).
In this literature, illiquidity is generally modeled as exogenous transaction costs and
therefore the fundamental question of what affects illiquidity (which in turn affects
asset pricing) is largely unanswered.6
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2 we present the
model. In Section 2.3 we solve the case with symmetric information, and in Section 2.4
we derive the equilibrium under asymmetric information. In Section 2.5 we provide
some comparative statics on asset prices, illiquidity, and welfare. We conclude in
Section 2.6. All proofs are in the Appendix.
6In addition, in most of this literature, it is not clear where transaction costs paid by the investors
go and the impact of the agents who receive these transaction costs is thus not examined.
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2.2 The model
In a one period setting, there are 푁 investors who maximize their expected constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility from the terminal wealth on date 1. They can
trade one risk-free asset and one risky asset (“stock”) on date 0. There is a zero net
supply for the risk-free asset, which also serves as the numeraire and thus the risk-free
interest rate is normalized to 0. The total supply of the stock is 푁휃¯ shares and the
date 1 payoff of each share is 푉˜ = 푉¯ + 퐹ˆ + 푢˜, where 푉¯ is a constant representing
the publicly known expected payoff, 퐹ˆ ∼ N(퐹¯ , 휎2퐹 ) is realized on date 0 and may be
observed only by informed investors on date 0, and 푢˜ ∼ N(0, 휎2푢) cannot be observed
by anyone until it becomes public on date 1, where 퐹¯ is a constant, 휎퐹 > 0, and N(⋅)
denotes the normal distribution.7
There are three types of investors: 푁퐼 informed investors (퐼), 푁푈 uninformed
investors (푈), and 푁푀 ≡ 푁 − (푁퐼 +푁푈) potential market makers (푀) who are also
uninformed. Every investor is endowed with 휃¯ shares of the stock but no risk-free
asset. To become a market maker, an investor must be a potential market maker and
must pay a fixed market-making utility cost 푐 on date 0 before making the market.
We assume that both 푁푈 and 푁퐼 are large such that all 퐼 and 푈 investors are price
takers and there are no strategic interactions among them or with market makers.
In addition to the stock, a type 퐼 investor is also subject to a liquidity shock that is
modeled as a random endowment of 푋ˆ퐼 ∼ N(0, 휎2퐼 ) units of a non-traded risky asset
on date 0, with 푋ˆ퐼 realized and only directly known to the investor on date 0. The
7퐹¯ can be set to zero and will not affect any of our results. Allowing 퐹¯ to be nonzero makes it
clear that the asymmetric information case nests the symmetric information case. Throughout this
paper, “bar” variables are constant, “tilde” variables are realized on date 1 and “hat” variables are
realized on date 0.
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non-traded asset has a per-unit payoff of 푁˜ ∼ N(0, 휎2푁) that has a covariance of 휎푢푁
with 푢˜ and is realized and becomes public on date 1.8 The correlation between the
nontraded asset and the stock results in a liquidity demand for hedging the nontraded
asset payoff. Assuming that the one who is subject to a liquidity shock is also informed
is for simplicity: even if he does not observe the private signal 퐹ˆ , because he observes
liquidity shock, he can infer it perfectly from the equilibrium price that reflects the
sum of private information and liquidity shock. Asymmetric information can therefore
exist only if some investors who do not have any liquidity shock are uninformed. We
assume that these investors are all uninformed for simplicity.9
All trades must go through market makers. Specifically, given market bid price 퐵
and ask price 퐴, 퐼 and 푈 investors sell to market makers at the bid or buy from them
at the ask or do not trade at all.
For each 푖 ∈ {퐼, 푈,푀}, investors of type 푖 are ex ante identical. Accordingly, we
restrict our analysis to symmetric equilibria where all type 푖 investors adopt the same
trading strategy. Let ℐ푖 represent a type 푖 investor’s information set on date 0 for
푖 ∈ {퐼, 푈,푀}. Given 퐵 and 퐴, for 푖 ∈ {퐼, 푈}, a type 푖 investor’s problem is
max
휃푖
퐸[−푒−훿푊˜푖 ∣ℐ푖], (2.1)
subject to the budget constraint
푊˜푖 = (휃¯ − 휃푖)+퐵 − (휃푖 − 휃¯)+퐴 + 휃푖푉˜ + 푋ˆ푖푁˜ , (2.2)
8The random endowment can represent any shock in the demand for the stock, such as a liquidity
shock or a change in the labor income or a change in a highly illiquid asset.
9Alternatively, we can view an informed investor as a broker who combines the information
motivated trades and liquidity shock motivated trades.
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where 푋ˆ푈 = 0, 훿 > 0 is the absolute risk-aversion parameter, 휃푖 is the number of
shares held until date 1 by the investor, and 푥+ ≡ max(0, 푥).10
As in Kyle (1985), informed and uninformed investors submit buy or sell orders
simultaneously to market makers who then choose how to trade. Since other investors
buy from market makers at ask and sell to them at bid, we can view these trades
occur in two separate markets: the “ask” market and the “bid” market. In the “ask”
market, other investors are demanders and market makers are suppliers and the op-
posite is true in the “bid” market. As market makers supply (sell) more in the “ask”
market, the ask price goes down and as market makers demand (buy) more in the
“bid” market, the bid price goes up. Accordingly, in contrast to the standard mi-
crostructure literature where market makers directly choose market prices, we assume
market makers directly choose how much to buy at bid given the inverse supply func-
tion (a function of the market makers’ purchasing quantity) of all other participants
and how much to sell at ask given the inverse demand function (a function of the
market makers’ selling quantity) of all other participants.11 Since all trades must go
through market makers, market makers can have market powers especially when the
number of market makers is small. To model the oligopolistic competition among the
market makers, we use the notion of the Cournot competition that is well studied and
understood in economics. Specifically, we assume that market makers simultaneously
choose the optimal number of shares to sell at ask and to buy at bid, taking into
10For the more general case where all investors have liquidity shocks or different risk aversions,
there are eight different subcases. We also obtain closed-form solutions and our main results still
hold in this more general case. We focus on the current case where all investors have the same risk
aversion and only an I investor has liquidity shock to make the main intuitions as clear as possible
and to save space.
11We view the posted bid and ask prices as the required prices to achieve the optimal amount
market makers choose to trade.
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account the price impact of their trades. This is the key innovation of this model and
it drives our main results.
Let 훼 = (훼1, 훼2, ..., 훼푁푀 )
⊤ and 훽 = (훽1, 훽2, ..., 훽푁푀 )
⊤ be the vector of the number
of shares market makers buy at bid (i.e., bid depth) and sell at ask (i.e., ask depth)
respectively. The bid price 퐵(훼) (i.e., the inverse supply function) and the ask price
퐴(훽) (i.e., the inverse demand function) can be determined by the following stock
market clearing conditions at the bid and ask prices.12
푁푀∑
푗=1
훼푗 =
∑
푖=퐼, 푈
푁푖(휃¯ − 휃∗푖 (퐴,퐵))+,
푁푀∑
푗=1
훽푗 =
∑
푖=퐼, 푈
푁푖(휃
∗
푖 (퐴,퐵)− 휃¯)+, (2.3)
where the left-hand sides represent the total purchases and sales by market makers
respectively and the right-hand sides represent the total sales and purchases by other
investors respectively.
Then for 푗 = 1, 2, ..., 푁푀 , the potential market maker 푀푗 ’s problem is
max
훼푗≥0,훽푗≥0,푅푗∈{0,1}
퐸
[(
−푒−훿푊˜푀푗 − 푐
)
푅푗 +
(
−푒−훿푊˜푀푗
)
(1− 푅푗)∣ℐ푀
]
, (2.4)
subject to the budget constraint
푊˜푀푗 =
(
훽푗퐴(훽)− 훼푗퐵(훼) + (휃¯ + 훼푗 − 훽푗)푉˜
)
푅푗
+
(
훽푗퐵 − 훼푗퐴+ (휃¯ + 훼푗 − 훽푗)푉˜
)
(1− 푅푗), (2.5)
where 푅푗 ∈ {1, 0} indicates the choice of being a market maker or not. Note that
if potential market maker 푀푗 chooses to be a market maker (i.e., 푅푗 = 1), then she
takes into account the price impact of her own trades, i.e., recognizing both 퐴 and 퐵
12The risk-free asset market will be automatically cleared by the Walras’ law. A buyer’s (seller’s)
trade only depends on ask 퐴 (bid 퐵). So 퐴 only depends on 훽 and 퐵 only depends on 훼.
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will be affected by her trades. On the other hand, if 푀푗 chooses not to be a market
maker (i.e., 푅푗 = 0), then she takes prices 퐵 and 퐴 as given and has exactly the same
problem as an uninformed investor.13
This leads to our definition of the Nash equilibrium of the Cournot competition
where all potential market makers choose to be market makers.14
Definition 2.1 An equilibrium (휃∗퐼 , 휃
∗
푈 , 훼
∗, 훽∗, 퐴∗(훽∗), 퐵∗(훼∗)) is such that
1. given 퐴∗(훽∗) and 퐵∗(훼∗), 휃∗푖 solves a type 푖 investor’s Problem (2.1) for 푖 ∈
{퐼, 푈};
2. given 휃∗퐼 and 휃
∗
푈 , 훼
∗
푗 , 훽
∗
푗 and 푅
∗
푗 = 1 solve potential market maker 푀푗’s Problem
(2.4), for 푗 = 1, 2, ..., 푁푀 ; and
3. 퐴∗(훽∗) and 퐵∗(훼∗) clear both the stock and the risk-free asset markets.
2.3 The equilibrium with symmetric information
As a benchmark, in this section we study the case with symmetric information where
퐹ˆ is publicly known at date 0 and therefore other investors can also infer a type 퐼
13Note that other investors’ problems can also be written in terms of the amount to sell at bid
(훽푖) and the amount to buy at ask (훼푖), for 푖 ∈ {퐼, 푈}. However, different from market makers,
either 훽푖 or 훼푖 must be zero for any of other investors. For simplicity, we use the after-trade position
휃푖 to describe the problems for other investors.
14This is without loss of generality, because the case where some potential market makers choose
not to be market makers is equivalent to the case with less potential market makers. Deviations
by undercutting prices can be prevented by matching prices by other market makers in subsequent
periods in a repeated games setting. As in a standard Cournot competition, varying prices is not in
the strategy space.
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investor’s liquidity shock from the equilibrium stock price. In this case, the equilib-
rium illiquidity arises from the market making cost and the market power of market
makers.
2.3.1 Perfect competition with symmetric information
We first examine the simplest subcase where all investors are price takers and there
is no market-making cost.15 With perfect competition and zero market-making cost,
equilibrium bid and ask prices must be the same and thus all investors trade at the
same price. Let 푃 ∗푠 denote the equilibrium stock price. In this subcase a market
maker has exactly the same problem as an uninformed, with 휃푀 ≡ 휃¯+훼푗 − 훽푗 (recall
that all market makers are identical and use the same trading strategy). In addition,
the market clearing condition becomes
푁퐼(휃
∗
퐼 − 휃¯) +푁푈(휃∗푈 − 휃¯) +푁푀(휃∗푀 − 휃¯) = 0. (2.6)
With symmetric information, investors’ information sets are such that ℐ퐼 = ℐ푈 =
ℐ푀 = {퐹ˆ , 푋ˆ퐼 , 푃 ∗푠 }. Therefore, a type 푖 (푖 = 퐼, 푈,푀) investor’s problem is equivalent
to
max
휃푖
−푒−훿(휃¯−휃푖)푃 ∗푠 −훿휃푖푉¯−훿휃푖퐹ˆ퐸[푒−훿휃푖푢˜−훿푋ˆ푖푁˜ ∣ℐ푖], (2.7)
15With positive market making cost, no competitive equilibrium exists. This is because on one
hand market makers need compensation in terms of a positive bid-ask spread for the market making
cost, on the other hand, a positive bid-ask spread implies infinite demand and supply by market
makers since as price takers they no longer internalize their trades’ price impact.
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which can be simplified into
min
휃푖
훿휃푖(푃
∗
푠 − 푉¯ − 퐹ˆ ) +
1
2
훿2(휃2푖 휎
2
푢 + 푋ˆ
2
푖 휎
2
푁 + 2휃푖휎푢푁푋ˆ푖), (2.8)
where 푋ˆ푀 = 푋ˆ푈 = 0. Let
ℎˆ푖 = −휎푢푁
휎2푢
푋ˆ푖 (2.9)
be a type 푖 investor’s hedging demand and
퐻ˆ푖 = 훿휎
2
푢ℎˆ푖 (2.10)
be the premium that a type 퐼 investor is willing to pay for hedging. From the first
order condition, we get:
푃 ∗푠 − 푉¯ − 퐹ˆ − 퐻ˆ푖 + 훿휎2푢휃∗푖 = 0, (2.11)
which leads to the optimal position
휃∗푖 =
푉¯ + 퐹ˆ + 퐻ˆ푖 − 푃 ∗푠
훿휎2푢
, 푖 = 퐼, 푈,푀. (2.12)
The following concept is helpful for understanding many main results of this paper.
Definition 2.2 The reservation price of an investor for a stock is the critical price
such that the investor buys (sells, respectively) the stock if and only if the ask price is
lower (the bid price is greater, respectively) than this critical price.
Equation (3.41) then implies that the reservation price of a type-푖 investor is
푃푅푖 ≡ 푉¯ + 퐹ˆ + 퐻ˆ푖 − 훿휎2푢휃¯, 푖 = 퐼, 푈,푀. (2.13)
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Equation (2.13) implies that the reservation price of a type-푖 investor increases with
expected stock payoff and the premium for hedging and decreases with stock payoff
volatility. Then (3.41) can be rewritten as
휃∗푖 = 휃¯ +
푃푅푖 − 푃 ∗푠
훿휎2푢
, 푖 = 퐼, 푈,푀. (2.14)
Let Δ푅푃푠 denote the difference in the reservation prices of the 퐼 and 푈 investors,
i.e.,
Δ푅푃푠 ≡ 푃푅퐼 − 푃푅푈 = 퐻ˆ퐼 . (2.15)
The following theorem provides the equilibrium price and equilibrium stock hold-
ings.
Theorem 2.1 With symmetric information, zero market-making cost, and perfect
competition,
1. the equilibrium price of the stock is
푃 ∗푠 =
푁퐼
푁
푃푅퐼 +
푁푈
푁
푃푅푈 +
푁푀
푁
푃푅푀 = 푉¯ + 퐹ˆ − 훿휎2푢휃¯ +
푁퐼
푁
Δ푅푃푠; 푎푛푑 (2.16)
2. the equilibrium stock holdings are
휃∗퐼 = 휃¯ +
(
1− 푁퐼
푁
)
Δ푅푃푠
훿휎2푢
, 휃∗푈 = 휃
∗
푀 = 휃¯ −
푁퐼
푁
Δ푅푃푠
훿휎2푢
. (2.17)
Theorem 2.1 shows that the equilibrium price is the population weighted average
of the reservation prices of all the investors, which follows directly from (2.14) and
the market clearing condition (2.6). The equilibrium price can also be rewritten as
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the reservation price of the uninformed investor plus the difference in the reservation
prices Δ푅푃푠. Theorem 2.1 implies that the equilibrium price increases with the
expected payoff (푉¯ + 퐹ˆ ), but decreases with the payoff volatility and stock supply.
Since Δ푅푃푠 = 훿휎
2
푢ℎˆ퐼 , which increases with risk aversion, the equilibrium price can
increase with the risk aversion in our model. This is because the risk from the non-
traded asset may dominate the risk from the stock and thus investors may be willing
to buy more shares of the stock to hedge the non-traded asset risk as they become
more risk averse, and thus drive up the stock price. Theorem 2.1 implies that 퐼
investors buy and 푈 investors sell if and only if 퐼 investors have a higher reservation
price than 푈 investors. Later we show that this result carries through the cases with
imperfect competition and with asymmetric information.
2.3.2 Imperfect competition with symmetric information
When the market-making cost is positive or the competition among market makers
is imperfect, the equilibrium bid-ask spread will no longer be zero. As the number
of market makers increases, the competition among market makers increases and the
benefit from market making decreases. When the number of market makers is so
high that the benefit of market making is lower than the cost of market making,
some potential market makers will choose not to make the market. The following
proposition shows that if the market making cost is below the utility gain from being
the monopolistic market maker and the number of potential market makers is small
enough, then there always exists a unique equilibrium (where all potential market
makers choose to be market makers).
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Proposition 2.1 For any given 푐 ∈ [0, 푐¯], where 푐¯ is a monopolistic market maker’s
utility gain from making the market in equilibrium, there exists a unique positive
integer 푁∗푀 such that: there is a unique equilibrium if and only if 푁푀 ≤ 푁∗푀 , where
푁∗푀 represents the maximum number of market makers that can exist in equilibrium
for the given market-making cost 푐.16
As in the perfect competition case, we conjecture that 퐼 investors buy and 푈
investors sell if and only if 퐼 investors have a higher reservation price than 푈 investors.
The following theorem shows that this conjecture is indeed correct.17
Theorem 2.2 Suppose 푁푀 ≤ 푁∗푀 . In the presence of market-making cost and mar-
ket power,
1. the equilibrium ask and bid prices are
퐴∗푠 = 푉¯ + 퐹ˆ − 훿휎2푢휃¯ +
푁푀푁퐼
(푁 + 1)(푁푀 + 1)
Δ푅푃푠 +
1
푁푀 + 1
(Δ푅푃푠)
+, (2.18)
퐵∗푠 = 푉¯ + 퐹ˆ − 훿휎2푢휃¯ +
푁푀푁퐼
(푁 + 1)(푁푀 + 1)
Δ푅푃푠 − 1
푁푀 + 1
(Δ푅푃푠)
−, (2.19)
which implies that 퐴∗푠 > 푃
∗
푠 > 퐵
∗
푠 , where 푃
∗
푠 is the perfect competition equi-
librium price as defined in (2.16), 푥− ≡ max(0,−푥), and the bid-ask spread
is
퐴∗푠 − 퐵∗푠 =
∣Δ푅푃푠∣
푁푀 + 1
=
∣퐻ˆ퐼 ∣
푁푀 + 1
;
16Amixed-strategy equilibrium can exist only when a potential market maker is indifferent between
being a market maker and being an uninformed investor and 푁푀 = 푁
∗
푀 . In these rare cases, we
pick the pure strategy equilibrium.
17Since market makers are identical, we use notations without the subscript 푗 to save notation.
We also use subscript 푠 to indicate the symmetric information case and subscript 푎 to indicate the
asymmetric information case in the next section.
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2. the equilibrium stock holdings are
휃∗퐼 = 휃¯+
푁푀(푁푈 +푁푀 + 1)
(푁 + 1)(푁푀 + 1)
(
Δ푅푃푠
훿휎2푢
)
, 휃∗푈 = 휃¯−
푁퐼푁푀
(푁 + 1)(푁푀 + 1)
(
Δ푅푃푠
훿휎2푢
)
,
(2.20)
휃∗푀 = 휃¯ −
푁퐼
푁 + 1
(
Δ푅푃푠
훿휎2푢
)
; 푎푛푑 (2.21)
the equilibrium quote depths are
훼∗푠 =
푁퐼(푁푀 +푁푈 + 1)
(푁 + 1)(푁푀 + 1)
(
Δ푅푃푠
훿휎2푢
)−
+
푁퐼푁푈
(푁 + 1)(푁푀 + 1)
(
Δ푅푃푠
훿휎2푢
)+
,
훽∗푠 =
푁퐼(푁푀 +푁푈 + 1)
(푁 + 1)(푁푀 + 1)
(
Δ푅푃푠
훿휎2푢
)+
+
푁퐼푁푈
(푁 + 1)(푁푀 + 1)
(
Δ푅푃푠
훿휎2푢
)−
,
which implies that the equilibrium trading volume is
푁푀(훼
∗
푠 + 훽
∗
푠 ) =
푁퐼푁푀(푁푀 + 2푁푈 + 1)
(푁푀 + 1)(푁 + 1)
( ∣Δ푅푃푠∣
훿휎2푢
)
. (2.22)
Theorem 2.2 implies that both the bid and the ask prices increase in the reservation
price difference Δ푅푃푠. In addition, similar to the results of classical Cournot compe-
tition models of multiple firms who compete through choosing the amount of output
of a homogeneous product, the bid and ask spread is equal to the absolute value of
the reservation price difference Δ푅푃푠, divided by the number of market makers plus
one. This implies that market makers equally split the market making benefit, which
increases in ∣Δ푅푃푠∣ and decreases in competition among market makers.
To help understand this result, suppose 퐼 investors buy and 푈 investors sell. The
market clearing condition (2.3) implies that the inverse demand and supply functions
faced by the market makers are respectively
퐴 = 푃푅퐼 − 푘1훽푠, 퐵 = 푃푅푈 + 푘2훼푠,
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Figure 2.1: Inverse Demand and Supply Functions and Bid and Ask Spread.
where
푘1 =
푁푀훿휎
2
푢
푁퐼
, 푘2 =
푁푀훿휎
2
푢
푁푈
.
We plot the inverse demand and supply functions and equilibrium spreads in Figure
2.1 for the case 푃푅퐼 > 푃
푅
푈 . Figure 2.1 shows that as market makers buy (sell) more
at the bid (ask), the bid (ask) price goes up (down). In the monopolistic case, the
equilibrium spread is equal to half of the reservation price difference. In addition,
Figure 2.1 also shows that the difference between 푃푅퐼 (푃
푅
푈 ) and the ask (bid) price
is also proportional to the reservation price difference Δ푅푃푠 = 푃
푅
퐼 − 푃푅푈 . Therefore
the trading amount of both 퐼 and 푈 investors and thus the trading volume are also
proportional to Δ푅푃푠.
As in the perfect competition case, 퐼 investors buy and 푈 investors sell if and only
if 퐼 investors have a higher reservation price than 푈 investors. Because market makers
have the same reservation price as the 푈 investors, in the net they trade in the same
direction as 푈 investors. Because market makers trade at more favorable prices due
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to market power, they trade more in the net than 푈 investors. More specifically, we
have
휃∗푀 − 휃¯ =
푁푀 + 1
푁푀
(휃∗푈 − 휃¯),
then by the market clearing condition, the net trade of an 퐼 investor satisfies
휃∗퐼 − 휃¯ = −
푁푈 +푁푀 + 1
푁퐼
(휃∗푈 − 휃¯).
Therefore, informed and uninformed investors always trade in the opposite directions.
(2.20) and (2.17) imply that investors buy less and sell less for the same hedging
demand Δ푅푃푠/(훿휎
2
푢) than the perfect competition case, due to the market illiquidity
resulted from the market power. As we show in the next section, all these properties
hold in the presence of asymmetric information.
2.4 The equilibrium with asymmetric information
We now assume that both 퐹ˆ and 푋ˆ퐼 are only observable to the informed investors.
Therefore, informed investors’ trades can be motivated by both liquidity shock and
private information. As before, we first consider the perfect competition case without
market making cost.
2.4.1 Perfect competition with asymmetric information
Let 푃 ∗푎 denote the competitive equilibrium price with asymmetric information. The
optimal demand of an informed investor is then
휃∗퐼 =
푉¯ + 푆ˆ − 푃 ∗푎
훿휎2푢
, (2.23)
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where 푆ˆ ≡ 퐹ˆ+퐻ˆ퐼 and 푆ˆ/(훿휎2푢) measures the combined demand from private informa-
tion about the expected payoff and hedging needs. (2.23) implies that the reservation
price for 퐼 investors is
푃푅퐼푎 = 푉¯ + 푆ˆ − 훿휎2푢휃¯, (2.24)
which is, as expected, the same as the reservation price 푃푅퐼 in the symmetric infor-
mation case.
Since the informed investor’s demand is a monotonically increasing function of
푆ˆ, his order reveals the value of 푆ˆ to market makers. Thus we conjecture that
the equilibrium price depends on 푆ˆ. Since the uninformed investors can then infer
the value of 푆ˆ from the market price, the information sets for the informed, the
uninformed investors and market makers are ℐ퐼 = {퐹ˆ , 푋ˆ퐼 , 푃 ∗푎 } and ℐ푈 = ℐ푀 =
{푃 ∗푎 } = {푆ˆ} respectively. Therefore, the uninformed investor’s problem is
max
휃푈
−푒−훿휃¯푃 ∗푎+훿휃푈 (푃 ∗푎−푉¯ )+ 12 훿2휃2푈휎2푢 ×퐸[푒−훿휃푈 퐹ˆ ∣ℐ푈 ]. (2.25)
Let 휎2퐻 ≡ 훿2휎2푢푁휎2퐼 , assumed to be strictly positive, be the variance of the premium
for hedging 퐻ˆ퐼 . Then the conditional expectation of 퐹ˆ is
퐸[퐹ˆ ∣푆ˆ] = 퐹¯ + 휎
2
퐹 (푆ˆ − 퐹¯ )
휎2퐹 + 휎
2
퐻
, (2.26)
and the conditional variance of 퐹ˆ is
Var[퐹ˆ ∣푆ˆ] = 휎
2
퐹휎
2
퐻
휎2퐹 + 휎
2
퐻
. (2.27)
Let
휎¯2푢 = Var[푉˜ ∣푆ˆ] = 휎2푢 +
휎2퐻휎
2
퐹
휎2퐹 + 휎
2
퐻
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be the conditional variance of the stock payoff of the uninformed (and the market
makers) and
휈 =
휎¯2푢
휎2푢
> 1
be the ratio of the conditional variance of the stock payoff of the uninformed to that
of the informed. Then, the optimal position of a 푈 -investor is:
휃∗푈 =
푉¯ + 퐹¯ +
휎2퐹 (푆ˆ−퐹¯ )
휎2퐹+휎
2
퐻
− 푃 ∗푎
훿휎¯2푢
. (2.28)
As in the symmetric information case with perfect competition, market makers solve
exactly the same problem as the uninformed and have the same reservation price
as the uninformed. Equation (2.28) then implies that the reservation price for a 푈
investor and an 푀 investor is now
푃푅푈푎 = 푃
푅
푀푎 = 푉¯ + 퐹¯ +
휎2퐹 (푆ˆ − 퐹¯ )
휎2퐹 + 휎
2
퐻
− 훿휎¯2푢휃¯. (2.29)
Thus the difference in the reservation prices is:
Δ푅푃푎 = 푃
푅
퐼푎 − 푃푅푈푎 = 퐻ˆ퐼 + (퐹ˆ − 퐸[퐹ˆ ∣푆ˆ]) + 훿휃¯푉 푎푟[퐹ˆ ∣푆ˆ] =
휎2퐻
휎2퐹 + 휎
2
퐻
(푆ˆ − 퐹¯ + 훿휎2퐹 휃¯).
(2.30)
Remark 1. As 휎2퐹 → 0, since 퐹ˆ ∼ N(퐹¯ , 휎2퐹 ), we must have 퐹ˆ → 퐹¯ . By (2.27),
we have 휎¯2푢 → 휎2푢 and 휈 → 1. Then 푃푅푖푎 → 푃푅푖 for 푖 = 퐼, 푈 , Δ푅푃푎 → Δ푅푃푠,
and therefore the equilibrium with asymmetric information converges to the equilib-
rium with symmetric information. This convergence holds with or without perfect
competition and with or without market making costs. In this sense, the symmetric
information case is a special case of the asymmetric information case. Accordingly,
we only provide proofs for the asymmetric information case.
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As in the symmetric information case, we conjecture that 퐼 investors buy and 푈
and 푀 investors sell if and only if Δ푅푃푎 > 0. The following theorem provides the
equilibrium price and equilibrium stock holdings, confirming our conjecture.
Theorem 2.3 In the presence of asymmetric information, there exists a unique com-
petitive equilibrium with stock price being linear in 푆ˆ, where the equilibrium price is
푃 ∗푎 =
휈푁퐼
푁푎
푃푅퐼푎 +
푁푈
푁푎
푃푅푈푎 +
푁푀
푁푎
푃푅푀푎 = 푉¯ + 퐹¯ − 훿(휎2퐹 + 휎2푢)휃¯ +
(
휎2퐹
휎2퐻
+
휈푁퐼
푁푎
)
Δ푅푃푎,
(2.31)
and the investors’ optimal stock positions are given by
휃∗퐼 = 휃¯ +
(
1− 휈푁퐼
푁푎
)
Δ푅푃푎
훿휎2푢
, (2.32)
휃∗푈 = 휃
∗
푀 = 휃¯ −
휈푁퐼
푁푎
Δ푅푃푎
훿휎¯2푢
, (2.33)
where
푁푎 ≡ 휈푁퐼 +푁푀 +푁푈 > 푁 (2.34)
is the information weighted total population.
As noted above, when 휎2퐹 → 0, the equilibrium quantities in Theorem 2.3 converge
to those in the symmetric information case. Since the difference in reservation prices
Δ푅푃푎 is linear in 푆ˆ, so is the equilibrium price. This implies that in equilibrium all
investors can indeed infer the unique value of 푆ˆ from observing the market price.18
As shown by (2.31), similar to the symmetric information case, the equilibrium price
18In our model, market makers observe order flow and can infer how much informed investors are
trading. However, they do not know how much of the informed investor’s order is due to information
on the stock’s payoff or how much is due to the hedging demand. This is similar to the set-up of
Glosten (1989) and Vayanos and Wang (2009). See Footnote 2.
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is again a weighted average of the reservation prices of the investors in the economy.
Compared to the symmetric information case, however, since 휈 > 1, the weight of the
reservation price of the informed investors (휈푁퐼/푁푎) is greater, because they have
more information about the stock payoff. Accordingly, the information weighted to-
tal population 푁푎 puts more weight on the informed investors, which justifies the
interpretation of 푁푎 as the information weighted total population. Since ex ante
퐸[Δ푅푃푎] =
휎2퐻
휎2
퐹
+휎2
퐻
훿휎2퐹 휃¯ > 0, on average informed investors buy in equilibrium be-
cause the uninformed investors require a risk premium for estimation risk and thus
on average value the stock lower than the informed. Since 푁푎 > 푁 , Theorems 2.3
and 2.1 imply that the informed trade less than in the symmetric information case
given the same difference in reservation prices.
2.4.2 Imperfect competition with asymmetric information
As in the symmetric information case, we first show that when the market-making
cost 푐 is not too large, there exists a maximum number of market makers 푁∗푀푎 below
which a unique equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2.2 For any given 푐 ∈ [0, 푐¯푎], where 푐¯푎 is a monopolistic market maker’s
equilibrium utility gain from making the market in the presence of asymmetric in-
formation, there exists a unique positive integer 푁∗푀푎 such that: there is a unique
equilibrium if and only if 푁푀 ≤ 푁∗푀푎, where 푁∗푀푎 represents the maximum number of
market makers that can exist in equilibrium for the given market-making cost 푐.
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From now on, we assume 푁푀 ≤ 푁∗푀푎 . Let 퐵∗푎 and 퐴∗푎 be the equilibrium bid price
and ask price respectively. Define
퐶퐼 ≡ 푁푀(푁푈 +푁푀 + 1)
(푁푀 + 1) (푁푎 + 1)
, 퐶푈 ≡ 휈푁푀푁퐼
(푁푀 + 1) (푁푎 + 1)
, (2.35)
퐶푀 ≡ 휈푁퐼
푁푎 + 1
, 퐶퐷 ≡ 푁퐼(푁푈 +푁푀 + 1)
(푁푀 + 1) (푁푎 + 1)
, and 휅 ≡ 휎
2
퐹
휎2퐻
+ 퐶푈 . (2.36)
The following theorem provides the equilibrium bid and ask prices and equilibrium
stock holdings in the presence of asymmetric information and market power.
Theorem 2.4 Suppose 푁푀 ≤ 푁∗푀푎. In the presence of asymmetric information and
market power, we have that
1. the equilibrium bid and ask prices are
퐴∗푎 = 푉¯ + 퐹¯ − 훿(휎2퐹 + 휎2푢)휃¯ + 휅Δ푅푃푎 +
Δ푅푃+푎
푁푀 + 1
,
퐵∗푎 = 푉¯ + 퐹¯ − 훿(휎2퐹 + 휎2푢)휃¯ + 휅Δ푅푃푎 −
Δ푅푃−푎
푁푀 + 1
.
The bid and ask spread is
퐴∗푎 − 퐵∗푎 =
∣Δ푅푃푎∣
푁푀 + 1
=
휎2퐻 ∣푆ˆ − 퐹¯ + 훿휎2퐹 휃¯∣
(푁푀 + 1)(휎2퐹 + 휎
2
퐻)
, (2.37)
and we have
퐴∗푎 > 푃
∗
푎 > 퐵
∗
푎; (2.38)
2. the equilibrium stock holdings are
휃∗퐼 = 휃¯ + 퐶퐼
Δ푅푃푎
훿휎2푢
, 휃∗푈 = 휃¯ − 퐶푈
Δ푅푃푎
훿휎¯2푢
, 휃∗푀 = 휃¯ − 퐶푀
Δ푅푃푎
훿휎¯2푢
; (2.39)
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the equilibrium quote depths are
훼∗푎 = 퐶퐷
((
Δ푅푃푎
훿휎2푢
)−
+
휈푁푈
푁푈 +푁푀 + 1
(
Δ푅푃푎
훿휎¯2푢
)+)
, (2.40)
and
훽∗푎 = 퐶퐷
(
휈푁푈
푁푈 +푁푀 + 1
(
Δ푅푃푎
훿휎¯2푢
)−
+
(
Δ푅푃푎
훿휎2푢
)+)
, (2.41)
which implies that the equilibrium trading volume is
푁푀(훼
∗
푎 + 훽
∗
푎) =
푁푀푁퐼(푁푀 + 2푁푈 + 1)
(푁푀 + 1)(푁푎 + 1)
( ∣Δ푅푃푎∣
훿휎2푢
)
. (2.42)
Theorem 2.4 implies that both the bid and ask prices increase in Δ푅푃푎 and thus
also in 푆ˆ.19 As in the symmetric information case, the bid and ask spread is equal
to the absolute value of the reservation price difference, divided by 푁푀 + 1. Thus
the bid-ask spread decreases in competition among market makers and increases in
∣Δ푅푃푎∣, as illustrated in Figure 2.2.
Both Theorem 2.2 and Theorem 2.4 imply that the bid price converges from be-
low and ask price converges from above to the competitive market equilibrium price
as 푁푀 increases when the market making cost is zero, as illustrated in Figure 2.3.
Moreover, the equilibrium bid price always increases in 푁푀 while the equilibrium
ask price always decreases in 푁푀 due to the more intensive competition among mar-
ket makers.20 Because the equilibrium bid (ask) price is lower (higher) than the
competitive equilibrium price, the equilibrium trading volume is lower than that in
19Theorem 2.4 also implies that in equilibrium, all investors always trade unless the reservation
prices of the 퐼 investors and 푈 investors are exactly the same. In the more general case where
different types of investors have different risk aversions or different liquidity shocks, then some types
of non-market-makers might not trade in equilibrium.
20If we measure the stock return of a non-market-maker by 푉˜
퐴∗
, these results suggest that market
maker competition increases expected return and return volatility, but does not affect the Sharpe-
ratio.
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Figure 2.2: Bid and Ask Spread Against 푁푀 and ∣Δ푅푃푎∣
The default parameter values are: 휃¯ = 1, 훿 = 1, 푁푀 = 10, 휎퐹 = 0.4, 휎퐻 = 0.4, 휎푢 =
0.4, 푆ˆ = 0.5, and 퐹¯ = 0.
the perfect competition case. Therefore, market power and market making cost in-
crease the spread and decrease the equilibrium trading volume. Thus market power
and market making cost tend to make the bid-ask spread negatively correlated with
trading volume, as expected. On the other hand, because both spread and trading
volume increase in ∣Δ푅푃푎∣, the bid-ask spread can also be positively correlated with
trading volume. Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995) find that trading volume and effective
spreads are positively correlated at the beginning and the end of the day. Chordia,
Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001) find that the effective bid-ask spread is positively
correlated with trading volume. Our model suggests that these positive correlation
may be caused by a change in the valuation difference of investors.
2.5 Comparative statics
In this section, we provide some comparative statics on asset prices, market illiquidity,
and welfare.
103
5 10 15 20 25 30
NM
2.3426
2.3427
2.3428
2.3429
2.3430
2.3431
2.3432 Aa
Ba
Pa
*
*
*
Figure 2.3: The Bid (lower curve), Ask (upper curve) and Competitive Market Equi-
librium Price (middle line) When 푁푀 Increases (with fixed 푁푈 +푁푀)
The default parameter values are: 휃¯ = 1, 훿 = 1, 푉¯ = 3, 푁퐼 = 100, 푁푈 = 1000, 휎퐹 =
0.4, 휎퐻 = 0.4, 휎푢 = 0.4, 푆ˆ = −0.5, and 퐹¯ = 0.
2.5.1 Bid-ask spread, market depths, and trading volume
First we compare bid-ask spread with and without asymmetric information.
Proposition 2.3 퐴∗푎 − 퐵∗푎 < 퐴∗푠 −퐵∗푠 iff ∣Δ푅푃푎∣ < ∣Δ푅푃푠∣.
Proposition 2.3 implies that the bid-ask spread with asymmetric information can
be smaller than with symmetric information. This occurs if and only if the reser-
vation price difference with asymmetric information is smaller than with symmetric
information. Figure 4 shows that this occurs when 퐹ˆ is relatively small for a given
premium for hedging 퐻ˆ퐼 . To help understand this result, we can rewrite (2.30) as
Δ푅푃푎 = 퐻ˆ퐼 +
(
퐹ˆ − 퐹¯ − 휎
2
퐹 (푆ˆ − 퐹¯ )
휎2퐹 + 휎
2
퐻
)
+
(
훿휃¯
휎2퐻휎
2
퐹
휎2퐹 + 휎
2
퐻
)
, (2.43)
where the first term is from the difference in the hedging demand (“hedging demand
effect”), the second term is the difference in the estimation of the expected stock pay-
off (“estimation error effect”), and the third term is the difference in the risk premium
required for the estimation risk (“estimation risk effect”). Since only the uninformed
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Figure 2.4: The Bid-Ask Spread with and without Asymmetric Information
The colored area denotes those states where the bid-ask spread is narrower with
asymmetric information. The default parameter values are: 휃¯ = 1, 훿 = 1, 푉¯ = 3,
푁푀 = 10, 휎퐻 = 0.4, 휎퐹 = 0.4, 휎푢 = 0.4, and 퐹¯ = 0.
are subject to the estimation risk and they are risk averse, they require a higher risk
premium, which drives their reservation price down and thus the estimation risk effect
always drives up the reservation price difference Δ푅푃푎. In contrast, since the unin-
formed can overestimate or underestimate the expected stock payoff, the estimation
error effect can drive Δ푅푃푎 down or up. When the uninformed overestimate and thus
the estimation error effect is negative, which occurs when the realized 퐹ˆ is relatively
small, the net of the estimation error effect and the estimation risk effect can cancel
out some of the hedging demand effect. In these cases, the reservation price differ-
ence with asymmetric information can be lower than with symmetric information,
and accordingly the bid-ask spread with asymmetric information can be lower than
with symmetric information. For example, if 퐹ˆ = 퐹 ∗ ≡ 퐹¯ − 퐻ˆ퐼 − 훿휎2퐹 휃¯, then the
reservation prices are the same for 퐼 and 푈 , because the net of the estimation error
effect and the estimation risk effect exactly cancels out the hedging demand effect.
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Therefore, the equilibrium bid-ask spread must be zero (and no trade). When 퐹ˆ is
near 퐹 ∗, then investors’ reservation prices are close, and thus the bid-ask spread can
be smaller than with symmetric information. On the other hand, when 퐹ˆ is far from
퐹 ∗, then investors’ reservation prices are significantly different from each other, thus
market makers can take advantage of this difference by increasing the bid-ask spread.
Therefore, when 퐹ˆ is far from 퐹 ∗, the bid-ask spread with asymmetric information
is wider than with symmetric information.
The bid-ask spread comparison in Proposition 2.3 is an ex-post result which is
dependent on the realized values of 퐹ˆ and 퐻ˆ퐼 . We next provide an ex-ante comparison
of the expected bid-ask spreads before the realization of 퐹ˆ and 퐻ˆ퐼 with and without
asymmetric information.
Proposition 2.4 1. The expected bid-ask spreads under symmetric and asymmet-
ric information are:
퐸[퐴∗푠 −퐵∗푠 ] =
2
푁푀 + 1
휎퐻√
2휋
, (2.44)
퐸[퐴∗푎 − 퐵∗푎] =
휎2퐻
(푁푀 + 1)푏2
(
2푏√
2휋
푒−
훿2휎4퐹 휃¯
2
2푏2 + 훿휎2퐹 휃¯
(
2N
(
훿휎2퐹 휃¯
푏
)
− 1
))
,
(2.45)
where 푏 =
√
휎2퐹 + 휎
2
퐻 and N is the cdf of the standard normal distribution.
2. If 0 < 휎퐻 <
휎퐹
1+훿휎퐹 휃¯
√
휋
2
, then 퐸[퐴∗푎 − 퐵∗푎] < 퐸[퐴∗푠 −퐵∗푠 ].
3. If
휎2퐹 >
2휎2퐻
훿휎퐻 휃¯
√
2휋 − 2 and 휎퐻 >
2√
2휋훿휃¯
, (2.46)
then 퐸[퐴∗푎 −퐵∗푎] > 퐸[퐴∗푠 − 퐵∗푠 ].
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Proposition 2.4 shows that in the presence of asymmetric information, if the uncer-
tainty about the hedging demand (휎퐻) is small and the uncertainty about the private
information (휎퐹 ) is large, then the average bid-ask spread with asymmetric informa-
tion is smaller than with symmetric information. This is because (1) 퐸[Δ푅푃푎] > 0
and so the informed buy on average; (2) when the uncertainty of the private in-
formation is much greater than that of the hedging demand, the uninformed can
significantly overestimate the expected stock payoff and thus the estimation error
effect offsets some hedging demand effect and the estimation risk effect, making the
expected spread smaller.
Next we further examine how bid-ask spread changes with the degree of information
asymmetry. The difference in the stock payoff conditional variances of the informed
and the uninformed is
Var(푉˜ ∣ℐ푈)− Var(푉˜ ∣ℐ퐼) = 휎
2
퐹휎
2
퐻
휎2퐹 + 휎
2
퐻
.
Since uncertainty about the hedging demand is unrelated to stock payoff, we will fix
휎퐻 and use 휎퐹 to measure the degree of information asymmetry. The larger 휎퐹 is,
the greater the information asymmetry between the informed and the uninformed
is. For example, as noted before, if 휎퐹 → 0, then the asymmetric information case
converges to the symmetric information case because there would be no uncertainty
about stock payoff 푉˜ .21
21Alternatively, as in Subrahmanyam (1991) and Vayanos and Wang (2009), one can assume that
the informed observes a private signal 푠 about the stock payoff 푉˜ in period 0, where 푠 = 푉˜ + 휀˜,
and 휀˜ is independently normally distributed with mean zero and variance 휎2휀 . Then 푉 푎푟[푉˜ ∣푠] =
(휎2
푢
+휎2
퐹
)휎2
휀
휎2
푢
+휎2
퐹
+휎2
휀
. In our model, 푉 푎푟[푉˜ ∣퐹ˆ ] = 휎2푢. So, the measure of the precision of private information,
휎2휀 = 휎
2
푢(1 +
휎2
푢
휎2
퐹
). Therefore, increasing the precision of the signal (decreasing 휎휀) in the alternative
model is qualitatively equivalent to increasing 휎2퐹 in our model.
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Figure 2.5: The Bid-Ask Spread in Equilibrium Against 휎퐹
The default parameter values are 휃¯ = 1, 훿 = 1, 푉¯ = 3, 푁푀 = 10, 푁퐼 = 100, 푁푈 =
1000, 휎퐹 = 0.4, 휎푢 = 0.4, 휎퐻 = 0.4, and 퐹¯ = 0. 푆ˆ = −0.5 in the left graph, and
푆ˆ = 0.1 in the right one.
The following proposition shows that in contrast to most of the existing literature
(e.g., Glosten and Milgrom (1985)), the bid-ask spread can decrease as the degree of
information asymmetry increases.
Proposition 2.5
∂(퐴∗푎−퐵∗푎)
∂휎퐹
< 0 iff Δ푅푃푎 < 0 or Δ푅푃푎 > 훿휎
2
퐻 휃¯.
Proposition 2.5 implies that the bid-ask spread decreases with the information
asymmetry if the informed sell or the informed buy a sufficient amount. To help
understand the intuition, note that 휎퐹 does not affect the informed’s reservation
price 푃푅퐼푎 and we rewrite the reservation price of the uninformed (2.29) as
푃푅푈푎 = 푉¯ +
(
퐹¯ +
휎2퐹 (푆ˆ − 퐹¯ )
휎2퐹 + 휎
2
퐻
)
− 훿
(
휎2푢 +
휎2퐹휎
2
퐻
휎2퐹 + 휎
2
퐻
)
휃¯. (2.47)
If Δ푅푃푎 < 0, then the reservation price of the uninformed is above that of the
informed and 퐼 investors sell, 푈 investors buy. In addition, in this case 푆ˆ− 퐹¯ < 0 by
(2.30), which implies that as 휎퐹 increases, the conditional mean (the second term in
(2.47)) decreases and the risk premium (the third term in (2.47)) increases. Therefore
as 휎퐹 increases, the reservation price of the uninformed decreases and gets closer to the
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reservation price of the informed as long as Δ푅푃푎 < 0, which reduces the reservation
price difference and hence also the spread.
If Δ푅푃푎 > 훿휎
2
퐻 휃¯, then the reservation price of the informed is above that of the
uninformed and 퐼 investors buy, 푈 investors sell. As 휎퐹 increases, the risk premium
still increases and thus drives down the reservation price of the uninformed and makes
it further away from the reservation price of the informed. However, because in this
case 푆ˆ − 퐹¯ > 훿휎2퐻 휃¯ > 0 by (2.30), the conditional mean increases as 휎퐹 increases,
which drives up the reservation price of the uninformed and thus makes it closer to
the reservation price of the informed. When 푆ˆ − 퐹¯ > 훿휎2퐻 휃¯, the effect of 휎퐹 on
the conditional mean dominates its effect on the risk premium and thus drives up
the reservation price of the uniformed. Therefore, the reservation price difference
decreases and so does the spread. On the other hand, if 0 < Δ푅푃푎 < 훿휎
2
퐻 휃¯, then the
effect of 휎퐹 on the risk premium dominates its effect on conditional mean and thus
drives down the reservation price of the uniformed. Therefore, the reservation price
difference increases and so does the spread. These cases are shown in Figure 2.5.
Next we examine how market depths, trading volume and net order size change
with information asymmetry, reservation price difference, the number of market mak-
ers and the stock payoff volatility.
Proposition 2.6 1. 훼∗푎 > 훼
∗
푠, 훽
∗
푎 > 훽
∗
푠 , and 푁푀(훼
∗
푎 + 훽
∗
푎) > 푁푀(훼
∗
푠 + 훽
∗
푠 ) iff
∣Δ푅푃푎∣ > 푁푎+1푁+1 ∣Δ푅푃푠∣.
2. ∂(푁푀 (훼
∗
푎+훽
∗
푎))
∂휎퐹
> 0 iff
0 < Δ푅푃푎 <
(푁푎 + 1)훿휎
2
푢휃¯
푁퐼 + (푁 + 1)휎2푢/휎
2
퐻
(< 훿휎2퐻 휃¯).
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The same is true for the net order size ∣훼∗푎 − 훽∗푎∣.
3. As ∣Δ푅푃푎∣ increases, the bid depth 훼∗푎, the ask depth 훽∗푎, the net order size
∣훼∗푎 − 훽∗푎∣, and the trading volume 푁푀 (훼∗푎 + 훽∗푎) all increase.
4. Fixing 푁푈+푁푀 , as 푁푀 increases, both the bid depth and the ask depth decrease,
but trading volume increases when the number of uninformed investors is large.
5. As the stock payoff volatility 휎푢 increases, the bid depth, the ask depth, the net
order size, and the trading volume all decrease.
Part 1 of Proposition 2.6 shows that the equilibrium market depths and trading
volume can be higher with asymmetric information when the reservation price differ-
ence is large relative to the symmetric information case. Intuitively, with a greater
reservation price difference, the difference between a buyer’s (seller’s) reservation price
and the ask (bid) price also increases, so the trading demand of the investor increases
and therefore both the market depths and the market trading volume increase. In
addition, Part 2 suggests that both the trading volume and the net order size can
increase with information asymmetry when 퐼 investors buy a moderate amount. In
contrast to Easley and O’Hara (1987, 1992), Proposition 2.5 and Part 2 of Proposition
2.6 imply that net order size can be negatively correlated with the bid-ask spread.
For example, if
(푁푎 + 1)훿휎
2
푢휃¯
푁퐼 + (푁 + 1)휎2푢/휎
2
퐻
< Δ푅푃푎 < 훿휎
2
퐻 휃¯,
then as information asymmetry 휎퐹 increases, the net order size decreases by Part 2
of Proposition 2.6, but bid-ask spread increases by Proposition 2.5. However, since
the bid-ask spread also increases with ∣Δ푅푃푎∣, Part 3 implies that the bid-ask spread
and net order size can also be positively correlated. A typical justification of this
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positive correlation (e.g., Easley and O’Hara (1987, 1992)) is that as the net order
size increases, the adverse effect of information asymmetry increases and thus the bid-
ask spread increases. In contrast, we view the net order size as the net trade that the
market makers are willing to make, because ∣훼∗푎 − 훽∗푎∣ = ∣휃∗푀 − 휃¯∣. As the reservation
price difference increases, the spread increases and thus the market makers are willing
to sell or buy more in the net at the better price.
Part 4 shows that when the number of the uninformed is large, then competition
increases market trading volume, although it decreases the quote depths of individual
market maker. Part 5 implies that as the stock payoff volatility increases, market
depths, trading volume, and net order size all decrease due to the increased risk.
2.5.2 Value of private information and utility loss due to
market power
In the standard microstructure models with noise investors, the value of private in-
formation to the informed is always positive, because the informed can always profit
from trading with noise investors. The following result shows it can be negative in
our model because the uninformed optimally react to market prices.
Proposition 2.7 1. The informed investors are worse off in the asymmetric in-
formation case than in the symmetric information case iff ∣Δ푅푃푎∣ < 푁푎+1푁+1 ∣Δ푅푃푠∣.
2. The expected utility of the informed decreases with information asymmetry 휎퐹
iff
Δ푅푃푎 < 0 표푟 Δ푅푃푎 >
(푁푎 + 1)훿휎
2
푢휃¯
푁퐼 + (푁 + 1)휎2푢/휎
2
퐻
.
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Proposition 2.7 implies that for any given liquidity shock, if the private information
퐹ˆ is relatively small in magnitude, then the informed are worse off with asymmetric
information, and therefore the value of the private information is negative in these
cases (similar to Figure 4). Intuitively, when the private information 퐹ˆ is relatively
small, the uninformed over-attribute the informed’s trading to the private informa-
tion 퐹ˆ and thus the market prices are worse for the informed investors than in the
symmetric information case. In addition, the expected utility of the informed can
decrease with information asymmetry when 퐼 investors sell or buy a large amount,
because the uninformed over-attribute more the informed’s trading to the private
information as the information asymmetry increases.
Next we analyze the welfare loss due to market power. To isolate the effect of
market power on welfare, in this subsection, we assume that the market-making cost
푐 = 0. Let 푈푖 and 푈¯푖 denote the utility of 푖 (푖 = 퐼, 푈,푀) investors with imperfect
and perfect competition respectively and 푓푖 and 푓¯푖 be the corresponding certainty
equivalent wealth, i.e., 푈푖 = − exp(−훿푓푖), and 푈¯푖 = − exp(−훿푓¯푖).
Definition 2.3 The certainty equivalent wealth loss of a type 푖 investor (푖 = 퐼, 푈,푀)
due to market power is 푓¯푖 − 푓푖.
The following proposition shows how market power affects the welfare of the in-
formed, the uninformed and market makers.22
22Closed-form expressions for the equivalent wealth losses are available from the authors.
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Proposition 2.8 1. Market makers’ market power makes themselves better off
and non-market-makers worse off. More importantly, the sum of their welfare
is reduced.
2. Both the certainty equivalent wealth losses for 퐼 and 푈 investors and the cer-
tainty equivalent wealth gain for 푀 investors decrease with 푁푀 , and increase
with ∣Δ푅푃푎∣.
Not surprisingly, market makers benefit from their market power by earning a
higher bid-ask spread. Other investors are worse off because they have to trade
at a worse price. More importantly, Proposition 2.8 shows that market makers’
welfare gain is less than the welfare loss of the other investors. This is because when
determining their trades, market makers do not internalize other investors’ losses.
As 푁푀 increases, market power decreases and thus both market makers’ utility gain
and other investors’ utility loss decrease. This implies that there exists a Pareto
improvement wealth transfer and market regulation mechanism that limits market
bid-ask spreads and depths and makes all investors (including market makers) strictly
better off. It also suggests the importance of promoting competition among market
makers on improving market liquidity and social welfare.
If the difference between reservation prices increases, then investors trade more
with market makers and therefore investors’ certainty equivalent wealth loss increases
as we can see in Figure 2.6.
Next we compare investors’ total certainty equivalent wealth loss due to market
power with and without asymmetric information and examine how the loss changes
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Figure 2.6: The Total Certainty Equivalent Wealth Loss due to Market Power Against
푁푀 and ∣Δ푅푃푎∣.
The default parameter values are: 휃¯ = 1, 훿 = 1, 푉¯ = 3, 푁푀 = 10, 푁퐼 = 100, 푁푈 =
1000, 휎퐹 = 0.4, 휎퐻 = 0.4, 휎푢 = 0.4, 푆ˆ = 0.5, and 퐹¯ = 0.
with information asymmetry. Since the bid-ask spread can decrease with informa-
tion asymmetry and investors’ welfare can increase when the spread is smaller, one
expects that the presence of asymmetric information may decrease the welfare loss
from market power. The following proposition confirms this expectation.
Proposition 2.9 Let 푊퐿푎 and 푊퐿푠 be the certainty equivalent wealth loss due to
market power with and without asymmetric information respectively, then
1. 푊퐿푎 < 푊퐿푠 if and only if ∣Δ푅푃푎∣ < 퐶1∣Δ푅푃푠∣, where 퐶1 ≥ 1 is as defined in
(2.68) in the Appendix.
2. If Δ푅푃푎 < 0, then the total certainty equivalent wealth loss due to market power
decreases with information asymmetry 휎퐹 .
Proposition 2.9 implies that the presence of asymmetric information indeed may
decrease the investors’ total certainty equivalent wealth loss due to market power.
This decrease typically occurs when 퐹ˆ is relatively small for a given hedging premium
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Figure 2.7: The Total Certainty Equivalent Wealth Loss with and without Asymmet-
ric Information.
The colored area denotes those states where the total certainty equivalent wealth loss
is greater with symmetric information. The default parameter values are: 휃¯ = 1, 훿 =
1, 푉¯ = 3, 푁푀 = 10, 푁퐼 = 100, 푁푈 = 1000, 휎퐻 = 0.4, 휎퐹 = 0.4, 휎푢 = 0.4 and 퐹¯ = 0.
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Figure 2.8: The Total Certainty Equivalent Wealth Loss due to Market Power Against
휎퐹 .
The default parameter values are: 휃¯ = 1, 훿 = 1, 푉¯ = 3, 푁푀 = 10, 푁퐼 = 100, 푁푈 =
1000, 휎퐹 = 0.4, 휎퐻 = 0.4, 휎푢 = 0.4, and 퐹¯ = 0. 푆ˆ = −0.5 in the left graph, and
푆ˆ = 0.1 in the right graph.
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퐻ˆ퐼 , as illustrated in Figure 2.7. In most of these cases, the bid-ask spread is smaller
in the presence of asymmetric information.
In addition, Part 2 of Proposition 2.9 shows that the total certainty equivalent
wealth loss due to the market power can decrease in information asymmetry 휎퐹 , as
illustrated in Figure 2.8. Intuitively, since the bid-ask spread can increase or decrease
with information asymmetry, so can the total welfare loss.
2.5.3 Maximum number of market makers in equilibrium
As shown in Propositions 1 and 2, as long as the market making cost is not too large,
there exists a positive maximum number of market makers in equilibrium.
Figure 2.9 shows that as the market making cost 푐 or the competition increases, the
maximum number decreases, because market making becomes less profitable. Figure
2.10 shows the same cases as Figure 2.5. When ∣푆ˆ∣ is large, the maximum number of
market makers decreases with information asymmetry, because the spread decreases
with information asymmetry (as shown in Figure 2.5) and the profitability of market
making declines.
2.6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we develop a novel framework to study how asymmetric information,
competition among market makers, and risk aversion affect equilibrium illiquidity and
asset pricing. All our results are obtained in closed-form. In contrast to most of the
existing models, our model can help explain many puzzling empirical findings such as
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Figure 2.9: The Maximum Number of Market Makers in Equilibrium Against Market
Making Utility Cost 푐 and ∣Δ푅푃푎∣
The default parameter values are 휃¯ = 1, 훿 = 1, 푉¯ = 3, 푁퐼 = 100, 푁푈 = 1000, 휎퐹 =
0.4, 휎푢 = 0.4, 휎퐻 = 0.4, 푐 = 0.005, 푆ˆ = −0.5, and 퐹¯ = 0.
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Figure 2.10: The Maximum Number of Market Makers in Equilibrium Against 휎퐹
The default parameter values are 휃¯ = 1, 훿 = 1, 푉¯ = 3, 푁푀 = 10, 푁퐼 = 100, 푁푈 =
1000, 휎퐹 = 0.4, 휎푢 = 0.4, 휎퐻 = 0.4, and 퐹¯ = 0. 푆ˆ = −0.5 in the left graph, and
푆ˆ = 0.1 in the right one.
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the bid-ask spread may decrease with asymmetric information, and trading volume
may be positively correlated with market illiquidity. The main departure from the
existing literature where market makers directly compete through prices is that in
our model market makers choose simultaneously how much to sell at the ask and how
much to buy at the bid through Cournot competition and then the market clearing
condition determines both the bid and the ask prices. Our new framework is flexible,
tractable and can be applied to analyze many interesting questions on the effect of
asymmetric information, competition, trading constraints on asset prices and market
illiquidity.
2.7 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2.1: This is a special case of the proof of Theorem 2.3 with
휎2퐹 = 0 and 퐹¯ = 퐹ˆ . 푄.퐸.퐷.
Proof of Theorem 2.2: This is a special case of the proof of Theorem 2.4 with
휎2퐹 = 0 and 퐹¯ = 퐹ˆ . 푄.퐸.퐷.
Proof of Proposition 2.1: This is a special case of the proof of Proposition 2.2
with 휎2퐹 = 0 and 퐹¯ = 퐹ˆ . 푄.퐸.퐷.
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Proof of Proposition 2.2: Let 푈푀 denote the utility of the 푁
푡ℎ
푀 potential market
maker with 푁푈 uninformed investors and 푈푈 denote the utility of the (푁푈+1)
푡ℎ unin-
formed investor with 푁푀 − 1 market makers. We compare their certainty equivalent
wealths 푓푀 and 푓푈 , where 푓푀 and 푓푈 are such that 푈푀 = − exp(−훿푓푀 ) − 푐, and
푈푈 = − exp(−훿푓푈 ). To save space, we prove the case when 푈 investors are buyers
in equilibrium. The proof for the other case is similar. First we assume that given
푁푀 and 푁푈 , all potential market makers choose to be market makers, then the proof
of Theorem 2.4 implies the existence of a unique (linear) equilibrium and provides
explicit expressions for the equilibrium. Later we show that when the market making
cost 푐 is small enough, the assumption indeed holds. Under the assumption, we have
푓푀 = (훽
∗
푎퐴
∗
푎−훼∗푎퐵∗푎)+(휃¯+훼∗푎−훽∗푎)
(
푉¯ +
휎2퐹 푆ˆ + 휎
2
퐻퐹¯
휎2퐹 + 휎
2
퐻
)
− 1
2
훿(휃¯+훼∗푎−훽∗푎)2휎2푢, (2.48)
and
푓푈 = (휃¯ − 휃∗푈)퐴∗푎 + 휃∗푈
(
푉¯ +
휎2퐹 푆ˆ + 휎
2
퐻 퐹¯
휎2퐹 + 휎
2
퐻
)
− 1
2
훿휃∗푈
2휎2푢, (2.49)
where 훼∗푎, 훽
∗
푎, 퐴
∗
푎 and 퐵
∗
푎 are as given in Theorem 2.4.
푓푀(푁푀 , 푁푈)− 푓푈(푁푀 − 1, 푁푈 + 1) = 푁퐼(Δ푅푃푎)2×
2푁2푀 (푁푀 +푁푈 + 1)
2 + 휈푁퐼(푁
2
푀 (2푁푀 + 2푁푈 + 3)− 1)
2푁2푀(푁푀 + 1)
2(푁푎 + 1)2훿휎2푢
> 0,
and 푓푀(푁푀 , 푁푈) → 푓푈(푁푀 − 1, 푁푈 + 1) as 푁푀 → ∞. It can be verified that
푓푀(푁푀 , 푁푈) − 푓푈(푁푀 − 1, 푁푈 + 1) strictly decreases in 푁푀 . Therefore, for small
enough 푐 > 0, −푒−훿푓푀 (푁푀 , 푁푈 ) − 푐 − (−푒−훿푓푈 (푁푀−1, 푁푈+1)) > 0 when 푁푀 < ∞,
and −푒−훿푓푀 (푁푀 , 푁푈 ) − 푐 < −푒−훿푓푈 (푁푀−1, 푁푈+1), when 푁푀 → ∞. It follows that for
small enough 푐 > 0, there is a unique 0 < 푥∗ < ∞, such that −푒−훿푓푀 (푥∗, 푁푈 ) − 푐 =
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−푒−훿푓푈 (푥∗−1, 푁푈+1). Then for any 푁푀 ≤ 푁∗푀푎 ≡ [푥∗], all potential market makers
choose to be market makers and then Theorem 2.4 implies there exists a unique equi-
librium. It can be shown that for a fixed 푁푈 +푁푀 , the equivalent wealth of a market
maker decreases with competition (푁푀) and the equivalent wealth of an uninformed
investor increases with competition, i.e., 푓푀(푛, 푁푈 +푁푀 − 푛) is decreasing in 푛 and
푓푈(푛 − 1, 푁푈 + 푁푀 − 푛 + 1) is increasing in 푛. This implies that a monopolistic
market maker’s equivalent wealth gain from making the market is the greatest. Let
푐¯ =
(−푒−훿푓푀 (1, 푁푈+푁푀−1))− (−푒−훿푓푈 (0, 푁푈+푁푀 )) be the monopolistic market maker’s
equivalent wealth gain from making the market, where 푓푈(0, 푁푈 + 푁푀) is the cer-
tainty equivalent wealth of the (푁푈 + 푁푀)
푡ℎ uninformed investor when there is no
trade. Then for any 푐 < 푐¯, there exists a unique 푁∗푀푎 such that for any 푁푀 ≤ 푁∗푀푎,
there exists an equilibrium where all potential market makers choose to be market
makers in equilibrium and then Theorem 2.4 implies the existence of a unique equi-
librium. 푄.퐸.퐷.
Proof of Theorem 2.3: From our assumption that 퐹ˆ and 휎푢푁푋ˆ퐼 are 푖.푖.푑 nor-
mally distributed, we know that 푆ˆ is normally distributed with mean 퐹¯ and variance
휎2퐹 + 휎
2
퐻 . The covariance between 퐹ˆ and 푆ˆ is 퐶표푣(퐹ˆ , 푆ˆ) = 퐶표푣(퐹ˆ , 퐹ˆ − 훿휎푢푁푋ˆ퐼) =
푉 푎푟(퐹ˆ ) = 휎2퐹 , therefore, the correlation coefficient of 퐹ˆ and 푆ˆ is 휌퐹ˆ ,푆ˆ =
휎퐹√
휎2퐹+휎
2
퐻
.
퐸[퐹ˆ ∣푆ˆ] = 휎2퐹 푆ˆ+휎2퐻 퐹¯
휎2퐹+휎
2
퐻
, and 푉 푎푟[퐹ˆ ∣푆ˆ] = 휎2퐻휎2퐹
휎2퐹+휎
2
퐻
. The optimal stock holding of an unin-
formed investor is given in (2.28), and similarly, for an market maker we get:
휃∗푀 =
푉¯ +
휎2퐹 푆ˆ+휎
2
퐻 퐹¯
휎2퐹+휎
2
퐻
− 푃 ∗푎
훿휎¯2푢
. (2.50)
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Substituting (2.23), (2.28) and (3.47) into the market clearing condition 푁퐼휃
∗
퐼 +
푁푈휃
∗
푈 + 푁푀휃
∗
푀 = 푁휃¯, we get the equilibrium stock price 푃
∗
푎 . Substituting 푃
∗
푎 into
(2.23), (2.28) and (3.47), we can get 퐼, 푈 and 푀 investors’ optimal stock holdings.
푄.퐸.퐷.
Proof of Theorem 2.4: We prove the case when Δ푅푃푎 < 0. In this case, we
conjecture that 퐼 investors sell at the bid and 푈 investors buy at the ask. Given bid
price 퐵 and ask price 퐴, the optimal demand of 퐼 and 푈 are:
휃∗퐼 =
푉¯ + 푆ˆ −퐵
훿휎2푢
푎푛푑 휃∗푈 =
푉¯ +
휎2퐹 푆ˆ+휎
2
퐻 퐹¯
휎2퐹+휎
2
퐻
− 퐴
훿휎¯2푢
. (2.51)
Substituting (2.51) into the market clearing conditions (2.3), we get that the mar-
ket clearing bid and ask prices are:
퐴 = 푉¯ +
휎2퐹 푆ˆ + 휎
2
퐻 퐹¯
휎2퐹 + 휎
2
퐻
−훿휎¯2푢휃¯−
훿휎¯2푢
푁푈
푁푀∑
푗=1
훽푗, 푎푛푑 퐵 = 푉¯ +푆ˆ−훿휎2푢휃¯+
훿휎2푢
푁퐼
푁푀∑
푗=1
훼푗 , (2.52)
where 훼푗 and 훽푗 are the optimal shares of stock 푀푗 choose to buy from 퐼 investors
and sell to 푈 investors respectively. Market maker 푀푗 ’s problem is:
min
훼푗 ,훽푗
−훿(훽푗퐴−훼푗퐵)−훿(휃¯+훼푗−훽푗)
(
푉¯ +
휎2퐹 푆ˆ + 휎
2
퐻퐹¯
휎2퐹 + 휎
2
퐻
)
+
1
2
훿2휎¯2푢(휃¯+훼푗−훽푗)2, (2.53)
where 퐴 and 퐵 are the market clearing prices given in (2.52). F.O.C with respect to
훼푗 gives us:
휎2퐻
휎2퐹 + 휎
2
퐻
(푆ˆ− 퐹¯ ) + 훿 (휎¯2푢 − 휎2푢) 휃¯+ 훿휎2푢푁퐼
푁푀∑
푗=1
훼푗 +
(
휎2푢
푁퐼
+ 휎¯2푢
)
훿훼푗 − 훿휎¯2푢훽푗 = 0. (2.54)
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Sum all, we get:
푁푀휎
2
퐻
휎2퐹 + 휎
2
퐻
(푆ˆ − 퐹¯ ) +푁푀훿
(
휎¯2푢 − 휎2푢
)
휃¯+
(
(푁푀 + 1)휎
2
푢
푁퐼
+ 휎¯2푢
)
훿
푁푀∑
푗=1
훼푗 − 훿휎¯2푢
푁푀∑
푗=1
훽푗 = 0.
(2.55)
F.O.C with respect to 훽푗 , we get:
훿
푁푈
푁푀∑
푗=1
훽푗 − 훿(훼푗 − 훽푗) + 훿
푁푈
훽푗 = 0. (2.56)
Sum all, we get:
푁푀∑
푗=1
훼푗 =
푁푈 +푁푀 + 1
푁푈
푁푀∑
푗=1
훽푗 . (2.57)
Substituting (2.57) into (2.55), we get
푁푀∑
푗=1
훽푗 = − 푁푀푁퐼푁푈
(푁푀 + 1) (푁푎 + 1)
휎2퐻
(
푆ˆ − 퐹¯ + 훿휎2퐹 휃¯
)
(휎2퐹 + 휎
2
퐻)훿휎
2
푢
= − 푁푀푁퐼푁푈
(푁푀 + 1) (푁푎 + 1)
Δ푅푃푎
훿휎2푢
.
(2.58)
Substituting (2.58) into (2.52), we can get the equilibrium ask and bid price 퐴∗푎 and
퐵∗푎. And then substituting 퐴
∗
푎 and 퐵
∗
푎 into (2.51), we can get the optimal stock
holdings of 퐼 and 푈 investors as stated in Theorem 2.4.
It is not difficult to derive that 퐴∗푎 < 푃
∗
푎푈 and 퐵
∗
푎 > 푃
∗
푎퐼 are equivalent to
푆ˆ < 퐹¯ − 훿휎2퐹 휃¯ which is exactly the condition we conjecture for 퐼 investors to sell
and 푈 investors to buy. Similarly, we can prove the other case of this Theorem when
퐼 investors buy and 푈 investors sell. 푄.퐸.퐷.
Proof of Proposition 2.3: This is direct from Theorem 2.4. 푄.퐸.퐷.
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Proof of Proposition 2.4:
퐸[퐴∗푠 − 퐵∗푠 ] =
1
푁푀 + 1
퐸∣퐻ˆ퐼 ∣ = 2
푁푀 + 1
휎퐻√
2휋
. (2.59)
We know from previous section,
푓(푆ˆ) =
1√
2휋푏
푒−
(푆ˆ−퐹¯ )2
2푏2 , 푆ˆ = 퐹ˆ + 퐻ˆ퐼 .
Therefore,
퐸[퐴∗푎 − 퐵∗푎]
=
휎2퐻
(푁푀 + 1)푏2
∫ +∞
−∞
∣푆ˆ − 퐹¯ + 훿휎2퐹 휃¯∣푓(푆ˆ)푑푆ˆ
=
휎2퐻
(푁푀 + 1)푏2
(
2푏√
2휋
푒−
훿2휎4퐹 휃¯
2
2푏2 + 훿휎2퐹 휃¯
(
2N
(
훿휎2퐹 휃¯
푏
)
− 1
))
.
We use the fact that 푥
1+푥2
푛(푥) < 1−N(푥) < 푛(푥)
푥
, for 푥 ≥ 0, where 푛(푥) is the 푝푑푓
for standard normal distribution. We have:
퐸[퐴∗푎 − 퐵∗푎] >
훿휎2퐻휎
2
퐹 휃¯
(푁푀 + 1)(휎2퐹 + 휎
2
퐻)
.
And we have
퐸[퐴∗푎 −퐵∗푎] ≤
휎2퐻
(푁푀 + 1)(휎
2
퐹 + 휎
2
퐻)
퐸(∣퐹ˆ − 퐹¯ ∣+ ∣퐻ˆ퐼 ∣+ 훿휎2퐹 휃¯)
=
휎2퐻
(푁푀 + 1)(휎2퐹 + 휎
2
퐻)
(
2휎퐹√
2휋
+
2휎퐻√
2휋
+ 훿휎2퐹 휃¯
)
Therefore, if
훿휎2퐻휎
2
퐹 휃¯
휎2퐻+휎
2
퐹
> 2휎퐻√
2휋
, which is equivalent to (2.46), then 퐸[퐴∗푎 − 퐵∗푎] >
퐸[퐴∗푠 −퐵∗푠 ], and if 0 < 휎퐻 < 휎퐹1+훿휃¯휎퐹√휋2 , then 퐸[퐴
∗
푎 − 퐵∗푎] < 퐸[퐴∗푠 −퐵∗푠 ]. 푄.퐸.퐷.
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Proof of Proposition 2.5: If 푆ˆ < 퐹¯ − 훿휎2퐹 휃¯, then ∂(퐴
∗
푎−퐵∗푎)
∂휎퐹
=
2휎퐹 휎
2
퐻 (푆ˆ−퐹¯−훿휎2퐻 휃¯)
(휎2퐹+휎
2
퐻 )
2(푁푀+1)
< 0.
If 푆ˆ > 퐹¯−훿휎2퐹 휃¯, then ∂(퐴
∗
푎−퐵∗푎)
∂휎퐹
= −2휎퐹 휎2퐻 (푆ˆ−퐹¯−훿휎2퐻 휃¯)
(휎2
퐹
+휎2
퐻
)2(푁푀+1)
< 0, when 푆ˆ > 퐹¯+훿휎2퐻 휃¯. 푄.퐸.퐷.
Proof of Proposition 2.6: Part 1 is direct from Theorems 2.2 and 2.4.
For Part 2, if Δ푅푃푎 < 0, i.e., 푆ˆ < 퐹¯ − 훿휎2퐹 휃¯, then
∂ (푁푀(훼
∗
푎 + 훽
∗
푎))
∂휎퐹
=
−2휎퐹푁푀푁퐼(1 +푁푀 + 2푁푈)휎
2
퐻(−(휎2퐻푁퐼 + (푁 + 1)휎2푢)(푆ˆ − 퐹¯ ) + (푁 + 1)훿휎2퐻휎2푢휃¯)
훿(푁푀 + 1)(휎
2
퐹 (푁 + 1)휎
2
푢 + 휎
2
퐻(휎
2
퐹푁퐼 + (푁 + 1)휎
2
푢))
2
< 0,
(2.60)
and if Δ푅푃푎 > 0, i.e., 푆ˆ > 퐹¯ − 훿휎2퐹 휃¯, then
∂ (푁푀(훼
∗
푎 + 훽
∗
푎))
∂휎퐹
=
2휎퐹푁푀푁퐼(1 +푁푀 + 2푁푈)휎
2
퐻(−(휎2퐻푁퐼 + (푁 + 1)휎2푢)(푆ˆ − 퐹¯ ) + (푁 + 1)훿휎2퐻휎2푢휃¯)
훿(푁푀 + 1)(휎
2
퐹 (푁 + 1)휎
2
푢 + 휎
2
퐻(휎
2
퐹푁퐼 + (푁 + 1)휎
2
푢))
2
,
(2.61)
which is positive if Δ푅푃푎 <
(푁푎+1)훿휎2푢 휃¯
푁퐼+(푁+1)휎2푢/휎
2
퐻
.
Part 3 follows directly from Theorem 2.4 and noting that the net order size is
∣훼∗푎 − 훽∗푎∣ =
푁퐼 ∣Δ푅푃푎∣
(휈푁퐼 +푁푈 +푁푀 + 1)훿휎2푢
.
For Part 4, fixing 푁푈 +푁푀 , we have
∂훼∗푎
∂푁푀
=
∂훽∗푎
∂푁푀
= −푁퐼(1 +푁푈 +푁푀)∣Δ푅푃푎∣
(푁푀 + 1)2(푁푎 + 1)훿휎2푢
< 0,
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∂
∑푁푀
푗=1(훼
∗
푎 + 훽
∗
푎)
∂푁푀
=
푁퐼(2푁푈 + 1−푁2푀)∣Δ푅푃푎∣
(푁푀 + 1)2(푁푎 + 1))훿휎2푢
,
which is positive when 푁푈 is large.
For Part 5, if Δ푅푃푎 < 0, then
∂훼∗푎
∂휎푢
=
2푁퐼(푁푈 +푁푀 + 1)(푁 + 1)Δ푅푃푎
(푁푀 + 1)(푁푎 + 1)2훿휎3푢
< 0,
∂훽∗푎
∂휎푢
=
∂훼∗푎
∂휎푢
푁푈
푁푀 +푁푈 + 1
< 0.
The case for Δ푅푃푎 > 0 is similar. 푄.퐸.퐷.
Proof of Proposition 2.7: The expected utility of 퐼 investors in asymmetric infor-
mation case is: 푈퐼푎 = − exp(−훿푓퐼푎), where
푓퐼푎 =
1
2
(
− 퐻ˆ
2
퐼휎
2
푁
훿휎2푢푁
+ 2휃¯
(
Δ푅푃푎 + 퐹¯ + 푉¯ − 훿휃¯휎2퐹 +
Δ푅푃푎휎
2
퐹
휎2퐻
)
(2.62)
+
Δ푅푃 2푎 (1 +푁푀 +푁푈)
2푁2푀
(1 +푁푎)2(1 +푁푀)2훿휎2푢
− 훿휃¯2휎2푢
)
(2.63)
Similarly, the expected utility of 퐼 investors in symmetric information case is: 푈퐼푠 =
− exp(−훿푓퐼푠), where
푓퐼푠 =
1
2
(
−퐻ˆ
2
퐼 휎
2
푁
훿휎2푢푁
+ 2휃¯
(
Δ푅푃푠 + 퐹ˆ + 푉¯
)
+
Δ푅푃 2푠 (1 +푁푀 +푁푈)
2푁2푀
(1 +푁)2(1 +푁푀 )2훿휎2푢
− 훿휃¯2휎2푢
)
.
Therefore, after some simplification, we have
푓퐼푎 − 푓퐼푠 =
푁2푀(1 +푁푀 +푁푈)
2
(
− Δ푅푃 2푠
(1+푁)2
+ Δ푅푃
2
푎
(1+푁푎)2
)
2(1 +푁푀)2훿휎2푢
.
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Therefore, the informed investors are better off if and only if ∣Δ푅푃푎∣ > 푁푎+1푁+1 ∣Δ푅푃푠∣.
Part 2 follows from the proof of the second part of Proposition 2.6. 푄.퐸.퐷.
Proof of Proposition 2.8: We will provide proof only for the case when 퐼 investors
sell and 푈 investors buy. Similar proof applies to the other case. The expected
utility of 퐼 investors in the perfect competition case (i.e., without market power) is:
푈¯퐼 = − exp(−훿푓¯퐼), where
푓¯퐼 =
(
휃¯ − 푆ˆ + 푉¯ − 푃
∗
푎
훿휎2푢
)
푃 ∗푎 +
푆ˆ + 푉¯ − 푃 ∗푎
훿휎2푢
(푉¯ + 퐹ˆ )
−1
2
훿
⎛
⎝( 푆ˆ + 푉¯ − 푃 ∗푎
훿휎2푢
)2
휎2푢 + 푋ˆ
2
퐼 휎
2
푁 + 2
푆ˆ + 푉¯ − 푃 ∗푎
훿휎2푢
휎푢푁푋ˆ퐼
⎞
⎠ . (2.64)
The expected utility of 퐼 investors with market power is: 푈퐼 = − exp(−훿푓퐼), where
푓퐼 =
(
휃¯ − 푆ˆ + 푉¯ − 퐵
∗
푎
훿휎2푢
)
퐵∗푎 +
푆ˆ + 푉¯ − 퐵∗푎
훿휎2푢
(푉¯ + 퐹ˆ )
−1
2
훿
⎛
⎝( 푆ˆ + 푉¯ −퐵∗푎
훿휎2푢
)2
휎2푢 + 푋ˆ
2
퐼 휎
2
푁 + 2
푆ˆ + 푉¯ −퐵∗푎
훿휎2푢
휎푢푁푋ˆ퐼
⎞
⎠ . (2.65)
It is not difficult to see that:
푊퐿퐼 ≡ 푓¯퐼 − 푓퐼 = (푃 ∗푎 − 퐵∗푎)
((
휃¯ − 푆ˆ + 푉¯
훿휎2푢
)
+
1
2훿
푃 ∗푎 +퐵
∗
푎
휎2푢
)
. (2.66)
Substituting 푃 ∗푎 , 퐵
∗
푎 and 퐴
∗
푎 into (2.66) and simplifying, we have
푊퐿퐼 = (Δ푅푃푎)
2 (푁푎푁푈 + (푁푈 +푁푀 )(푁푀 + 1))((푁푎 + 1)(2푁푀 + 1)(푁푈 +푁푀) + 휈푁퐼푁푀)
2푁2푎 (푁푎 + 1)
2(푁푀 + 1)2훿휎2푢
,
126
which is greater than 0, i.e., 퐼 investors are always worse off with market power.
Similarly, we can show that
푊퐿푈 = (Δ푅푃푎)
2푁
2
퐼 ((푁푀 + 1)
2 + 2푁푎(푁푀 + 1)
2 +푁2푎 (2푁푀 + 1)) 휈
2푁2푎 (푁푎 + 1)
2(푁푀 + 1)2훿휎2푢
which is greater than 0 and
푊퐿푀 = −(Δ푅푃푎)2푁퐼 ((푁푀 + 1)
2((2푁푎 + 1)(푁푈 +푁푀)−푁푎) + 2푁2푎푁푈(푁푎 +푁푀 + 2))
2푁2푎 (푁푎 + 1)
2(푁푀 + 1)2훿휎2푢
,
which is less than 0, i.e., the uninformed are worse off and market makers are better
off with market power. The total certainty equivalent wealth loss is 푊퐿퐴 = 푁퐼 ×
푊퐿퐼 +푁푈 ×푊퐿푈 +푁푀 ×푊퐿푀 , which can be shown to be
(Δ푅푃푎)
2 (푁푎 + 1)
2푁푈 +푁푀 ((푁푀 + 1)
2 + (푁푎 +푁푀 + 2)푁푈)
2푁푎(푁푎 + 1)2(푁푀 + 1)2훿휎2푢
,
which is strictly greater than 0, i.e., other investors lose more than market makers
gain due to market power.
Then taking derivative of 푊퐿푖 (푖 = 퐼, 푈,푀) with respect to 푁푀 yields that they
all decrease with 푁푀 . 푊퐿푖 (푖 = 퐼, 푈,푀) clearly increases with ∣Δ푅푃푎∣. 푄.퐸.퐷.
Proof of Proposition 2.9: The total equivalent wealth loss with symmetric infor-
mation is: 푊퐿푠 = (Δ푅푃푠)
2퐷2, and the total equivalent wealth loss with asymmetric
information is: 푊퐿푎 = (Δ푅푃푎)
2퐸2, where 퐷2 and 퐸2 are as follows.
퐷2 =
푁퐼 (푁푈(푁 + 1)
2 +푁푀푁푈(푁 + 1) +푁푀(푁푀 + 1)(푁푈 +푁푀 + 1))
2(푁푀 + 1)2푁(푁 + 1)2훿휎2푢
, (2.67)
퐸2 =
푁퐼 (푁푈(푁푎 + 1)
2 +푁푀푁푈(푁푎 + 1) +푁푀(푁푀 + 1)(푁푈 +푁푀 + 1))
2(푁푀 + 1)2푁푎(푁푎 + 1)2훿휎2푢
.
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We then have
퐶1 ≡ 퐷
퐸
≥ 1, (2.68)
where the inequality holds because 퐸 is decreasing in 푁푎, which is increasing with
information asymmetry 휎2퐹 . Then we have 푊퐿푎 < 푊퐿푠 if and only if ∣Δ푅푃푎∣ <
퐶1∣Δ푅푃푠∣. For Part 2, taking derivative of 푊퐿푎 with respect to 휎퐹 (푁푎 is a function
of 휎퐹 ) shows that 푊퐿푎 decreases with 휎퐹 when Δ푅푃푎 < 0. 푄.퐸.퐷.
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Chapter 3
Increases in Risk Aversion and the
Distribution of Portfolio Payoffs1
3.1 Introduction
The trade-off between risk and return arises in many portfolio problems in finance.
This trade-off is more-or-less assumed in mean-variance optimization, and is also
present in the comparative statics for two-asset portfolio problems explored by Arrow
(1965) and Pratt (1964) (for a model with a riskless asset) and Kihlstrom, Romer,
and Williams (1981) and Ross (1981) (for a model without a riskless asset). However,
the trade-off is less clear in portfolio problems with many risky assets, as pointed
out by Hart (1975). Assuming a complete market with many states (and therefore
many assets), we show that a less risk-averse (in the sense of Arrow and Pratt)
agent’s portfolio payoff is distributed as the payoff for the more risk-averse agent,
plus a non-negative random variable (extra return), plus conditional-mean-zero noise
(risk). Therefore, the general complete-markets portfolio problem, which may not be
a mean-variance problem, still trades off risk and return.
1This is a joint work with Philip H. Dybvig.
133
If either agent has non-increasing absolute risk aversion, then the non-negative
random variable (extra return) can be chosen to be a constant. We also give a
counter-example that shows that in general, the non-negative random variable cannot
be chosen to be a constant. In this case, the less risk averse agent’s payoff can also
have a higher mean and a lower variance than the more risk averse agent’s payoff.
We further prove a converse theorem. Suppose there are two agents, such that in all
complete markets, the first agent chooses a payoff that is distributed as the second’s
payoff, plus a non-negative random variable, plus conditional-mean-zero noise. Then
the first agent is less risk averse than the other agent.
Our main result applies directly in a multiple period setting with consumption
only at a terminal date, and perhaps dynamic trading is the most natural motivation
for the completeness we are assuming. Our main result can also be extended to
a multiple period model with consumption at many dates, but this is more subtle.
Consumption at each date may not be ordered when risk aversion changes, due to
shifts in the timing of consumption. However, for agents with the same pure rate
of time preference, we show there is a weighting of probabilities across periods that
preserves the single-period result.
Our main result also extends to some special settings with incomplete markets,
for example, a two-asset world with a risk-free asset. The proof is in two parts. The
first part is the standard result: decreasing the risk aversion increases the portfolio
allocation to the asset with higher return. The second part shows that the portfolio
payoff for the higher allocation is distributed as the other payoff plus a constant plus
conditional-mean-zero noise. However, for a two-asset world without a risk-free asset,
both parts of the proof fail in general and we have a counter-example. Therefore, our
134
result is not true in general with incomplete markets. We further provide sufficient
conditions under which our results still hold in a two-risky-asset world using Ross’s
stronger measure of risk aversion. Each result from two assets can be re-interpreted
as applying to parallel settings with two-fund separation identifying the two funds
with the two assets.
The proofs in the paper make extensive use of results from stochastic dominance,
portfolio choice, and Arrow-Pratt and Ross (1981) risk aversion. One contribution of
the paper is to show how these concepts relate to each other. We use general versions
of the stochastic dominance results for 퐿1 random variables2 and monotone concave
preferences, following Strassen (1965) and Ross (1971). To see why our results are
related to stochastic dominance, note that if the first agent’s payoff equals the second
agent’s payoff plus a non-negative random variable plus conditional-mean-zero noise,
this is equivalent to saying that negative the first agent’s payoff is monotone-concave
dominated by negative the second agent’s payoff.
Section 3.2 introduces the model setup and provides some preliminary results,
Section 3.3 derives the main results. Section 3.4 extends the main results in a multiple-
period model. Section 3.5 discusses the case with incomplete markets. Section 3.6
illustrates the main results using some examples and Section 3.7 concludes.
2We assume that the consumptions have unbounded distributions instead of compact support
(e.g., Rothschild-Stiglitz (1970)). Compact support for consumption is not a happy assumption in
finance because it is violated by most of our leading models. Unfortunately, as noted by Rothschild-
Stiglitz (1972), the integral condition is not available in our general setting.
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3.2 Model Setup and Some Standard Results
We want to work in a fairly general setting with complete markets and strictly concave
increasing von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences. There are two agents 퐴 and 퐵
with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions 푈퐴(푐) and 푈퐵(푐), respectively. We
assume that 푈퐴(푐) and 푈퐵(푐) are of class 퐶
2, 푈 ′퐴(푐) > 0, 푈
′
퐵(푐) > 0, 푈
′′
퐴(푐) < 0 and
푈 ′′퐵(푐) < 0. Each agent’s problem has the form:
Problem 3.1 Choose random consumption 푐˜ to
max퐸[푈푖(푐˜)],
푠.푡. 퐸[휌˜푐˜] = 푤0. (3.1)
In Problem 3.1, 푖 = 퐴 or 퐵 indexes the agent, 푤0 is initial wealth (which is the
same for both agents), and 휌˜ > 0 is the state price density. We will assume that 휌˜ is
in the class 풫 for which both agents have optimal random consumptions with finite
means, denoted 푐˜퐴 and 푐˜퐵.
The first order condition is
푈 ′푖(푐˜푖) = 휆푖휌˜, (3.2)
푖.푒., the marginal utility is proportional to the state price density 휌˜. We have
푐˜푖 = 퐼푖(휆푖휌˜), (3.3)
where 퐼푖 is the inverse function of 푈
′
푖(⋅). By continuity and negativity of the second
order derivative 푈 ′′푖 (⋅), 푐˜푖 is a decreasing function of 휌˜.
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Our main result will be that 푐˜퐴 ∼ 푐˜퐵 + 푧˜ + 휀˜, where “ ∼ ” denotes “is distributed
as,” 푧˜ ≥ 0, and 퐸[휀˜∣푐퐵+푧] = 0.3 We firstly review and give the proofs in the Appendix
of some standard results in the form needed for the proofs of our main results.
Lemma 3.1 If 퐵 is weakly more risk averse than 퐴,
(
∀푐,−푈 ′′퐵(푐)
푈 ′퐵(푐)
≥ −푈 ′′퐴(푐)
푈 ′퐴(푐)
)
, then
1. for any solution to (3.2) (which may not satisfy the budget constraint (3.1)),
there exists some critical consumption level 푐∗ (can be ±∞) such that 푐˜퐴 ≥ 푐˜퐵
when 푐˜퐵 ≥ 푐∗, and such that 푐˜퐴 ≤ 푐˜퐵 when 푐˜퐵 ≤ 푐∗;
2. assuming 푐˜퐴 and 푐˜퐵 have finite means, and 퐴 and 퐵 have equal initial wealths
푤0, then 퐸[푐˜퐴] ≥ 퐸[푐˜퐵] ≥ 푤0퐸[휌˜] . Note that 푤0퐸[휌˜] is the payoff to a riskless invest-
ment of 푤0.
The first result in Lemma 3.1 implies that the consumptions function of the less
risk averse agent crosses that of the more risk averse agent at most once and from
above. This single-crossing result is due to Pratt (1964), expressed in a slightly dif-
ferent way. Lemma 3.1 gives us a sense in which decreasing the agent’s risk aversion
takes us further from the riskless asset. In fact, we can obtain a more explicit descrip-
tion (our main result) of how decreasing the agent’s risk aversion changes the optimal
portfolio choice. The description and proof are both related to monotone concave
stochastic dominance.4 The following theorem gives a distributional characterization
3Throughout this paper, the letters with “tilde” denote random variables, and the corresponding
letters without “tilde” denote particular values of these variables.
4We avoid using the term “second order stochastic dominance” in this paper because different
papers use different definitions. In this paper, we follow unambiguous terminology from Ross (1971):
(1) if 퐸[푉 (푋˜)] ≥ 퐸[푉 (푌˜ )] for all nondecreasing functions, then 푋˜ monotone stochastically dominates
푌˜ ; (2) if 퐸[푉 (푋˜)] ≥ 퐸[푉 (푌˜ )] for all concave functions, then 푋˜ concave stochastically dominates
푌˜ ; (3) if 퐸[푉 (푋˜)] ≥ 퐸[푉 (푌˜ )] for all concave nondecreasing functions, then 푋˜ monotone-concave
stochastically dominates 푌˜ .
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of stochastic dominance for all monotone and concave functions of one random vari-
able over another. The form of this result is from Ross (1971) and is a special case of
a result of Strassen (1965) which generalizes a traditional result for bounded random
variables to possibly unbounded random variables with finite means.
Theorem 3.1 (Monotone Concave Stochastic Dominance: Strassen (1965)
and Ross (1971)) Let 푋˜ and 푌˜ be two random variables defined in 푅1 with finite
means; then 퐸[푉 (푋˜)] ≥ 퐸[푉 (푌˜ )], for all concave nondecreasing functions 푉 (⋅), 푖.푒.,
푋˜ monotone-concave stochastically dominates 푌˜ , if and only if 푌˜ ∼ 푋˜− 푍˜+ 휀˜, where
푍˜ ≥ 0, and 퐸[휀˜∣푋 − 푍] = 0.
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970, 1972) popularized a similar characterization of
stochastic dominance for all concave functions (which implies equal means) that is a
special case of another result of Strassen’s.
Theorem 3.2 (Concave Stochastic Dominance: Strassen (1965), and Roth-
schild and Stiglitz (1970, 1972)) Let 푋˜ and 푌˜ be two random variables defined in 푅1
with finite means; then 퐸[푉 (푋˜)] ≥ 퐸[푉 (푌˜ )], for all concave functions 푉 (⋅), 푖.푒., 푋˜
concave stochastically dominates 푌˜ , if and only if 푌˜ ∼ 푋˜ + 휀˜, where 퐸[휀˜∣푋 ] = 0.
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) also offered an integral condition for Concave Stochas-
tic Dominance, which unfortunately does not generalize to all random variables with
finite mean, as they note in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1972).5
5The integration by parts used to prove the integral condition unfortunately includes a term
at the lower endpoint which needs not equal to zero in general. Therefore, the integral condition
may not be sufficient or necessary condition for Concave Stochastic Dominance under unbounded
distribution. As noted by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1972), the integral condition does not appear to
have any natural analog in these more general cases. Ross (1971) has a sufficient condition for the
integral condition to be valid, but unfortunately it is hard to interpret.
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3.3 Main Results
Suppose agent 퐴 with utility function 푈퐴 and agent 퐵 with utility function 푈퐵 have
identical initial wealth 푤0 and solve Problem 3.1. Recall that we assume that 푈퐴(푐)
and 푈퐵(푐) are of class 퐶
2, 푈 ′퐴(푐) > 0, 푈
′
퐵(푐) > 0, 푈
′′
퐴(푐) < 0 and 푈
′′
퐵(푐) < 0. We have
Theorem 3.3 If 퐵 is weakly more risk averse than 퐴 in the sense of Arrow and Pratt(
∀푐,−푈 ′′퐵(푐)
푈 ′퐵(푐)
≥ −푈 ′′퐴(푐)
푈 ′퐴(푐)
)
, then for every 휌˜ ∈ 풫, 푐˜퐴 is distributed as 푐˜퐵 + 푧˜ + 휀˜, where
푧˜ ≥ 0 and 퐸[휀˜∣푐퐵 + 푧] = 0. Furthermore, if 푐˜퐴 ∕= 푐˜퐵, neither 푧˜ nor 휀˜ is identically
zero.
Proof: The first step of the proof6 is to show that −푐˜퐵 monotone-concave stochas-
tically dominates −푐˜퐴, 푖.푒., 퐸[푉 (−푐˜퐵)] ≥ 퐸[푉 (−푐˜퐴)] for any concave nondecreasing
function 푉 (⋅). By Lemma 3.1, 푐˜퐴 and 푐˜퐵 are monotonely related and there is a critical
value 푐∗ above which 푐˜퐴 is weakly larger and below which 푐˜퐵 is weakly larger. Let
푉 ′(⋅) be any selection from the subgradient correspondence ∇푉 (⋅), then 푉 ′(⋅) is posi-
tive and nonincreasing and it is the derivative of 푉 (⋅) whenever it exists. Recall from
Rockafellar (1970), the subgradient for concave7 푉 (⋅) is ∇푉 (푥1) ≡ {푠∣(∀푥), 푉 (푥) ≤
푉 (푥1) + 푠(푥 − 푥1)}. By concavity of 푉 (⋅), ∇푉 (푥) is nonempty for all 푥1. And if
푥2 > 푥1, then 푠2 ≤ 푠1 for all 푠2 ∈ ∇푉 (푥2) and 푠1 ∈ ∇푉 (푥1).
The definition of subgradient for concave 푉 (⋅) implies that
푉 (푥+Δ푥) ≤ 푉 (푥) + 푉 ′(푥)Δ푥. (3.4)
6As noted in Footnote 4, the integral condition does not hold under unbounded distributions,
so that a proof using Lemma 3.1 and the intergral condition would be wrong. More specifically,
because 푐˜퐴 and 푐˜퐵 might be unbounded, we cannot get that −푐˜퐵 monotone concave stochastically
dominates −푐˜퐴 directly from
∫ 푐
푞=−∞ [퐹−푐퐴(푞)− 퐹−푐퐵 (푞)] 푑푞 ≥ 0.
7For convex 푉 (⋅), the inequality is reversed.
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Letting 푥 = −푐˜퐵 and Δ푥 = −푐˜퐴 + 푐˜퐵 in (3.4), we have
푉 (−푐˜퐴)− 푉 (−푐˜퐵) ≤ 푉 ′(−푐˜퐵)(−푐˜퐴 + 푐˜퐵). (3.5)
If 푐˜퐵 ≥ 푐∗, then 푐˜퐴 ≥ 푐˜퐵 (by Lemma 3.1), and 푉 ′(−푐˜퐵) ≥ 푉 ′(−푐∗), while if 푐˜퐵 ≤ 푐∗,
then 푐˜퐴 ≤ 푐˜퐵 and 푉 ′(−푐˜퐵) ≤ 푉 ′(−푐∗). In both cases, we always have (푉 ′(−푐˜퐵) −
푉 ′(−푐∗))(푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵) ≥ 0. Rewriting (3.5) and substituting in this inequality, we have
푉 (−푐˜퐵)− 푉 (−푐˜퐴) ≥ 푉 ′(−푐˜퐵)(푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵) ≥ 푉 ′(−푐∗)(푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵). (3.6)
Since 푉 (⋅) is nondecreasing and 퐸[푐˜퐴] ≥ 퐸[푐˜퐵] (result 2 of Lemma 3.1), we have
퐸[푉 (−푐˜퐵)− 푉 (−푐˜퐴)] ≥ 퐸[푉 ′(−푐∗)(푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵)] = 푉 ′(−푐∗)(퐸[푐˜퐴]− 퐸[푐˜퐵]) ≥ 0. (3.7)
Therefore, we have that −푐˜퐵 is preferred to −푐˜퐴 by all concave nondecreasing 푉 (⋅),
and by Theorem 3.1, this says that −푐˜퐴 is distributed as −푐˜퐵 − 푧˜ + 휀˜, where 푧˜ ≥ 0
and 퐸[휀˜∣ − 푐퐵 − 푧] = 0. This is exactly the same as saying that 푐˜퐴 is distributed as
푐˜퐵 + 푧˜ + (−휀˜), where 푧˜ ≥ 0 and 퐸[−휀˜∣푐퐵 + 푧] = 0. Relabel −휀˜ as 휀˜, and we have
proven the first sentence of the theorem.
To prove the second sentence of the theorem, note that because 푐˜퐴 and 푐˜퐵 are
monotonely related, 푐˜퐴 is distributed the same as 푐˜퐵 only if 푐˜퐴 = 푐˜퐵. Therefore,
if 푐˜퐴 ∕= 푐˜퐵, one or the other of 푧˜ or 휀˜ is not identically zero. Now, if 푧˜ is identi-
cally zero, then 휀˜ must not be identically zero, and 푐˜퐴 is distributed as 푐˜퐵 + 휀˜, by
Jensen’s inequality, we have 퐸[푈퐴(푐˜퐴)] = 퐸[푈퐴(푐˜퐵 + 휀˜)] = 퐸[퐸[푈퐴(푐˜퐵 + 휀˜)∣푐˜퐵]] <
퐸[푈퐴(퐸[푐˜퐵∣푐˜퐵] + 퐸[휀˜∣푐˜퐵])] = 퐸[푈퐴(푐˜퐵)], which contradicts the optimality of 푐˜퐴 for
agent 퐴. If 휀˜ is identically zero, then 푧˜ must not be, and 푐˜퐴 is distributed as 푐˜퐵 + 푧˜,
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where 푧˜ ≥ 0 and is not identically zero. Therefore, 푐˜퐴 strictly monotone stochastically
dominates 푐˜퐵, contradicting optimality of 푐˜퐵 for agent 퐵. This completes the proof
that if 푐˜퐴 and 푐˜퐵 do not have the same distribution, then neither 휀˜ nor 푧˜ is identically
0. 푄.퐸.퐷.
We now prove a converse result of Theorem 3.3: if in all complete markets, one
agent chooses a portfolio whose payoff is distributed as a second agent’s payoff plus
a nonnegative random variable plus conditional-mean-zero noise, then the first agent
is less risk averse than the second. Specifically, we have
Theorem 3.4 If for all 휌˜ ∈ 풫, 퐸[푐˜퐴] ≥ 퐸[푐˜퐵], then 퐵 is weakly more risk averse
than 퐴
(
∀푐,−푈 ′′퐵(푐)
푈 ′퐵(푐)
≥ −푈 ′′퐴(푐)
푈 ′퐴(푐)
)
. This implies a converse result of Theorem 3.3: if for
all 휌˜ ∈ 풫, 푐˜퐴 is distributed as 푐˜퐵 + 푧˜ + 휀˜, where 푧˜ ≥ 0 and 퐸[휀˜∣푐퐵 + 푧] = 0, then 퐵
is weakly more risk averse than 퐴.
Proof: We prove this theorem by contradiction. If 퐵 is not weakly more risk averse
than 퐴, then there exists a constant 푐ˆ, such that −푈 ′′퐵(푐ˆ)
푈 ′퐵(푐ˆ)
< −푈 ′′퐴(푐ˆ)
푈 ′퐴(푐ˆ)
. Since 푈퐴 and
푈퐵 are of the class of 퐶
2, from the continuity of −푈 ′′푖 (푐)
푈 ′푖(푐)
, where 푖 = 퐴,퐵, we get
that there exists an interval 푅퐴 containing 푐ˆ, 푠.푡., ∀푐 ∈ 푅퐴, −푈 ′′퐵(푐)
푈 ′
퐵
(푐)
< −푈 ′′퐴(푐)
푈 ′
퐴
(푐)
. We
pick 푐1, 푐2 ∈ 푅퐴 with 푐1 < 푐2. Now from Lemma 3.5 in the Appendix, there exists
hypothetical agents 퐴1 and 퐵1, so that 푈퐴1 agrees with 푈퐴 and 푈퐵1 agrees with 푈퐵
on [푐1, 푐2], but 퐴1 is everywhere strictly more risk averse than 퐵1 (and not just on
[푐1, 푐2]).
Fix any 휆퐵 > 0 and choose 휌˜ to be any random variable that takes on all the
values on [
푈 ′퐵(푐2)
휆퐵
,
푈 ′퐵(푐1)
휆퐵
]. Then, the corresponding 푐˜퐵 solving the first order condition
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푈 ′퐵(푐˜퐵) = 휆퐵휌˜ takes on all the values on [푐1, 푐2]. Because 푈
′′
퐵 < 0, the 퐹.푂.퐶 solution
is also sufficient(expected utility exists because 휌˜ and 푈퐵(푐˜퐵) are bounded), 푐˜퐵 solves
the portfolio problem for utility function 푈퐵, state price density 휌˜ and initial wealth
푤0 = 퐸[휌˜푐˜퐵]. Since 푈퐵1 = 푈퐵 on the support of 푐˜퐵, letting 푐˜퐵1 = 푐˜퐵, then 푐˜퐵1 solves
the corresponding optimization for 푈퐵1 for 휆퐵1 = 휆퐵.
We now show that there exists 휆퐴1 such that 푐˜퐴1 ≡ 퐼퐴1(휆퐴1 휌˜) satisfies the budget
constraint 퐸[휌˜푐˜퐴1] = 푤0. Due to the choice of 푈퐴1, 퐼퐴1(휆퐴1 휌˜) exists and is a bounded
random variable for all 휆퐴1. Letting 휌 =
푈 ′퐵(푐2)
휆퐵
and 휌¯ =
푈 ′퐵(푐1)
휆퐵
( so, 휌˜ ∈ [휌, 휌¯]), we
define 휆1 =
푈 ′퐴1
(푐1)
휌
and 휆2 =
푈 ′퐴1
(푐2)
휌¯
, then we have
푐1 = 퐼퐴1(휆1휌) > 퐼퐴1(휆1휌˜) , 푐2 = 퐼퐴1(휆2휌¯) < 퐼퐴1(휆2휌˜). (3.8)
The inequalities follow from 퐼퐴1(⋅) decreasing. From (3.8) and 푐1 ≤ 푐˜퐵 ≤ 푐2, we have
퐸[휌˜퐼퐴1(휆1휌˜)] < 퐸[휌˜푐1] ≤ 퐸[휌˜푐˜퐵] = 푤0, 퐸[휌˜퐼퐴1(휆2휌˜)] > 퐸[휌˜푐2] ≥ 퐸[휌˜푐˜퐵] = 푤0.
(3.9)
Since 퐼퐴1(휆휌˜) is continuous from the assumption that 푈퐴1(⋅) is in the class of 퐶2
and 푈 ′′퐴1 < 0. By the intermediate value theorem, there exists 휆퐴1 , such that
퐸[휌˜퐼퐴1(휆퐴1 휌˜)] = 푤0, 푖.푒., 푐˜퐴1 satisfies the budget constraint for 휌˜ and 푤0.
From the second result of Lemma 3.6 in the Appendix, if 푐˜퐴1 ∕= 푐˜퐵1 , then we have
that 푐˜퐵1 has a wider range of support than that of 푐˜퐴1. Let the support of 퐴1’s
optimal consumption be [푐3, 푐4] ⊆ [푐1, 푐2]. From the construction of 푈퐴1 , 푈퐴1 = 푈퐴 on
the support of 푐˜퐴1 . Letting 푐˜퐴 = 푐˜퐴1 , then 푐˜퐴 solves the corresponding optimization
for 푈퐴 for 휆퐴 = 휆퐴1.
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Now, since 퐵1 is strictly less risk averse than 퐴1, from Theorem 3.3, 푐˜퐵1 ∼ 푐˜퐴1 +
푧˜1 + 휀˜1, where 푧˜1 ≥ 0 and 퐸[휀˜1∣푐퐴1 + 푧1] = 0. Furthermore, if 푐˜퐴1 ∕= 푐˜퐵1, then neither
푧˜1 nor 휀˜1 is identically zero. From the first result of Lemma 3.6 in the Appendix, if 퐴1
is strictly more risk averse than 퐵1, then 푐˜퐴1 ∕= 푐˜퐵1 . Thus, by Theorem 3.3, neither
푧˜1 nor 휀˜1 is identically zero. Therefore, 퐸[푐˜퐵1 ] > 퐸[푐˜퐴1 ], 푖.푒. 퐸[푐˜퐵] > 퐸[푐˜퐴], this
contradicts the assumption that, for all 휌˜ ∈ 풫, 퐸[푐˜퐴] ≥ 퐸[푐˜퐵]. This also contradicts
a stronger condition: for all 휌˜ ∈ 풫, 푐˜퐴 is distributed as 푐˜퐵 + 푧˜ + 휀˜, where 푧˜ ≥ 0 and
퐸[휀˜∣푐퐵 + 푧] = 0. 푄.퐸.퐷.
Theorem 3.3 shows that if 퐵 is weakly more risk averse than 퐴, then 푐˜퐴 is dis-
tributed as 푐˜퐵 plus a risk premium plus random noise. The distributions of the
risk premium and the noise term are typically not uniquely determined. Also, it
is possible that the weakly less risk averse agent’s payoff can have a higher mean
and a lower variance than the weakly more risk averse agent’s payoff as we will see
in example 3.6.2. This can happen because although adding condition-mean-zero
noise always increases variance, adding the non-negative random variable decreases
variance if it is sufficiently negatively correlated with the rest (Since 푉 푎푟(푐˜퐴) =
푉 푎푟(푐˜퐵)+푉 푎푟(휀˜)+푉 푎푟(푧˜)+2퐶표푣(푐˜퐵, 푧˜), if 퐶표푣(푐˜퐵, 푧˜) < −12 (푉 푎푟(푧˜) + 푉 푎푟(휀˜)) , then
푉 푎푟(푐˜퐴) < 푉 푎푟(푐˜퐵)). This should not be too surprising, given that it is well-known
that in general variance is not a good measure of risk8 for von Neumann-Morgenstern
8See, for example Hanoch and levy (1970), and the survey of Machina and Rothschild (2008).
143
utility functions,9 and for general distributions in a complete market, mean-variance
preferences are hard to justify.
Our second main result says that when either of the two agents has non-increasing
absolute risk aversion, we can choose 푧˜ to be non-stochastic, in which case 푧 =
퐸[푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵]. The basic idea is as follows. If either agent has non-increasing absolute
risk aversion, then we can construct a new agent 퐴∗ whose consumption equals to
퐴’s consumption plus 퐸[푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵]. We can therefore get the distributional results for
agent 퐴∗ and 퐵 since 퐴∗ is weakly less risk averse than 퐵.
Theorem 3.5 If 퐵 is weakly more risk averse than 퐴 and either of the two agents
has non-increasing absolute risk aversion, then 푐˜퐴 is distributed as 푐˜퐵 + 푧 + 휀˜, where
푧 = 퐸[푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵] ≥ 0 and 퐸[휀˜∣푐퐵 + 푧] = 0.
Proof: Define the utility function 푈퐴∗(푐˜) = 푈퐴(푐˜ + 퐸[푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵]). In the case when 퐴
has non-increasing absolute risk aversion, 퐴∗ is weakly less risk averse than 퐵 because
퐴 is weakly less risk averse than 퐵 and non-increasing risk aversion of 퐴 implies that
퐴∗ is weakly less risk averse than 퐴. In the case when 퐵 has non-increasing absolute
risk aversion, 퐵∗ with utility 푈퐵∗ = 푈퐵(푐˜+퐸[푐˜퐴− 푐˜퐵]) is weakly less risk averse than
퐵 and 퐴∗ is weakly less risk averse than 퐵∗. Therefore, in both cases, we have that
퐴∗ is weakly less risk averse than 퐵.
9If von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are mean-variance preferences, then they have
to be quadratic utility functions, but quadratic preferences are not appealing because they are not
increasing everywhere and they have increasing risk aversion where they are increasing. Also, Dybvig
and Ingersoll (1982) show that if markets are complete, mean-variance pricing of all assets implies
there is arbitrage unless the payoff to the market portfolio is bounded.
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Give agent 퐴∗ initial wealth 푤퐴∗ = 푤0 −퐸[휌˜]퐸[푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵], where 푤0 is the common
initial wealth of agent 퐴 and 퐵. 퐴∗’s problem is
max
푐˜
퐸[푈퐴(푐˜+ 퐸[푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵])],
푠.푡. 퐸[휌˜푐˜] = 푤퐴∗ . (3.10)
The first order conditions are related to the optimality of 푐˜퐴 for agent 퐴. To satisfy
the budget constraints, agent 퐴∗ will optimally hold 푐˜퐴 −퐸[푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵].
By Lemma 3.1, 푐˜퐴 − 퐸[푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵] and 푐˜퐵 are monotonely related and there is a
critical value 푐∗ above which 푐˜퐴 − 퐸[푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵] is weakly larger and below which 푐˜퐵 is
weakly larger. This implies that
(푉 ′(−푐˜퐵)− 푉 ′(−푐∗))(푐˜퐴 − 퐸[푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵]− 푐˜퐵) ≥ 0, (3.11)
where 푉 (⋅) is an arbitrary concave function and 푉 ′(⋅) is any selection from the sub-
gradient correspondence ∇푉 (⋅). The concavity of 푉 (⋅) implies that
푉 (−푐˜퐴 + 퐸[푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵])− 푉 (−푐˜퐵) ≤ 푉 ′(−푐˜퐵)(−푐˜퐴 + 퐸[푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵] + 푐˜퐵). (3.12)
(3.11) and (3.12) imply that
푉 (−푐˜퐵)− 푉 (−푐˜퐴 + 퐸[푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵]) ≥ 푉 ′(−푐∗)(푐˜퐴 −퐸[푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵]− 푐˜퐵). (3.13)
We have
퐸[푉 (−푐˜퐵)− 푉 (−푐˜퐴 +퐸[푐˜퐴− 푐˜퐵])] ≥ 퐸[푉 ′(−푐∗)(푐˜퐴− 푐˜퐵 −퐸[푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵])] = 0. (3.14)
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Therefore, for any concave function 푉 (⋅), we have
퐸[푉 (−푐˜퐵)] ≥ 퐸[푉 (−푐˜퐴 + 퐸[푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵])]. (3.15)
By Theorem 3.2, this says that −푐˜퐴 + 퐸[푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵] is distributed as −푐˜퐵 + 휀˜, where
퐸[휀˜∣ − 푐퐵] = 0. This is exactly the same as saying that 푐˜퐴−퐸[푐˜퐴− 푐˜퐵] is distributed
as 푐˜퐵 + (−휀˜), where 퐸[−휀˜∣푐퐵] = 0. Relabel −휀˜ as 휀˜, and we have
푐˜퐴 − 퐸[푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵] ∼ 푐˜퐵 + 휀˜, 푖.푒., 푐˜퐴 ∼ 푐˜퐵 + 퐸[푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵] + 휀˜, (3.16)
where 퐸[휀˜∣푐퐵 + 푧] = 0. 푄.퐸.퐷.
The non-increasing absolute risk aversion condition is sufficient but not neces-
sary. A quadratic utility function has increasing absolute risk aversion. But, as
illustrated by example 3.6.1, the non-negative random variable can still be chosen to
be a constant for quadratic utility functions (which can be viewed as an implication
of two-fund separation and Theorem 3.7). If the non-negative random variable can
be chosen to be a constant, then we have the following Corollary:
Corollary 3.1 If 퐵 is weakly more risk averse than 퐴 and either of the two agents
has non-increasing absolute risk aversion, then 푉 푎푟(푐˜퐴) ≥ 푉 푎푟(푐˜퐵).
Proof: From Theorem 3.5, the non-negative random variable 푧˜ can be chosen to be
the constant 퐸[푐˜퐴− 푐˜퐵]. Then we have 퐸(휀˜∣푐˜퐵) = 0, which implies that 퐶표푣(휀˜, 푐˜퐵) =
0. Therefore, 푉 푎푟(푐˜퐴) = 푉 푎푟(푐˜퐵) + 푉 푎푟(휀˜) + 2퐶표푣(푐˜퐵, 휀˜) = 푉 푎푟(푐˜퐵) + 푉 푎푟(휀˜) ≥
푉 푎푟(푐˜퐵). 푄.퐸.퐷.
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3.4 Extension to a Multiple-Period Model
We now examine our main results in a multiple period model. We assume that each
agent’s problem is:
Problem 3.2
max
푐˜푡
퐸[
푇∑
푡=1
퐷푡푈푖(푐˜푡)],
푠.푡. 퐸[
푇∑
푡=1
휌˜푡푐˜푡] = 푤0, (3.17)
where 푖 = 퐴 or 퐵 indexes the agent, 퐷푡 is a discount factor (푒.푔., 퐷푡 = 푒
−휅푡 if the
pure rate of time discount 휅 is constant), and 휌˜푡 is the state price density in period 푡.
Again, we will assume that both agents have optimal random consumptions, denoted
푐˜퐴푡 and 푐˜퐵푡, and both 푐˜퐴푡 and 푐˜퐵푡 have finite means. The first order condition gives
us
푈 ′푖(푐˜푖푡) = 휆푖
휌˜푡
퐷푡
, 푖 = 퐴,퐵,
we have
푐˜푖푡 = 퐼푖
(
휆푖
휌˜푡
퐷푡
)
,
where 퐼푖(⋅) is the inverse function of 푈 ′푖(⋅), by negativity of the second order deriva-
tives, 푐˜푖푡 is a decreasing function of 휌˜푡. By similar arguments in the one period model,
we have
Lemma 3.2 If 퐵 is weakly more risk averse than 퐴, then
1. there exists some critical consumption level 푐∗푡 (can be ±∞) such that 푐˜퐴푡 ≥ 푐˜퐵푡
when 푐˜퐵푡 ≥ 푐∗푡 , and such that 푐˜퐴푡 ≤ 푐˜퐵푡 when 푐˜퐵푡 ≤ 푐∗푡 ;
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2. if it happens that the budget shares as a function of time are the same for both
agents at some time 푡, 푖.푒., 퐸[휌˜푡푐˜퐴푡] = 퐸[휌˜푡푐˜퐵푡], then 퐸[푐˜퐴푡] ≥ 퐸[푐˜퐵푡], and we
have 푐˜퐴푡 ∼ 푐˜퐵푡 + 푧˜푡 + 휀˜푡, where 푧˜푡 ≥ 0 and 퐸[휀˜푡∣푐퐵푡 + 푧푡] = 0. And if 푐˜퐴푡 ∕= 푐˜퐵푡,
then neither 푧˜푡 nor 휀˜푡 is identically zero. In particular, if the budget shares are
the same for all 푡, then this distributional condition holds for all 푡.
The proof of Lemma 3.2 is essentially the same as the proof of the corresponding
parts of Lemma 3.1, and Theorem 3.3 in the one-period model. If the 퐷푡 is not the
same for both agents, or the same for the two agents without any restriction on budget
shares, then the distributional condition may not hold in any period. For example, if
the weakly more risk averse agent 퐵 spends most of the money earlier but the weakly
less risk averse agent 퐴 spends more later, then the mean payoff could be higher in
an earlier period for the weakly more risk averse agent, 푖.푒., 퐸[푐˜퐵푡] > 퐸[푐˜퐴푡].
Now, assume both agents have the same discount factor 퐷푡 and choose the period
and consumption using a mixture model: first choose 푡 with probability 휇푡 =
퐷푡∑푇
푡=1퐷푡
,
and then choose 휌˜푡 from its distribution. Then, we will show that, under this proba-
bility measure 푐˜퐴 ∼ 푐˜퐵 + 푧˜ + 휀˜.
Definition 3.1 Suppose the original probability space has probability measure P over
states Ω with filtration {ℱ푡}. We define the discrete random variable 휏 on associated
probability space (Ω∗,ℱ∗, 푃 ∗) so that 푃 ∗(휏 = 푡) = 휇푡 ≡ 퐷푡/(
∑푇
푡=1퐷푡). We then
define a single-period problem on a new probability space (Ωˆ, ℱˆ , 푃ˆ ). Define the state
of nature in the product space (푡, 휔) ∈ Ωˆ ≡ Ω∗×Ω with t and 휔 drawn independently.
Let ℱˆ be the optional 휎-algebra, which is the completion of ℱ∗ × ℱ휏 . The synthetic
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probability measure is the one consistent with independence generated from 푃ˆ (푓 ∗, 푓) =
푃 ∗(푓 ∗)× 푃 (푓) for all subsets 푓 ∗ ∈ ℱ∗ and subsets 푓 ∈ ℱ휏 .
The synthetic probability measure assigns a probability measure that looks like a
mixture model, drawing time first assigning probability 휇푡 to time 푡, and then drawing
from 휌˜푡 using its distribution in the original problem.
Recall that under the original probability measure, each agent’s problem is given
in (3.17). Now we want to write down an equivalent problem, in terms of the choice
of distribution of each 푐˜푡, but with the new synthetic probability measure. The
consumption 푐˜ under the new probability space over which synthetic probabilities are
defined is a function of 휌˜ and 푡; we identify 푐˜(휌˜, 푡) with what used to be 푐˜푡(휌˜). To
write the objective function in terms of the synthetic probabilities, we can write
퐸[
푇∑
푡=1
퐷푡푈(푐˜푡)] =
푇∑
푡=1
퐷푡퐸[푈(푐˜푡)] =
푇∑
푡=1
(
푇∑
푠=1
퐷푠)휇푡퐸ˆ[푈(푐˜)∣푡]
= (
푇∑
푠=1
퐷푠)
푇∑
푡=1
휇푡퐸ˆ[푈(푐˜)∣푡] = (
푇∑
푠=1
퐷푠)퐸ˆ[푈(푐˜)], (3.18)
where 퐸ˆ denotes the expectation under the synthetic probability.
∑푇
푠=1퐷푠 is a posi-
tive constant, so the objective function is equivalent to maximizing 퐸ˆ[푈(푐˜)].
Now, we can write the budget constraint in terms of the synthetic probabilities,
푤0 = 퐸[
푇∑
푡=1
휌˜푡푐˜푡] =
푇∑
푡=1
휇푡퐸[
휌˜푡
휇푡
푐˜푡] =
푇∑
푡=1
휇푡퐸ˆ[
휌˜
휇
푐˜∣푡] = 퐸ˆ[ 휌˜
휇
푐˜]. (3.19)
Then we can apply our single-period results (Theorem 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5) to derive
that our main results holds on a mixture model of the 푐˜퐴 and 푐˜퐵 over time:
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Theorem 3.6 In a multiple-period model, assume agent 퐴 and 퐵 have the same dis-
count factor 퐷푡 and solve Problem 3.2, and let 푐˜퐴 and 푐˜퐵 be the optimal consumption
of 퐴 and 퐵 respectively under the synthetic probability measure, we have
1. if 퐵 is weakly more risk averse than 퐴, then, 푐˜퐴 ∼ 푐˜퐵+ 푧˜+ 휀˜ under the synthetic
probabilities, where 푧˜ ≥ 0, 퐸ˆ[휀˜∣푐퐵 + 푧] = 0;
2. If for all 휌˜ ∈ 풫, 퐸ˆ[푐˜퐴] ≥ 퐸ˆ[푐˜퐵], then 퐵 is weakly more risk averse than 퐴. This
implies a converse result of statement 1: if for all 휌˜ ∈ 풫, 푐˜퐴 is distributed as
푐˜퐵 + 푧˜ + 휀˜, where 푧˜ ≥ 0 and 퐸ˆ[휀˜∣푐퐵 + 푧] = 0, then 퐵 is weakly more risk averse
than 퐴;
3. If 퐵 is weakly more risk averse than 퐴 and either of the two agents has non-
increasing absolute risk aversion, then 푐˜퐴 is distributed as 푐˜퐵 + 푧 + 휀˜, where
푧 = 퐸ˆ[푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵] ≥ 0 and 퐸ˆ[휀˜∣푐퐵 + 푧] = 0.
Therefore, if the budget shares are not the same for both agents at each time
period 푡, then the distributional result may not hold period-by-period in a multiple-
period model with time-separable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility having identical
weights over time. However, Theorem 3.6 implies that our main results still hold
under the synthetic probabilities in a multiple-period model. This results retain the
spirit of our main results while acknowledging that changing risk aversion may cause
consumption to shift over time.
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3.5 Possibly Incomplete Market Case
Our result still holds in a two-asset world with a risk-free asset. For a two-asset world
without a risk-free asset, we have a counter-example to our result holding. Therefore,
our main result does not hold in general with incomplete markets. However, our result
holds in a two-risky-asset world if we make enough assumptions about asset payoffs
and the risk-aversion measure. Also, each two-asset result has a natural analog for
models with many assets and two-fund separation, since the portfolio payoffs will be
the same as in a two-asset model in which only the two funds are traded.10 Note
that while this section is intended to ask to what extent our results can be extended
to incomplete markets, the results also apply to complete markets with two-fund
separation.
First, we show that our main result still holds in a two-asset world with a risk-free
asset. The proof is in two parts. The first part is the standard result: decreasing the
risk aversion increases the portfolio allocation to the asset with higher return. The
second part shows that the portfolio payoff for the higher allocation is distributed
as the other payoff plus a constant plus conditional-mean-zero noise. To show the
second part, we use the following Lemma:
Lemma 3.3 1. If 퐸[푞˜] = 0 and 0 ≤ 푚1 ≤ 푚2, then 푚2푞˜ ∼ 푚1푞˜ + 휀˜, where
퐸[휀˜∣푚1푞] = 0.
2. Let 퐸[휒˜] be finite, 퐸[푞˜∣휒] ≥ 0, and 0 ≤ 푚1 ≤ 푚2. Then 휒˜+푚2푞˜ ∼ 휒˜+푚1푞˜+푧˜+휀˜,
where 푧˜ = (푚2 −푚1)퐸[푞˜∣휒] ≥ 0 and 퐸[휀˜∣휒+푚1푞 + 푧] = 0.
10See Cass and Stiglitz (1970) and Ross (1978) for characterization of two-fund separation, 푖.푒.,
for portfolio choice to be equivalent to choice between two mutual funds of assets.
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Proof: We prove 2, and 1 follows immediately by setting 휒˜ = 0 and 퐸[푞˜] = 0. Let
푧˜0 ≡ 퐸[푞˜∣휒] and 푧˜ ≡ (푚2 − 푚1)푧˜0. By Theorem 3.2, we only need to show that,
for any concave function 푉 (⋅), 퐸[푉 (휒˜ + 푚2푞˜)] ≤ 퐸[푉 (휒˜ + 푚1푞˜ + 푧˜)]. Fix 푉 (⋅) and
let 푉 ′(⋅) be any selection from its subgradient correspondence ∇푉 (⋅) (so 푉 ′(⋅) is the
derivative of 푉 (⋅) whenever it exists). The concavity of 푉 (⋅) and the definitions of 푧˜0
and 푧˜ imply that
푉 (휒˜ +푚2푞˜)− 푉 (휒˜ +푚1푞˜ + 푧˜) ≤ 푉 ′(휒˜+푚1푞˜ + 푧˜)(푚2 −푚1)(푞˜ − 푧˜0). (3.20)
Furthermore, 푉 ′(⋅) nonincreasing, 푚2 ≥ 푚1 ≥ 0, and the definitions of 푧˜0 and 푧˜ imply
(푉 ′(휒˜+푚1푞˜ + 푧˜)− 푉 ′(휒˜+푚2푧˜0))(푚2 −푚1)(푞˜ − 푧˜0) ≤ 0. (3.21)
From (3.20), (3.21), and the definitions of 푧˜0 and 푧˜, we get
퐸[푉 (휒˜ +푚2푞˜)]− 퐸[푉 (휒˜+푚1푞˜ + 푧˜)] ≤ 퐸[푉 ′(휒˜+푚1푞˜ + 푧˜)(푚2 −푚1)(푞˜ − 푧˜0)]
≤ 퐸[푉 ′(휒˜+푚2푧˜0)(푚2 −푚1)(푞˜ − 푧˜0)]
= 퐸[퐸[푉 ′(휒˜+푚2푧˜0)(푚2 −푚1)(푞˜ − 푧˜0)∣휒]] = 0.
푄.퐸.퐷.
Now, we consider the following portfolio choice problem:
Problem 3.3 (Possibly Incomplete Market with Two Assets) Agent 푖’s (푖 = 퐴,퐵)
problem is
max
훼푖∈푅
퐸[푈푖(푤0푥˜+ 훼푖푤0푣˜)],
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where 푤0 is the initial wealth, 훼푖 is the proportion invested in the second asset, and
푣˜ is the excess of the return on the second asset over the first asset, 푖.푒., 푣˜ = 푦˜ − 푥˜,
where 푥˜ and 푦˜ are the total returns on the two assets. We assume that 퐸[푣˜] ≥ 0, 푣˜ is
nonconstant, and 퐸[푣˜] and 퐸[푥˜] are finite.
We denote agent 퐴 and 퐵’s respective optimal investments in the risky asset with
payoff 푦˜ by 훼∗퐴 and 훼
∗
퐵. The payoff for agent 퐴 is 푐˜퐴 = 푤0푥˜ + 훼
∗
퐴푤0푣˜ and agent
퐵’s payoff is 푐˜퐵 = 푤0푥˜ + 훼
∗
퐵푤0푣˜. We maintain the utility assumptions made earlier:
푈 ′푖(⋅) > 0 and 푈 ′′푖 (⋅) < 0, so 푣˜ nonconstant implies that 훼∗퐴 and 훼∗퐵 are unique if they
exist. We have the following well-known result.
Lemma 3.4 Suppose 푥˜ is riskless (푥˜ nonstochastic), if 퐵 is weakly more risk averse
than 퐴, then the agents’ solutions to Problem 3.3 satisfy 훼∗퐴 ≥ 훼∗퐵.
Proof: The first-order condition of 퐴’s problem is:
퐸[푈 ′퐴(푥푤0 + 훼
∗
퐴푤0푣˜)푤0푣˜] = 0. (3.22)
The analogous expression for 퐵 is 휑(훼∗퐵) = 0, where
휑(훼) ≡ 퐸[푈 ′퐵(푥푤0 + 훼푤0푣˜)푤0푣˜]. (3.23)
Since 푈퐵(⋅) = 퐺(푈퐴(⋅)), where 퐺′(⋅) > 0 and 퐺′′(⋅) ≤ 0, we have:
휑(훼∗퐴) = 퐸[퐺
′(푈퐴(푥푤0 + 훼∗퐴푤0푣˜))푈
′
퐴(푥푤0 + 훼
∗
퐴푤0푣˜)푤0푣˜]
= 퐺′(푈퐴(푥푤0))퐸[푈 ′퐴(푥푤0 + 훼
∗
퐴푤0푣˜)푤0푣˜]
+퐸[(퐺′(푈퐴(푥푤0 + 훼∗퐴푤0푣˜))−퐺′(푈퐴(푥푤0)))푈 ′퐴(푥푤0 + 훼∗퐴푤0푣˜)푤0푣˜] ≤ 0, (3.24)
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where the first term in (3.24) is zero by (3.22) and the expression inside the expec-
tation in the second term is non-positive because 퐺′′(⋅) ≤ 0 and 푈 ′퐴(⋅) > 0. Finally,
the concavity of 푈퐵(⋅) implies that 휑(⋅) is decreasing, and therefore from (3.23) and
(3.24), we must have 훼∗퐴 ≥ 훼∗퐵. 푄.퐸.퐷.
Lemma 3.4 implies that decreasing the risk aversion increases the portfolio alloca-
tion to the asset with higher return. Now, we show that our main result still holds
in a two-asset world with a risk-free asset. We have
Theorem 3.7 (Two-asset World with a Riskless Asset) Consider the two-asset world
with a riskless asset (푥˜ nonstochastic) of Problem 3.3, if 퐵 is weakly more risk averse
than 퐴 in the sense of Arrow and Pratt, then 푐˜퐴 is distributed as 푐˜퐵 + 푧 + 휀˜, where
푧 = 퐸[푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵] ≥ 0 and 퐸[휀˜∣푐퐵 + 푧] = 0.
Proof: When the first asset in Problem 3.3 is riskless, then we have 푐˜퐴 − 퐸[푐˜퐴] =
훼∗퐴푤0(푦˜ − 퐸[푦˜]) and 푐˜퐵 − 퐸[푐˜퐵] = 훼∗퐵푤0(푦˜ − 퐸[푦˜]). From Lemma 3.4, 훼∗퐴 ≥ 훼∗퐵. Let
푞˜ ≡ 푦˜ − 퐸[푦˜], 푚1 ≡ 훼∗퐵푤0 and 푚2 ≡ 훼∗퐴푤0 in the first part of Lemma 3.3, we have
푐˜퐴−퐸[푐˜퐴] ∼ 푐˜퐵 −퐸[푐˜퐵] + 휀˜, which implies that 푐˜퐴 is distributed as 푐˜퐵 + 푧+ 휀˜, where
푧 = 퐸[푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵] ≥ 0 and 퐸[휀˜∣푐퐵 + 푧] = 0. 푄.퐸.퐷.
Theorem 3.7 generalizes in obvious ways to settings with two-fund separation since
optimal consumption is the same as it would be with ordering the two funds as
assets. The main requirement is that one of the funds can be chosen to be riskless,
for example, in a mean-variance world with a riskless asset and normal returns for
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risky assets.11 In this example, if 퐵 is weakly more risk averse than 퐴, Theorem 3.7
tells us that 푐˜퐴 ∼ 푐˜퐵 + 푧 + 휀˜, where 푧 ≥ 0 is constant and 퐸[휀˜∣푐퐵 + 푧] = 0. We know
that 퐴’s optimal portfolio is further up the frontier than 퐵′푠, 푖.푒., 퐸[푐˜퐴] ≥ 퐸[푐˜퐵] and
푉 푎푟[푐˜퐴] ≥ 푉 푎푟[푐˜퐵]. This result is verified by noting that we can choose 푧 = 퐸[푐˜퐴−푐˜퐵],
휀˜ ∼ 푁(0, 푉 푎푟[푐˜퐴]− 푉 푎푟[푐˜퐵]), and 휀˜ is drawn independently of 푐˜퐵.
Now, we examine the case with two risky assets in Problem 3.3. For a two-asset
world without a riskless asset, we have a counter-example to our result holding. In
the counter-example, 훼∗퐴 > 훼
∗
퐵, but the distributional result does not hold.
Example 3.6.1 We assume that there are two risky assets and four states. The
probabilities for the four states are 0.2, 0.3, 0.3 and 0.2 respectively. The payoff of
푥˜ is (10 8 1 1)푇 and the net payoff 푣˜ is (−1 1 1 − 1)푇 . Agent’s utility function is
푈푖(푤˜푖) = −푒−훿푖푤˜푖, where 푖 = 퐴,퐵, and 푤˜푖 is agent i’s terminal wealth. We assume
that agent 퐵 is weakly more risk averse than 퐴 with 훿퐴 = 1 and 훿퐵 = 1.5. The agents
solve Problem 3.3 with initial wealth 푤0 = 1.
The agents’ problems are:
max
훼퐴
0.2푒−(10−훼퐴) + 0.3푒−(8+훼퐴) + 0.3푒−(1+훼퐴) + 0.2푒−(1−훼퐴),
and
max
훼퐵
0.2푒−1.5(10−훼퐵) + 0.3푒−1.5(8+훼퐵) + 0.3푒−1.5(1+훼퐵) + 0.2푒−1.5(1−훼퐵).
First-order conditions give 훼∗퐴 =
1
2
log
(
3+3푒−7
2+2푒−9
)
= 0.2, and 훼∗퐵 =
1
3
log
(
3+3푒−10.5
2+2푒−13.5
)
=
0.135. Therefore, agent 퐴’s portfolio payoff is (9.8 8.2 1.2 0.8)푇 and agent 퐵’s portfolio
11This example is a special case of two-fund separation in mean-variance worlds or the separating
distributions of Ross (1978).
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payoff is (9.865 8.135 1.135 0.865)푇 . If agent 퐴’s payoff 푐˜퐴 ∼ 푐˜퐵 + 푧˜ + 휀˜, where
퐸[휀˜∣푐퐵 + 푧] = 0, then we have 푃푟(휀˜ ≥ 0∣푐퐵 + 푧) > 0, therefore, we have max 푐˜퐴 ≥
max 푐˜퐵. However, in this example, we can see that max 푐˜퐴 = 9.8 and max 푐˜퐵 = 9.865,
푖.푒., max 푐˜퐴 < max 푐˜퐵. Contradiction! Therefore, in general, our result does not hold
in a two-asset world without a riskless asset. 푄.퐸.퐷.
It is a natural question to ask whether our main result holds in a two risky asset
world if we make enough assumptions about asset payoffs. We can, if we use Ross’s
stronger measure of risk aversion (see Ross (1981)) and his payoff distributional con-
dition. We have
Theorem 3.8 (Two Risky Assets with Ross’s Measure) Consider the two-risky-asset
world of Problem 3.3 with 퐸[푣˜∣푥] ≥ 0 for all 푥. If 퐵 is weakly more risk averse than
퐴 under Ross’s stronger measure of risk aversion, then 푐˜퐴 is distributed as 푐˜퐵+ 푧˜+ 휀˜,
where 퐸[휀˜∣푐퐵 + 푧] = 0, and 푧˜ ≥ 0.
Proof: Our proof is in two parts. The first part is from Ross (1981): if agent 퐴 is
weakly less risk averse than 퐵 under Ross’s stronger measure, then 훼∗퐴 ≥ 훼∗퐵. The
first order condition of 퐴’s problem is
퐸[푈 ′퐴(푤0푥˜+ 훼
∗
퐴푤0푣˜)푤0푣˜] = 0. (3.25)
The analogous expression for 퐵 is 휑(훼∗퐵) = 0, where
휑(훼∗퐵) ≡ 퐸[푈 ′퐵(푤0푥˜+ 훼∗퐵푤0푣˜)푤0푣˜]. (3.26)
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From Ross (1981), if 퐵 is weakly more risk averse than 퐴 under Ross’s stronger
measure, then there exists 휆 > 0 and a concave decreasing function 퐺(⋅), such that
푈퐵(⋅) = 휆푈퐴(⋅) +퐺(⋅). Therefore,
휑(훼∗퐴) = 퐸[(휆푈
′
퐴(푤0푥˜+ 훼
∗
퐴푤0푣˜) +퐺
′(푤0푥˜+ 훼∗퐴푤0푣˜))푤0푣˜]
= 퐸[퐺′(푤0푥˜+ 훼
∗
퐴푤0푣˜)푤0푣˜] = 퐸[퐸[퐺
′(푤0푥˜+ 훼
∗
퐴푤0푣˜)푤0푣˜∣푥]] ≤ 0, (3.27)
where the last inequality is a consequence of the fact that 퐺′(⋅) is negative and
decreasing while 퐸[푣˜∣푥] ≥ 0. The concavity of 푈퐵(⋅) implies that 휑(⋅) is decreasing.
Therefore, from (3.25) and (3.27), we have 훼∗퐴 ≥ 훼∗퐵.
The second part shows that the portfolio payoff for the higher allocation is dis-
tributed as the other payoff plus a constant plus conditional-mean-zero noise. Let
푞˜ ≡ 푣˜, 휒˜ ≡ 푤0푥˜, 푚1 ≡ 훼∗퐵푤0 and 푚2 ≡ 훼∗퐴푤0 in Lemma 3.3, part 2, we have 푤0푥˜ +
훼∗퐴푤0푣˜ ∼ 푤0푥˜+훼∗퐵푤0푣˜+ 푧˜+ 휀˜, 푖.푒., 푐˜퐴 ∼ 푐˜퐵+ 푧˜+ 휀˜, where 푧˜ = 푤0(훼∗퐴−훼∗퐵)퐸[푣˜∣푥] ≥ 0
and 퐸[휀˜∣푐퐵 + 푧] = 0. 푄.퐸.퐷.
Theorem 3.8 implies that our main result holds when we use Ross’s stronger mea-
sure of risk aversion with the assumption of 퐸[푣˜∣푥] ≥ 0. If the condition 퐸[푣˜∣푥] ≥ 0
is not satisfied, then our main result may not hold even when we use Ross’s stronger
measure of risk aversion as we can see in the following example.
Example 3.6.2 We assume that there are two risky assets and four states. The
probabilities for the four states are 0.3, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.2 respectively. The payoff of 푥˜
is (10 8 1 1)푇 and the net payoff 푣˜ is (−1 1 1 − 1)푇 . Agent 퐴’s utility function is
푈퐴(푤˜퐴) = 푒
6푤˜퐴 − 푒−푤˜퐴, and agent 퐵’s utility function is 푈퐵(푤˜퐵) = 푤˜퐵 − 푒6−1.5푤˜퐵 ,
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where 푤˜푖 is the terminal wealth of agent 푖. The agents solve Problem 3.3 with initial
wealth 푤0 = 1. We have
푈 ′′퐵(푤)
푈 ′′퐴(푤)
=
2.25푒6−1.5푤
푒−푤
= 2.25푒6−0.5푤,
푈 ′퐵(푤)
푈 ′퐴(푤)
=
1 + 1.5푒6−1.5푤
푒6 + 푒−푤
.
Therefore, inf푤
푈 ′′퐵(푤)
푈 ′′퐴(푤)
> sup푤
푈 ′퐵(푤)
푈 ′퐴(푤)
, for any 0 ≤ 푤 ≤ 10, which implies that agent
퐵 is strictly more risk aversion than agent 퐴 under Ross’s stronger measure of risk
aversion.
The Agents’ problems are:
max
훼퐴
0.3
(
푒6(10− 훼퐴)− 푒−(10−훼퐴)
)
+ 0.2
(
푒6(8 + 훼퐴)− 푒−(8+훼퐴)
)
+0.3
(
푒6(1 + 훼퐴)− 푒−(1+훼퐴)
)
+ 0.2
(
푒6(1− 훼퐴)− 푒−(1−훼퐴)
)
,
and
max
훼퐵
0.3
(
10− 훼퐵 − 푒6−1.5(10−훼퐵 )
)
+ 0.2
(
8 + 훼퐵 − 푒6−1.5(8+훼퐵)
)
+0.3
(
1 + 훼퐵 − 푒6−1.5(1+훼퐵)
)
+ 0.2
(
1− 훼퐵 − 푒6−1.5(1−훼퐵)
)
.
From the first order condition, 푒2훼
∗
퐴 = 3+2푒
−7
2+3푒−9
, 푖.푒., 훼∗퐴 =
1
2
log
(
3+2푒−7
2+3푒−9
)
= 0.2029,
and 푒3훼
∗
퐵 = 3푒
−1.5+2푒−12
2푒−1.5+3푒−15
, 푖.푒., 훼∗퐵 =
1
3
log
(
3푒−1.5+2푒−12
2푒−1.5+3푒−15
)
= 0.1352. Therefore, agent 퐴’s
portfolio payoff is (9.7971 8.2029 1.2029 0.7971)푇 and agent 퐵’s portfolio payoff is
(9.8648 8.1352 1.1352 0.8648)푇 . If agent 퐴’s payoff 푐˜퐴 ∼ 푐˜퐵 + 푧˜ + 휀˜, where 퐸[휀˜∣푐퐵 +
푧] = 0, then we have 푃푟(휀˜ ≥ 0∣푐퐵 + 푧) > 0. Therefore, we have max 푐˜퐴 ≥ max 푐˜퐵.
However, in this example, we can see that max 푐˜퐴 = 9.7971 and max 푐˜퐵 = 9.8648,
푖.푒., max 푐˜퐴 < max 푐˜퐵. Contradiction! Therefore, in a two-risky asset world, our main
result does not hold in general even under Ross’s stronger measure of risk aversion if
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we don’t make the assumption that 퐸[푣˜∣푥] ≥ 0. 푄.퐸.퐷.
An alternative to the approach following Ross (1981) is the approach of Kihlstrom,
Romer and Williams (1981) for handling random base wealth. They show that the
Arrow-Pratt measure works if we restrict attention to comparisons in which (1) at
least one of the utility functions has nonincreasing absolute risk aversion and (2)
base wealth is independent of the other gambles. Here is how their argument works.
The independence implies that we can convert a problem with random base wealth
푥 to a problem with nonrandom base wealth by using the indirect utility functions
푈ˆ푖(푤) ≡ 퐸[푈푖(푥˜+푤)], and our results for nonrandom base wealth apply directly. For
this to work, the indirect utility functions 푈ˆ퐴 and 푈ˆ퐵 must inherit the risk aversion
ordering from 푈퐴 and 푈퐵, which as they point out, does not happen in general.
However, letting 퐹 (⋅) be the distribution function of 푥˜, simple calculations tell us
that provided integrals exist, we can write
−푈ˆ
′′
푖 (푤)
푈ˆ ′푖(푤)
=
∫
푈 ′푖(푥˜+ 푤)∫
푈 ′푖(푦˜ + 푤)푑퐹 (푦˜ + 푤)
(
−푈
′′
푖 (푥˜+ 푤)
푈 ′푖(푥˜+ 푤)
)
푑퐹 (푥˜) (3.28)
For both agents, the risk aversion of the indirect utility function is therefore a weighted
average of the risk aversion of the direct utility function, but the weights are different
so the risk aversion ordering is not preserved in general (since the more risk averse
agent may have relatively higher weights from wealth regions where both agents have
small risk aversion). However, we do know that the more risk averse agents’ weights
put relatively higher weight on lower wealth levels (since 푖’s absolute risk aversion is
−푑 log(푈 ′푖(푤)/푑푤)), so if either agent has nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, then
the risk aversion ordering of the direct utility function is inherited by the indirect
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utility function. Subject to existence of some integrals (ensured by compactness in
their paper), their results and our Theorem 3.7 imply that if B is weakly more risk
averse than A, at least one of 푈퐴 and 푈퐵 has nonincreasing absolute risk aversion,
and 푣˜ is independent of 푥˜, then our main result holds: 푐˜퐴 ∼ 푐˜퐵 + 푧˜ + 휀˜, where 푧˜ ≥ 0
and 퐸[휀˜∣푐퐵 + 푧] = 0.
As we have shown that our main result does not hold in general in the traditional
type of incomplete markets where portfolio payoffs are restricted to a subspace. How-
ever, it is an open question whether the results extend to more interesting models of
incomplete markets in which there is a reason for the incompleteness. For example, a
market that is complete over states distinguished by security returns and incomplete
over other private states (see Dybvig (1992) or Chen and Dybvig (2009)). Another
type of incompleteness comes from a nonnegative wealth constraint (which is an im-
perfect solution to information problems when investors have private information or
choices related to default), which means agents have individual incompleteness and
cannot fully hedge future non-traded wealth or else they would violate the nonnega-
tive wealth constraint (see Dybvig and Liu (2009)).
3.6 Examples
In example 3.6.1, we illustrate our main result with specific distribution of 푐˜퐴, 푐˜퐵
and 휀˜. In this example, the nonnegative random variable 푧˜ can be chosen to be a
constant, and therefore from Corollary 3.1 in Section 3.3, the variance of the less risk
averse agent’s payoff is higher.
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Example 3.6.1 퐵 is weakly more risk averse than 퐴, 퐴 and 퐵 have the same
initial wealth 푤0 = 1 and the utility functions are as follows
푈퐴(푐˜) = −1
2
(4− 푐˜)2 , 푈퐵(푐˜) = −1
2
(3− 푐˜)2 ,
where 푐˜ < 4 for agent 퐴, and 푐˜ < 3 for agent퐵. We assume that the state price density
휌˜ is uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. The first-order conditions give us 푐˜퐴 = 4 − 휆퐴휌˜,
and 푐˜퐵 = 3−휆퐵휌˜. Because 퐸[휌˜] = 12 and 퐸[휌˜2] = 13 , the budget constraint 퐸[휌˜푐˜푖] = 1,
푖 = 퐴,퐵, implies that 휆퐴 = 3 and 휆퐵 =
3
2
. Therefore, 푐˜퐴 is uniformly distributed
in [1, 4] and 푐˜퐵 is uniformly distributed in
[
3
2
, 3
]
. We have 퐸[푐˜퐴] − 퐸[푐˜퐵] = 14 . Let
휀˜ have a Bernoulli distribution drawn independently of 푐˜퐵 with two equally possible
outcomes 3
4
and −3
4
. It is not difficult to see that 푐˜퐴 is distributed as 푐˜퐵+ 푧˜+ 휀˜ , where
푧˜ = 퐸[푐˜퐴]− 퐸[푐˜퐵] = 14 , and 휀˜ is independent of 푐˜퐵, which implies 퐸[휀˜∣푐퐵 + 푧] = 0.
Next, in example 3.6.2, we show that in general 푧˜ may not be chosen to be a con-
stant. Interestingly, the variance of the weakly less risk averse agent’s payoff can be
smaller than the variance of the weakly more risk averse agent’s payoff.
Example 3.6.2 퐵 is weakly more risk averse than 퐴, 퐴 and 퐵 have the same
initial wealth 푤0 = 1 and the utility functions are as follows
푈퐴(푐˜) = −(8− 푐˜)
3
3
, 푈퐵(푐˜) = −(8− 푐˜)
5
5
,
where 푐˜ < 8. The first-order conditions give us
푈 ′퐴(푐˜퐴) = (8− 푐˜퐴)2 = 휆퐴휌˜, 푈 ′퐵(푐˜퐵) = (8− 푐˜퐵)4 = 휆퐵휌˜. (3.29)
161
Therefore,
푐˜퐴 = 8−
√
휆퐴휌˜, 푐˜퐵 = 8− (휆퐵 휌˜)1/4. (3.30)
From (3.30), we get
푐˜퐴 = 8−
√
휆퐴
휆퐵
(8− 푐˜퐵)2. (3.31)
We have: 푐˜퐴 ≥ 푐˜퐵 iff 푐˜퐵 ≥ 8−
√
휆퐵
휆퐴
. From Theorem 3.3, we know that 푐˜퐴 ∼ 푐˜퐵+ 푧˜+ 휀˜,
where 푧˜ ≥ 0 and 퐸[휀˜∣푐퐵 + 푧] = 0. To find an example that the variance of the less
risk averse agent’s payoff can be smaller, we assume that 휌˜ has a discrete distri-
bution, 푖.푒., 휌1 = 휀 with probability
1
2
, 휌2 =
1
4
with probability 1
4
, and 휌3 =
1
2
with probability 1
4
. If 휀 is very tiny (close to zero), then from (3.30) and the bud-
get constraint 퐸[휌˜푐˜퐴] = 1. It is not difficult to compute 휆퐴 ≈ 17.5, 휆퐵 ≈ 125.8,
푐˜퐴 ≈ (8 5.91 5.045) and 푐˜퐵 ≈ (8 5.632 5.184). Therefore, 퐸[푐˜퐴] ≈ 6.73, 퐸[푐˜퐵] ≈ 6.70,
and 푉 푎푟(푐˜퐴) ≈ 1.684 < 푉 푎푟(푐˜퐵) ≈ 1.704, 푖.푒., the variance of the weakly more
risk averse agent’s payoff is higher. In this example, both agents’ utility functions
have increasing absolute risk aversion, which gets very high at the shared satiation
point 푐˜ = 8. In the high-consumption (low 휌˜), the optimal consumptions of agent
퐴 and 퐵 are both very close to 8. To have 퐸[푐˜퐴] > 퐸[푐˜퐵], 푧˜ is greater in the low-
consumption states. Therefore 푧˜ is large when 푐˜ is small and small when 푐˜ is large,
and thus 푧˜ is very negatively correlated with 푐˜퐵 + 휀˜. As noted in Section 3.3, we
know that if the non-negative random variable 푧˜ can be chosen to be a constant, then
푉 푎푟(푐˜퐴) = 푉 푎푟(푐˜퐵) + 푉 푎푟(휀˜) ≥ 푉 푎푟(푐˜퐵). Therefore, in this example, 푧˜ cannot be
chosen to be a constant.
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The next example shows that if the utility functions are not strictly concave, then
our main result does not hold.
Example 3.6.3 퐵 is weakly more risk averse than 퐴, 퐴 and 퐵 have the same initial
wealth 푤0 = 1 and the utility functions are 푈퐴(푐˜) = 푈퐵(푐˜) = 푐˜. We assume there are
two states with 휌1 =
1
2
with probability 1
3
, and 휌2 =
1
2
with probability 2
3
. It is not
difficult to see that 푐˜퐴 = (0, 3) and 푐˜퐵 = (4, 1) is an optimal consumption for agent
퐴 and 퐵 for 휆퐴 = 휆퐵 = 2. We have 퐸[푐˜퐴] = 퐸[푐˜퐵] = 2 and 푉 푎푟[푐˜퐴] = 푉 푎푟[푐˜퐵] = 2.
If 푐˜퐴 ∼ 푐˜퐵 + 푧˜ + 휀˜, where 푧˜ ≥ 0 and 퐸[휀˜∣푐퐵 + 푧] = 0, then 푧˜ = 0 and 휀˜ = 0, we
get 푐˜퐴 ∼ 푐˜퐵. Contradiction! So, we cannot have 푐˜퐴 ∼ 푐˜퐵 + 푧˜ + 휀˜, where 푧˜ ≥ 0 and
퐸[휀˜∣푐퐵 + 푧] = 0.
Example 3.6.3 is degenerate with constant 휌˜ and linear utility. It is not difficult to
construct a more general example (Example 3.6.4), where 휌˜ is random and the utility
function has two straight segments. The optimal portfolio is not unique on these two
straight segments taken together and therefore our payoff distributional result may
not hold.
Example 3.6.4 퐵 is weakly more risk averse than 퐴, 퐴 and 퐵 have the same
initial wealth 푤0 = 2 and the utility functions are as follows
푈퐴(푐˜) = 푈퐵(푐˜) =
⎧⎨
⎩
−(푐˜− 1)4 + 푐˜ 푐˜ < 1
푐˜ 1 ≤ 푐˜ ≤ 2
1
256
(푐˜4 − 16푐˜3 + 72푐˜2 + 128푐˜+ 80) 2 < 푐˜ < 6
1
2
푐˜+ 2 6 ≤ 푐˜ ≤ 14
1
2
푒−(푐˜−14) − 2푒−(푐˜−14)/2 + 9 푐˜ ≥ 14.
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In this example, the utility function has two straight segments and the optimal
portfolio is not unique on these two straight segments taken together. We assume
that 휌1 =
1
2
with probability 1
2
and 휌2 =
1
4
with probability 1
2
. Then, it is not difficult
to see that 푐˜퐴 = (2, 12) and 푐˜퐵 = (1, 14) is the optimal consumption for agent 퐴 and
퐵 for 휆퐴 = 휆퐵 = 2. So, while 퐴 is weakly less risk averse than 퐵 (their risk aversion
is equal everywhere), 푐˜퐴 is not distributed as 푐˜퐵+ 푧˜+ 휀˜ with 푧˜ ≥ 0 and 퐸[휀˜∣푐퐵+푧] = 0.
It is natural to think of the completeness in our model as coming from dynamic
trading in a continuous-time model. This is a good setting for seeing that our distri-
butional result holds even if it is hard to interpret what is happening with portfolio
weights. In the next example, we consider a continuous-time model with one-year
investment horizon. There are two assets: a locally riskless bond and a one-year risky
discount bond. We show that a very risk averse agent may invest all of his wealth
in the one-year risky discount bond while a less risk averse agent invests part of his
wealth in the locally riskless bond. Therefore, the comparative statics results in port-
folio weights do not hold in a continuous-time model with two assets. However, our
comparative statics results in the distribution of portfolio payoffs still hold.
Example 3.6.5 There are two assets that trade continuously: a locally riskless
bond and a one-year discount bond that is locally risky because the interest rate is
random. Agents are endowed with wealth 푤0 at time 0 and consume 푐˜ at time 1. Each
investor has constant relative risk aversion 푈(푐˜) = 푐˜
1−훾
1−훾 (or 푈(푐˜) = log(푐˜) if 훾 = 1),
and chooses a dynamic portfolio strategy to maximize 퐸[푈(푐˜)], where 푐˜ equals wealth
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at time 1. The interest rate follows the absolute12 Vasicek process 푑푟푡 = 휎푑푍푡, or
equivalently 푟푡 = 푟0 + 휎푍푡, where 푍푡 is a standard Wiener process. The state price
density is
휌˜푡 = 푒
− ∫ 푡0 (푟푠+ 12휅2)푑푠−
∫ 푡
0 휅푑푍푠 = 푒−푟0푡−
∫ 푡
0 (휅+휎(푡−푠))푑푍푠−휅
2
2
푡, (3.32)
where 휅 > 0 is the local Sharpe ratio. We have 휌˜1 = 푒
−푟0−
∫ 1
0
(휅+휎(1−푠))푑푍푠−휅22 . Agents’
problem is max푐˜퐸[
푐˜1−훾
1−훾 ], subject to the budget constraint 퐸[휌˜1푐˜] = 푤0.
The first order condition gives us 푐˜−훾 = 휆휌˜1. Substituting 푐˜ = (휆휌1)
− 1
훾 into the
budget constraint, we get
휆 = 푒−푟0(훾−1)−
휅2
2
(훾−1)+ 훾
2
(1− 1
훾
)2(휅2+휎
2
3
+휅휎).
Therefore, we have
푐˜ = 푒푟0+
1
2
휅2− 1
2
(1− 1
훾
)2(휅2+ 1
3
휎2+휅휎)+ 1
훾
∫ 1
0 (휅+휎(1−푠))푑푍푠 . (3.33)
Suppose that there are two agents 퐴 and 퐵 with risk aversion 훾퐴 and 훾퐵, with
훾퐴 < 훾퐵. For 푖 = 퐴,퐵, we have
log 푐˜푖 ∼ ln푁(푟0 + 1
2
휅2 − 1
2
(1− 1
훾푖
)2(휅2 +
1
3
휎2 + 휅휎),
1
훾2푖
(휅2 +
1
3
휎2 + 휅휎)). (3.34)
It is not difficult to show that 푐˜퐴 ∼ 푐˜퐵+푧˜+휀˜, where 푧˜ = 푐˜퐵
(
푒
( 1
훾퐴
− 1
훾퐵
)(휅2+ 1
3
휎2+휅휎) − 1
)
>
0, and
휀˜ = 푐˜퐵푒
( 1
훾퐴
− 1
훾퐵
)(휅2+ 1
3
휎2+휅휎)
(
푒
휂− 1
2
( 1
훾2
퐴
− 1
훾2
퐵
)(휅2+ 1
3
휎2+휅휎) − 1
)
,
where 휂 ∼ 푁
(
0, ( 1
훾2퐴
− 1
훾2퐵
)(휅2 + 1
3
휎2 + 휅휎)
)
and is drawn independently of 푐˜퐵. This
confirms our comparative statics result for the distribution of portfolio payoffs from
12A more complex Vasicek process with mean reversion gives similar results but the calculations
are more complex.
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Theorem 3.3. However, we next show that the comparative static result in portfolio
weights does not hold, 푖.푒., the more risk averse agent may invest more in the locally
risky bond.
Investor’s wealth at time 푡,
푊푡 = 퐸푡
[
휌˜1푐˜
휌˜푡
]
= 푓(푡)푒
∫ 푡
0 ((휅+휎(푡−푠))−(1− 1훾 )(휅+휎(1−푠)))푑푍푠 , (3.35)
where 푓(푡) = 푒푟0푡+
1
2
휅2푡− 1
2(1− 1훾 )
2
( 13휎2푡2−휎(휅+휎)푡+(휅+휎)2)푡. Using 퐼푡표′푠 Lemma, we get
푑푊푡
푊푡
=
(
푟푡 + 휅
(
휅−
(
1− 1
훾
)
(휅+ 휎(1− 푡))
))
푑푡
+
(
휅−
(
1− 1
훾
)
(휅+ 휎(1− 푡))
)
푑푍푡. (3.36)
The discount bond price at time 푡,
퐵푡 = 퐸푡
[
휌˜1
휌˜푡
]
= 푔(푡)푒
∫ 푡
0
휎(푡−1)푑푍푠 , (3.37)
where 푔(푡) = 푒−(푟0+
1
2
휅2)(1−푡)+ 1
6휎 ((휅+휎(1−푡))3−휅3). Using 퐼푡표′푠 Lemma, we have
푑퐵푡
퐵푡
= (푟푡 + 휅휎(푡− 1)) 푑푡+ 휎(푡− 1)푑푍푡. (3.38)
From (3.36) and (3.38), we get that the investor with risk aversion 훾 optimally invests
휅−
(
1− 1
훾
)
(휅 + 휎(1− 푡))
휎(푡− 1) = 1−
1
훾
(
1 +
휅
(1− 푡)휎
)
(3.39)
proportion of wealth in the risky discount bond. Therefore, the proportion of wealth
invested in the locally risky bond increases in investors’ risk aversion. It is useful to
consider the intuition in a limiting case when 휅 ↓ 0 and 훾퐵 ↑ ∞, with 훾퐴 = 1. In this
case, agent 퐴 with log utility holds approximately the locally riskless asset, because
166
log utility is myopic, and the agent does not invest much in the risky bond when
its local risk premium is small. The very risk averse agent 퐵 puts approximately
100% in the locally risky bond with a positive risk premium. This generates a nearly
riskless payoff at the end, which is what a very risk averse agent wants. This example
illustrates that although it is hard to get comparative statics results in portfolio
weights, our comparative statics result in the distribution of portfolio payoffs still
holds.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
Under some assumptions, Hart (1975) proved the impossibility of deriving general
comparative statics on how portfolio weights vary with risk aversion. We have proven
comparative statics results instead in the distribution of portfolio payoffs. Specifically,
in a complete market, we show that an agent who is less risk averse than another will
choose a portfolio whose payoff is distributed as the other’s payoff plus a nonnegative
random variable plus conditional-mean-zero noise. This result holds for any increasing
and strictly concave 퐶2 utility functions. If either agent has non-increasing absolute
risk aversion, then the non-negative random variable can be chosen to be a constant.
The non-increasing absolute risk aversion condition is sufficient but not necessary. We
also provide a counter-example showing that, in general, this non-negative random
variable cannot be chosen to be a constant.
We further prove a converse theorem. If in all complete markets the first agent
chooses a payoff that is distributed as the second’s payoff, plus a non-negative random
variable, plus conditional-mean-zero noise, then the first agent is less risk averse than
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the second agent. We also extend our main results to a multiple period model. Due
to shifts in the timing of consumption, agents’ optimal consumption at each date may
not be ordered when risk aversion changes. However, for agents with the same pure
rate of time preference, there is a natural weighting of probabilities across periods
that preserves the single-period result.
The optimal consumption may not be ordered for agents with different risk aver-
sion when agents’ utility functions are concave but not strictly concave as we have
shown in example 3.6.3 and 3.6.4. Intuitively, the problem is that even with identical
preferences, two different optimal consumptions may not be ordered. We conjecture
that there exists some canonical choice of optimal consumption for each agent that
extends our main results to weakly concave preferences. Our paper derives compar-
ative statics results in complete markets for agents with von Neumann-Morgenstern
preferences. Machina (1989) has shown that many previous comparative statics re-
sults generalize to the broader class of Machina preferences (Machina (1982)). Our
proofs do not generalize obviously to this class, but we conjecture that our results are
still true.
We also show that our main result still holds in a two-asset world with a risk-free
asset or more generally in a two-fund separation world with a risk-free asset. However,
our main result is not true in general with incomplete markets. We further provide
sufficient conditions under which our results still hold in a two-risky-asset world or a
world with two-fund separation.
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3.8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.1: By Pratt (1964), we have the concave transform characteri-
zation13 that there exists 퐺(⋅) ∈ 퐶2, such that
푈퐵(푐) = 퐺(푈퐴(푐)), (3.40)
where 퐺′(⋅) > 0 and 퐺′′(⋅) ≤ 0. Using the concave transform characterization of more
risk averse in (3.40), the first order condition (3.2) becomes
푈 ′퐴(푐˜퐴) = 휆퐴휌˜ =
휆퐴
휆퐵
휆퐵 휌˜ =
휆퐴
휆퐵
퐺′(푈퐴(푐˜퐵))푈
′
퐴(푐˜퐵). (3.41)
Because marginal utility is strictly decreasing, we have: if 퐺′ < 휆퐵
휆퐴
, then 푐˜퐴 >
푐˜퐵; if 퐺
′ = 휆퐵
휆퐴
, then 푐˜퐴 = 푐˜퐵; and if 퐺
′ > 휆퐵
휆퐴
, then 푐˜퐴 < 푐˜퐵. Choose 푐
∗ so that
퐺′(푈퐴(푐∗)) =
휆퐵
휆퐴
if possible, or pick 푐∗ = −∞ if 퐺′ < 휆퐵
휆퐴
everywhere or 푐∗ = +∞ if
퐺′ > 휆퐵
휆퐴
everywhere. If 푐˜퐵 ≥ 푐∗, then 퐺′(푈퐴(푐˜퐵)) ≤ 퐺′(푈퐴(푐∗)) = 휆퐵휆퐴 , 푖.푒., 퐺′ ≤
휆퐵
휆퐴
,
therefore, 푐˜퐴 ≥ 푐˜퐵. If 푐˜퐵 ≤ 푐∗, then 퐺′(푈퐴(푐˜퐵)) ≥ 퐺′(푈퐴(푐∗)) = 휆퐵휆퐴 , 푖.푒., 퐺′ ≥
휆퐵
휆퐴
,
therefore, 푐˜퐴 ≤ 푐˜퐵. This proves statement 1.
Now suppose that 퐴 and 퐵 have equal initial wealths, then the budget constraints
for the agents are that
퐸[휌˜푐˜퐴] = 퐸[휌˜푐˜퐵] = 푤0, (3.42)
therefore, we have 퐸[휌˜(푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵)] = 0. Since 휆퐵휌˜ = 푈 ′퐵(푐˜퐵) and 푈 ′′퐵 < 0, 휌˜ and 푐˜퐵 are
negatively monotonely related. Let 휌∗ ≡ 푈 ′퐵(푐∗)/휆퐵 > 0. Then 휌˜ ≥ 휌∗ ⇒ 푐˜퐴 ≤ 푐˜퐵
13This result can be obtained by defining 퐺(⋅) implicitly from (3.40) and using the implicit function
theorem to compute the derivatives of 퐺(⋅).
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and 휌˜ ≤ 휌∗ ⇒ 푐˜퐴 ≥ 푐˜퐵. Therefore, (휌˜− 휌∗)(푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵) ≤ 0 and we have
0 = 퐸[휌˜(푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵)] = 퐸[휌∗(푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵)] + 퐸[(휌˜− 휌∗)(푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵)] ≤ 휌∗퐸[푐˜퐴 − 푐˜퐵]. (3.43)
Therefore, 퐸[푐˜퐴] ≥ 퐸[푐˜퐵]. This proves statement 2. 푄.퐸.퐷.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: (Sufficiency) The monotonicity and concavity of the
function and Jensen’s inequality yield 퐸[푉 (푌˜ )] = 퐸[푉 (푋˜ − 푍˜ + 휀˜)] = 퐸[퐸[푉 (푋˜ −
푍˜ + 휀˜)∣푋,푍]] ≤ 퐸[푉 (푋˜ − 푍˜)] ≤ 퐸[푉 (푋˜)].
(Necessity) Let 휇1 be the distribution of −푋˜ , and let 휇2 be the distribution of −푌˜ .
From Theorem 9 of Strassen (1965),14 the following two statements are equivalent.
(i) For any concave nondecreasing function 푉 (푠),
∫
푉 (−푠)푑휇1(푠) ≥
∫
푉 (−푠)푑휇2(푠).
(ii) There exists a submartingale 휉˜푛 (푛 = 1, 2), 푖.푒., 퐸[휉˜2∣휉1] ≥ 휉˜1, such that the
distribution of 휉˜푛 is 휇푛.
Let 푍˜ ≡ 퐸[휉˜2∣휉1]− 휉˜1 and 휀˜ ≡ −휉˜2 + 퐸[휉˜2∣휉1], then (푖푖) implies that 푍˜ ≥ 0. Since
휉˜1 + 푍˜ = 퐸[휉˜2∣휉1], we have 퐸[휀˜∣휉1 + 푍] = 퐸[(−휉˜2 +퐸[휉˜2∣휉1])∣퐸[휉˜2∣휉1]] = 0. (푖) implies
퐸[푉 (푋˜)] ≥ 퐸[푉 (푌˜ )], and since 휉˜2 = 휉˜1 + (퐸[휉˜2∣휉1] − 휉˜1) + (휉˜2 − 퐸[휉˜2∣휉1]), we have
−푌˜ ∼ −푋˜ + 푍˜ − 휀˜, where 푍˜ ∼ 퐸[−푌˜ ∣ −푋 ] + 푋˜ ≥ 0 and 휀˜ ∼ 푌˜ + 퐸[−푌˜ ∣ −푋 ]. It
follows that 푌˜ ∼ 푋˜ − 푍˜ + 휀˜, where 푍˜ ≥ 0 and 퐸[휀˜∣푋 − 푍] = 0. 푄.퐸.퐷.
Proof of Theorem 3.2: The sufficiency follows directly from Jensen’s inequality.
The necessity can be proved using Theorem 8 in Strassen (1965). We prove it instead
14In applying Strassen’s result, we ignore 휉푛 for 푛 > 2. Formally, we set 휉푛 = 휉2 and 휇푛 = 휇2 for
all 푛 > 2.
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using Theorem 3.1 above. We have 퐸[푉 (푋˜)] ≥ 퐸[푉 (푌˜ )] for all concave function, and
in particular, 퐸[푉 (푋˜)] ≥ 퐸[푉 (푌˜ )] for all concave nondecreasing functions. Therefore,
by Theorem 3.1, 푌˜ ∼ 푋˜ − 푍˜1 + 휀˜1, where 푍˜1 ≥ 0 and 퐸[휀˜1∣푋 − 푍1] = 0. We have
퐸[푌˜ ] = 퐸[퐸[푌˜ ∣푋−푍1]] = 퐸[퐸[푋˜−푍˜1+ 휀˜1∣푋−푍1]] = 퐸[푋˜ ]−퐸[푍˜1] ≤ 퐸[푋˜ ]. (3.44)
Now 퐸[푉 (푋˜)] ≥ 퐸[푉 (푌˜ )] for all concave functions also implies 퐸[푉 (푋˜)] ≥ 퐸[푉 (푌˜ )]
for all concave nonincreasing functions, 푖.푒., 퐸[푉 (−푋˜)] ≥ 퐸[푉 (−푌˜ )] for all concave
nondecreasing functions. From Theorem 3.1, −푌˜ ∼ −푋˜−푍˜2+ 휀˜2 ⇒ 푌˜ ∼ 푋˜+푍˜2− 휀˜2,
where 푍˜2 ≥ 0, and 퐸[휀˜2∣푋 + 푍2] = 0. We have
퐸[푌˜ ] = 퐸[퐸[푌˜ ∣푋+푍2]] = 퐸[퐸[푋˜+푍˜2− 휀˜2∣푋+푍2]] = 퐸[푋˜ ]+퐸[푍˜2] ≥ 퐸[푋˜ ]. (3.45)
Therefore, 퐸[푋˜ ] = 퐸[푌˜ ], which implies 퐸[푍˜1] = 0. Since 푍˜1 ≥ 0, we must have
푍˜1 = 0. It follows that 푌˜ ∼ 푋˜ + 휀˜, where 퐸[휀˜∣푋 ] = 0. 푄.퐸.퐷.
Lemma 3.5 Suppose 퐵 is not weakly more risk averse than 퐴, then there exists
an bounded nondegenerate interval [푐1, 푐2] and hypothetical agents 퐴1 and 퐵1, such
that 퐴1 strictly more risk averse than 퐵1 (∀푐,−푈
′′
퐵1
(푐)
푈 ′퐵1
(푐)
< −푈
′′
퐴1
(푐)
푈 ′퐴1
(푐)
) and ∀푐 ∈ [푐1, 푐2],
푈퐴1(푐) = 푈퐴(푐) and 푈퐵1(푐) = 푈퐵(푐).
Proof of Lemma 3.5: If 퐵 is not weakly more risk averse than 퐴, then there exists
a constant 푐ˆ, such that −푈 ′′퐵(푐ˆ)
푈 ′퐵(푐ˆ)
< −푈 ′′퐴(푐ˆ)
푈 ′퐴(푐ˆ)
. Since 푈퐴 and 푈퐵 are of the class of 퐶
2
(see our assumptions in the beginning of Section 3.2), from the continuity of −푈 ′′푖 (푐)
푈 ′푖(푐)
,
where 푖 = 퐴,퐵, we get that there exists an interval 푅퐴 containing 푐ˆ, 푠.푡., ∀푐 ∈ 푅퐴,
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−푈 ′′퐵(푐)
푈 ′퐵(푐)
< −푈 ′′퐴(푐)
푈 ′퐴(푐)
. We pick 푐1, 푐2 ∈ 푅퐴 with 푐1 < 푐2. Now, let
푈퐴1(푐) =
⎧⎨
⎩
푎1 −푚1 exp(푈
′′
퐴(푐1)
푈 ′퐴(푐1)
푐) 푐 < 푐1
푈퐴(푐) 푐1 ≤ 푐 ≤ 푐2
푎2 −푚2 exp(푈
′′
퐴(푐2)
푈 ′퐴(푐2)
푐) 푐 > 푐2,
and let
푈퐵1(푐) =
⎧⎨
⎩
푏1 − 푛1 exp(푈
′′
퐵(푐1)
푈 ′퐵(푐1)
푐) 푐 < 푐1
푈퐵(푐) 푐1 ≤ 푐 ≤ 푐2
푏2 − 푛2 exp(푈
′′
퐵(푐2)
푈 ′퐵(푐2)
푐) 푐 > 푐2,
where 푎푗 and 푚푗 (푗 = 1, 2) are determined by the continuity and smoothness of
푈퐴1(푐), and 푏푗 and 푛푗 (푗 = 1, 2) are determined by the continuity and smoothness of
푈퐵1(푐). More specifically, for 푗 = 1, 2, we have
푚푗 = −(푈
′
퐴(푐푗))
2
푈 ′′퐴(푐푗)
exp
(
−푈
′′
퐴(푐푗)
푈 ′퐴(푐푗)
푐푗
)
, 푎푗 = 푚푗 exp
(
푈 ′′퐴(푐푗)
푈 ′퐴(푐푗)
푐푗
)
+ 푈퐴(푐푗), (3.46)
and
푛푗 = −(푈
′
퐵(푐푗))
2
푈 ′′퐵(푐푗)
exp
(
−푈
′′
퐵(푐푗)
푈 ′퐵(푐푗)
푐푗
)
, 푏푗 = 푛푗 exp
(
푈 ′′퐵(푐푗)
푈 ′퐵(푐푗)
푐푗
)
+ 푈퐵(푐푗). (3.47)
Now, 푈퐴1(푐) is in the class of 퐶
2 since from (3.46), we have:
−푚푗 exp
(
푈 ′′퐴(푐푗)
푈 ′퐴(푐푗)
푐푗
)(
푈 ′′퐴(푐푗)
푈 ′퐴(푐푗)
)2
= 푈 ′′퐴(푐푗),
푖.푒., 푈퐴1 is twice differentiable. Similarly, we can show that 푈퐵1(푐) is also in the class
of 퐶2. Also, we have 푈 ′′퐴1(푐) < 0, 푈
′′
퐵1
(푐) < 0, and ∀푐, −푈
′′
퐵1
(푐)
푈 ′퐵1
(푐)
< −푈
′′
퐴1
(푐)
푈 ′퐴1
(푐)
, 푖.푒., agent
퐴1 is more risk averse than 퐵1. 푄.퐸.퐷.
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Lemma 3.6 Suppose 퐵 is strictly more risk averse than 퐴 (∀푐,−푈 ′′퐴(푐)
푈 ′퐴(푐)
< −푈 ′′퐵(푐)
푈 ′퐵(푐)
),
and 퐴 and 퐵 have equal initial wealths. 퐴 has an optimal choice 푐˜퐴, and 퐵 has an
optimal choice 푐˜퐵. We assume that the state price density 휌˜ is not a constant. Then,
we have
1. 푐˜퐴 ∕= 푐˜퐵;
2. if 푐˜퐴 has a bounded support [푐1, 푐2], then we have sup 푐˜퐴 ≥ sup 푐˜퐵, and inf 푐˜퐴 ≤
inf 푐˜퐵.
Proof of Lemma 3.6: We first prove statement 1 by contradiction. If 푐˜퐴 = 푐˜퐵,
then we pick any two points, for example, 푐3, 푐4 (푐3 < 푐4) in the support of both 푐˜퐴
and 푐˜퐵. From the first order conditions, we get:
푈 ′퐴(푐3)
푈 ′퐴(푐4)
=
푈 ′퐵(푐3)
푈 ′퐵(푐4)
, 푖.푒.,
푈 ′퐴(푐3)
푈 ′퐵(푐3)
=
푈 ′퐴(푐4)
푈 ′퐵(푐4)
.
However, from −푈 ′′퐴(푐)
푈 ′퐴(푐)
< −푈 ′′퐵(푐)
푈 ′퐵(푐)
, we have: 푑
푑푐
(
log
푈 ′퐵(푐)
푈 ′퐴(푐)
)
< 0, 푖.푒.,
푈 ′퐵(푐)
푈 ′퐴(푐)
decreases in
푐. We have:
푈 ′퐵(푐3)
푈 ′퐴(푐3)
>
푈 ′퐵(푐4)
푈 ′퐴(푐4)
. Contradiction! So, 푐˜퐴 ∕= 푐˜퐵.
Since 퐵 is more risk averse than 퐴, from Lemma 3.1, we know that there exists
푐∗, such that 푐˜퐴 ≥ 푐˜퐵 when 푐˜퐵 ≥ 푐∗, and 푐˜퐴 ≤ 푐˜퐵 when 푐˜퐵 ≤ 푐∗. And we have
푐∗ ∈ [푐1, 푐2], or else either 푐˜퐴 ≤ 푐˜퐵 but 푐˜퐴 ∕= 푐˜퐵 or 푐˜퐴 ≥ 푐˜퐵 but 푐˜퐴 ∕= 푐˜퐵 and both
could not satisfy the budget constraint (퐸[휌˜푐˜퐴] = 퐸[휌˜푐˜퐵] = 푤0). Therefore, 푐˜퐴 has a
wider range of support than that of 푐˜퐵. 푄.퐸.퐷.
173
Bibliography
[1] Arrow, Kenneth J. (1965) Aspects of the Theory of Risk-Bearing Helsinki: Yrjo
Jahnssonin Saatio.
[2] Arrow, Kenneth J. (1971) The Theory of Risk Aversion Chapter 3 in Essays in
the Theory of Risk Bearing. New York: American Elsevier, 1971.
[3] Cass, David, and Joeseph E. Stiglitz (1970) The Structure of Investor Preferences
and Asset Returns, and Separability in Portfolio Allocation: A Contribution to the
Pure Theory of Mutual Funds. Journal of Economic Theory 2, 122-160.
[4] Dybvig, P. (1992) Hedging Nontraded Wealth: When is there Separation of
Hedging and Investment? in Hodges, S. D. (Ed) Options: Recent Advances in
Theory and Practice 2, 1992, Manchester University Press.
[5] Dybvig P. and Chen A. (2009) Optimal Casualty Insurance, Repair, and Regula-
tion in the Presence of a Securities Market. Working Paper.
[6] Dybvig P. and Ingersoll J. (1982) Mean-variance Theory in Complete Markets.
ournal of Business 55, 1982, 233-251.
[7] Dybvig P. and Liu H. (2010) Lifetime Consumption and Investment:Retirement
and Constrained Borrowing. Journal of Economic Theory 145, 885-907.
[8] Hadar, J., and W.R. Russell (1969) Rules for Ordering Uncertain Prospects.
American Economic Review 59, 25-34.
174
[9] Hart, O. (1975) Some negative results on the existence of comparative static
results in portfolio theory. Review of Economic Studies, 42, 615-622.
[10] Hanoch, Giora, and Haim Levy (1970) Relative Effectiveness of E.fficiency Cri-
teriz for Portfolio Selection. Jounal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 5:63-76.
[11] Kihlstrom, Richard E., David Romer, and Steve Williams (1981) Risk Aversion
with Random Initial Wealth. Econometrica 49, 911-920.
[12] Machina, Mark (1982) Expected Utility Analysis without the Independence
Axiom. Econometrica, March, 1982.
[13] Machina, Mark (1989) Comparative Statics and Non-Expected Utility Prefer-
ences. Journal of Economic Theory, April, 1989.
[14] Machina, Mark, and Michael Rothschild. (2008) Risk. In the New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics, 2nd ed., edited by Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E.
Blume. London: Macmillan.
[15] Pratt, John W. (1964) Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large. Econometrica
32, 122-136.
[16] R. Tyrrell Rockafellar (1970) Convex Analysis. Princeton University Press.
[17] Ross, Stephen A. (1971) Risk and Efficiency. Discussion Paper No. 196
[18] Ross, Stephen A. (1978) Mutual Fund Separation in Financial Theory-The Sep-
arating Distributions. Journal of Economic Theory 17, 254-286
[19] Ross, Stephen A. (1981) Some Stronger Measures of Risk Aversion in the Small
and the Large with Applications. Econometrica 49, 621-638.
175
[20] Rothschild, M. and J.E. Stiglitz (1970) Increasing Risk: I. A. Definition. Journal
of Economic Theory Vol.2, No.3.
[21] Rothschild, M. and J.E. Stiglitz (1972) Addendum to “Increasing Risk: I. A.
Definition”. Journal of Economic Theory 5, 306
[22] V. Strassen (1965) The Existence of Probability Measures With Given Marginals.
The Annals of Mathematical Statistics. 36, 423-439.
176
